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Abstract
Attribute-based credentials (ABCs) provide a new way to authenticate using se-
lectively disclosed personal attributes, possibly without identification. Smart-card
technology has now become sufficiently advanced to implement and deploy ABCs.
This thesis focusses on the cryptographic and broader technical challenges of ap-
plying ABCs in identity management, both online and offline.
X
Chapter 2 discusses identity management technologies. We show that many
security, privacy and usability issues are present. In our view the main reasons for
these problems are the legacy of traditional identitymanagement, having its origin
in centralised organisations, and the ubiquity of ad hoc solutions devised in the
ever expanding digital world. In a more general sense, the main problem seems to
stem from the lack of an identitymeta-layer and from the overspill of personal data
processed by a great number of systems. We put forward recommendations about
how to ameliorate this identity crisis and what research directions are ahead of us
in this context.
The cryptographic techniques of ABCs provide a novel approach in authentica-
tion, one of themain functions within identitymanagement: Personal information
can be proven without identification. Chapter 3 provides a description and com-
parison of the two major ABC technologies, U-Prove and Idemix. In such a sys-
tem there are two main procedures. In the issuing procedure an issuer (or identity
provider) provisions an attribute-based credential to the user, and in the verifica-
tion procedure the user selectively discloses the necessary attributes from already
existing credentials to a service provider (aka a verifier). A smart card is a suit-
able choice for carrying credentials related to a user since it is secure, personal and
stays under the user’s control. Furthermore, as recent efficient implementation re-
sults show, the smart-card technology is now ready for performing all the necessary
computation for ABCs. We call a card with such an ABC implementation an ABC
card.
Since attributes are not necessarily identifiable, verification can be completely
anonymous. This offers unprecedented privacy for the user. However, the com-
munication between an ABC card and a verifier should be secured to make sure
that an adversary cannot eavesdrop on disclosed attributes. Chapter 4 studies this
problem. The main challenge lies in the fact that mutual authentication is requi-
red for setting up a secure channel, while an ABC card remains anonymous. We
introduce therefore a credential that proves validity of an ABC card without revea-
ling any identifying information. Such a credential is issued only to verified cards,
and then this validity can be checked by verifiers and used for bootstrapping trust
(without identification). We offer two different solutions for establishing a secure
channel. Both of them have different properties in terms of efficiency and privacy.
In particular, one scheme is more efficient, the other one provides privacy not only
for the ABC card but also for the verifier. This latter functionality gives rise to po-
tentially new applications in which the verifier also needs privacy.
Another approach to provide confidentiality for selectively disclosed attributes
may be required when a personal device or the infrastructure is not suitable for es-
tablishing a secure channel. ABCs can also be implemented on RFID tags, which
typically communicate with the tag reader (acting as a verifier) in a simpler way
without the possibility to set up a secure channel. Chapter 5 explores this chal-
lenge. We give a solution in which the prover (RFID tag) ‘wraps’ the selective dis-
closure proof using the public key of a verifier in a way that only this designated ve-
rifier can open and retrieve the disclosed attributes along with the corresponding
proof. A relatively small change in the verification protocol suffices on the tag’s
side. However, a modification in the infrastructure is necessary: instead of creden-
tial signatures an authentic database is used for valid tag identifiers. The technique
offers further cryptographic potential in hiding a statement together with a zero-
knowledge proof that it proves; this can be called a ‘zero-knowledge proof with
statement recovery’ referring to the conceptual similarity with a digital signature
with message recovery.
Chapter 6 describes a new paradigm in identity management based on attribu-
tes. Our starting point is the given cryptographic ABC techniques, the ABC cards
and the secure communication required in practice. While designing such an iden-
tity management system, one encounters many questions and possible solutions.
To provide security, privacy and transparency in attribute-based identity manage-
ment, we need to introduce new concepts, including credential design, a scheme
manager, a card management application. Furthermore, to motivate the need for
this technology, we describe several use cases from very simple proofs (like, over
18), through a secure login process, to a privacy-friendly authorisation with mul-
tiple attributes (like anonymous membership and age verification) and to the is-
suance of a new credential based on attributes already present on the ABC card.
Finally, in order to set up such a new system, we need to outline a secure card pro-
visioning process that preserves user privacy for thewhole life-time of an ABCcard.
Although there are some open challenges (e.g. a privacy-friendly and efficient re-
vocation solution, an implementation of increased security level), attribute-based
identity management is becoming practical.
Ultimately, some exciting questions are yet to be answered in the near future.
What approach canmake secure, privacy-friendly anduser-centred attribute-based
identity management widely used? Will a top-down or a bottom-up approach suc-
ceed? What will the killer application be: a national identity infrastructure, a loyalty
system, extended enterprise identitymanagement or somenovel business applica-
tion?

Samenvatting
Attribuutgebaseerde credentials (ABCs) bieden eennieuwemanier van authentice-
ren door het selectief onthullen van persoonlijke attributen, zonder daarbij nood-
zakelijkerwijs de gebruiker te identificeren. Chipkaarttechnologie is inmiddels vol-
doende geavanceerd om ABCs te implementeren en in te zetten. Dit proefschrift
concentreert zich op de cryptografische en bredere technische uitdagingen van het
toepassen van ABCs in identiteitsbeheer, zowel online als offline.
X
Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt identiteitsbeheer-technologieën. We laten zien dat be-
veiligings-, privacy- enbruikbaarheidskwestieshierin de overhandhebben. In onze
optiek zijn de hoofdoorzaken hiervan de nalatenschap van traditioneel identiteits-
beheer, ontstaan in centralistische organisaties, en de alomvertegenwoordige ad
hoc oplossingen die zijn ontworpen in een zich continue uitbreidende digitale we-
reld. In meer algemene zin lijken de problemen te liggen in het gebrek aan een
identiteitsmetalaag en aan het onnodig opslaan en verwerken van persoonlijke
data door een groot aantal systemen. We doen aanbevelingen over hoe deze identi-
teitscrisis beteugeld kan worden en welke onderzoeksrichtingen er voor ons in het
verschiet liggen in deze context.
De cryptografische technieken van ABC bieden een nieuwe aanpak voor au-
thenticatie, een van de hoofdfunctionaliteiten binnen identiteitsbeheer: de cor-
rectheid aantonen van persoonlijke informatie zonder identificatie. Hoofdstuk 3
beschrijft en vergelijkt de twee voornaamste ABC technologieën: U-Prove en Ide-
mix. In eendergelijk systeemzijn er tweehoofdprocedures. In de uitgeef procedure
voorziet een uitgever (Engels: issuer) de gebruiker van een attribuutgebaseerd cre-
dential. In de verificatieprocedure onthult de gebruiker selectief de noodzakelijke
attributen van een reeds bestaand credential aan een dienstverlener (of contro-
leur). Een chipkaart is een geschikte drager voor aan een gebruiker gerelateerde
credentials omdat het veilig en persoonlijk is en onder de controle van de gebrui-
ker blijft. Bovendien tonen recente efficiënte implementaties aan dat chipkaart-
technologie ondertussen klaar is voor het uitvoeren van alle voor ABCs benodigde
berekeningen. We noemen een chipkaart met een dergelijke ABC implementatie
een ABC kaart.
Omdat attributen niet noodzakelijkerwijs identificeerbaar zijn, kan de controle
ervan volledig anoniem plaats vinden. Dit biedt ongekende privacy voor de gebrui-
ker. Echter, de communicatie tussen een ABC kaart en een controleur moet bevei-
ligd worden om te voorkomendat een tegenstander (Engels: adversary) de selectief
onthulde attributen af kan luisteren. Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert dit probleem. De pri-
maire uitdaging ligt in het feit dat wederzijdse authenticatie nodig is om een veilig
kanaal op te zetten, terwijl de ABC kaart anoniem moet blijven. Daarom introdu-
ceren we een apart credential op de ABC kaart waarmee de geldigheid van de kaart
kan worden aangetoond zonder (de kaart) te identificeren. Dit credential wordt
alleen uitgegeven aan geverifiëerde kaarten binnen een specifiek systeem. Hierna
kan deze geldigheid geverifiëerd worden door de controleur en gebruikt worden
als fundering voor de daaropvolgende veilige communicatie. We bieden twee ver-
schillende oplossingen voor het opzetten van een veilig kanaal. Beide hebben ver-
schillende eigenschappen in termen van efficiëntie en privacy; in het bijzonder is
de ene oplossing efficiënter, terwijl de andere niet alleen privacy biedt voor de ABC
kaart, maar ook voor de controleur. Deze laatste functionaliteit maakt nieuwe toe-
passingen mogelijk waarin ook voor de controleur privacy een vereiste is.
Wanneer een persoonlijk apparaat of de infrastructuur niet geschikt is voor het
opzetten van een veilig kanaal is een andere aanpak nodig om de selectief ont-
hulde attributen geheim te houden. ABCs kunnen ook geïmplementeerd worden
op RFID-tags. Deze tags communiceren normaal gesproken op een eenvoudigere
maniermet de taglezer (met de rol van controleur), zonder dat daarbij demogelijk-
heid bestaat om een veilig kanaal op te zetten. Hoofdstuk 5 verkent deze uitdaging.
We presenteren een oplossing waarin de bewijzer (de RFID-tag) het selectiefont-
hullingsbewijs zodanig verpakt met behulp van de publieke sleutel van een con-
troleur dat alleen deze aangewezen controleur de onthulde attributen en het bij-
behorende bewijs kan terughalen. Een relatief kleine aanpassing in de verificatie
procedure volstaat aan de kant van de tag. Echter, er is ook een wijziging in de in-
frastructuur nodig: in plaats van handtekeningen op credentials moet er gebruikt
gemaakt worden van een authentieke database die de nog geldige tagidentificatie-
nummers bevat. Deze techniek is daarnaast cryptografisch interessant omdat het
zowel de uitspraak als het zero-knowledge bewijs dat deze uitspraak bewijst ver-
bergt; dit kan een ‘zero-knowledge bewijs met uitspraakterugwinning’ genoemd
worden, verwijzend naar het vergelijkbare concept van een ‘digitale handtekening
met berichtterugwinning’ (Engels: message recovery).
Hoofdstuk 6 beschrijft een nieuw paradigma in identiteitsbeheer dat is geba-
seerd op attributen. Ons beginpunt wordt gevormd door de cryptografische ABC
technieken, de ABC kaart en het in de praktijk benodigde veilige communicatie-
kanaal. Bij het ontwerpen van een dergelijk identiteitsbeheersysteem komt men
vele vragen enmogelijke oplossingen tegen. Om veiligheid, privacy en transparan-
tie te bewerkstelligen in attribuutgebaseerd identiteitsbeheer moeten we nieuwe
concepten introduceren, waaronder credential ontwerp, een schema beheerder en
een kaartbeheerapplicatie. Daarnaast beschrijven we, om de noodzaak van deze
technologie te motiveren, een aantal usecases. Deze usecases variëren van zeer
eenvoudige bewijzen (zoals ouder dan 18), via een veilige inlogmethode, tot pri-
vacyvriendelijke authorisatie met behulp van meerdere attributen (zoals anoniem
lidmaatschap en leeftijdsverificatie) en het uitgeven van een nieuw credential ge-
baseerd op attributen die reeds op de ABC kaart staan. Tot slot moeten we, ten
einde eendergelijk nieuw systeemop te zetten, een veilig kaartuitgifteproces schet-
sen dat de privacy van de gebruiker garandeert gedurende de gehele levensduur
van een ABC kaart. Hoewel er nog een aantal uitdagingen zijn (zoals privacyvrien-
delijke en efficiënte revocatie, en het implementeren van een verhoogd veiligheids-
niveau), wordt attribuutgebaseerd identiteitsbeheer in de praktijk haalbaar.
Uiteindelijk moeten een aantal spannende vragen in de nabije toekomst nog
beantwoord worden. Welke aanpak kan zorgen voor een brede adoptie van veilig,
privacyvriendelijk attribuutgebaseerd identiteitsbeheer waarin de gebruiker cen-
traal staat? Zal een top-down of een bottom-up aanpak succesvol zijn? Wat zal
de killer-applicatie worden? Een nationale identititeitsinfrastruuctuur, een loya-
liteitssysteem, uitgebreid enterprise identiteitsbeheer of een vernieuwende com-
merciële toepassing?
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Preface
“The river is everywhere.”
Hermann Hesse, Siddhartha
I spent the first two years of my PhD project mostly at TNO, an applied scientificresearch institute in The Netherlands. It was then that I realised how different
industrial and academic research are. I have to confess that to come to this revela-
tion was not easy. The two fields use very similar terminology and often definitions
are alike. But the goals are far apart. For instance, ‘privacy’ for business partici-
pants, and thus for industrial research, means a particular set of regulations that
they have to satisfy; it’s basically a hindrance. For the academia, however, ‘privacy’
is one of the main values in a modern society that in the ever digitising world we
have to safeguard as much as possible. As a consequence of this difference, re-
search takes very different directions. A ‘privacy tool’, for example, that has to be
developed for industry would aim at analysing the current state in terms of pri-
vacy at a company, relating it to the regulations and providing concrete guidance
how tomeet the requirements not yet satisfied. The same term ‘privacy tool’ in the
academic world would most likely trigger a research project that helps individuals
analyse and manage all the personal data that they use in transactions with other
parties.
It is not only the approaches that are different. Industrial research focusses on
standards, off-the-shelf products and fast deployment. They generally know lit-
tle about what is happening in academia. On the other hand, academic research
addresses challenging problems arising within their own community. Attribute-
based (or anonymous) credentials and their important privacy features, as an ex-
ample, are essentially unknown to the industrial research community, while aca-
demic research considers it, having been around for a decade and a half, almost
a commonplace. Even in an industrial or governmental context, identity manage-
ment couldwidely use ABCs, but enterprise identitymanagement and related tech-
nologies (X509, SAML, LDAP, Kerberos, etc.) are easily available and the privacy
concerns when such solutions employed are very different, as mentioned above.
There are no standards, off-the-shelf implementations, best practices, hence non-
academic research does not consider ABCs as a viable choice.
One can argue that applied research, in contrast with pure research, is tailored
to fill this gap. Butmy experience is that the applied side from a pure perspective is
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still far away from a more theoretical project in industrial research. Therefore, we
have to build bridges and bring the two communities closer and closer.
In my view an evidence for this niche inmy field is the launch of the Real World
Cryptography workshop, started in 2011.1 Its growing success has shown that there
is an increasing interest towards this bridge from both academy as well as compa-
nies. The latter can offer problems (and open positions), applied research can find
quick solutions and/or developmodelswith solutions, and ultimately academic re-
search can find new challenges, carry out fundamental research and establish new
concepts or even research fields.
The current thesis is a summary ofmy experiences and contributions during the
four years of my PhD project. It intends to build bridges in several different senses:
between business and academia, between written protocols and efficient imple-
mentations, between a full cryptographic description and an up-and-running sys-
tem.
These four years were an incredible journey for me. Identity management was
the main topic of my research, but in a sense to learn my own identity was at least
as hard as the work. After so many years of my childhood, my study period and –
unlike for most PhD students – myworking years (including my own company and
teaching), I was able to spend many hours on working on myself. I had to find my
past, present and future, my strengths and weaknesses, and I had to make friends
with all of them. Or even better said, I had to build bridges also within myself.
1First it was organised by the Newton Institute at CambridgeUniversity in the UK as one of the trib-
ute events to Alan Turing on the 100th anniversary of his birthday; see http://www.realworldcrypto.
com [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
Chapter 1
Introduction
“Those who surrender freedom for
security will not have, nor do they
deserve, either one.”
Benjamin Franklin
We live in an information-driven society. Information is power and informa-tion has business value. Personal data, an important type of information,
has a special role in society on an individual and on a social level. The collection of
personal information is ubiquitous.
As a PhD student I had the chance to travel a lot by airplane, so I pick that as
an example – with some simplification, e.g. no visa or ESTA – to illustrate this ubiq-
uity. Here’s how it goes from booking to taking off. After selecting the appropriate
flight on an airline’s web site, you purchase the ticket online. You have to give ex-
plicitly your name and other personal details and possibly your loyalty number to
collect points and get some extra service or discount, while implicitly you give fur-
ther information by means of cookies stored on your computer. The airline com-
pany sends you a confirmation e-mail that also serves as a ticket. It contains most
details you gave during booking, including the exact dates of your trip. Often you
get a reminder a few days before the travelling date about what you have to re-
member to bring. This message frequently contains ads and promotions about
accommodations and other services at the destination. When you arrive at the air-
port on the day of departure, there is an abundant amount of information flowing
about and around you. You are recorded on security cameras. Using your ticket
and your passport, you check in your luggage and you receive your boarding pass.
You go through the security check, including body scan. When you settle down
in the waiting area, you might post a message on Facebook using your mobile to
let your friends know how thrilled you are to fly wherever you go, and – since the
timemoves slowly – you entertain yourself by checking what others posted on your
wall. Finally, while you’re boarding the plane, you show and possibly let scan your
boarding pass and your passport. Here you are, sitting on the plane, ready for the
flight.
This simple example shows how intermingled our life has become with infor-
mation. Personal information, in particular, that we release on purpose, implicitly
or perhaps involuntarily. What you post on Facebook you do want your friends to
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know about; you do that intentionally. By buying a ticket and travelling with it,
you know that your personal details are processed by the airline company and the
airport staff, even though you may not think about it. There is an underlying con-
tract with terms of conditions that legally drives the business process, and which
you have approved by one of your clicks while purchasing the ticket. But there
may be several parties that have learnt information about you that you did not
intend. Google, if you are using Gmail and thus sending all your booking details
through the USA, scans your e-mail for keywords based on which you are provided
advertisements. Facebook’s employees and the system administrators of your e-
mail provider can possibly see what you have written and received as responses.
(For instance, they knowwhen you are not at homewhile travelling.) Moreover, the
airline company may use some of the information you gave to improve the profile
they store about you. And of course security systems at the airport store your face
and your gait.
Privacy in an information-driven society is under threat. Homeland security
and criminal investigations argue for surveillance and for increasingly extensive
knowledge about individuals. Companies, providing free services on the Internet,
need revenue and they build their business models on collecting personal details,
constructing individual profiles and selling well-targeted advertisements.
Privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) aim to design applications that sup-
port privacy while preserving the application’s most important functions. The de-
sign process of a PET includes the collection of security, privacy and functional
requirements, and the development of a tool that satisfies those. The tool often
involves cryptographic techniques that can achieve sometimes intuitively contra-
dicting goals. Using PETs, security and privacy are not necessarily a trade-off, both
can be reached simultaneously.
We acknowledge that the collection and the processing of personal data are of-
ten required to achieve certain goals. But is it always necessary? And if it is, is it
necessary to such an extent as we experience now? The data minimisation princi-
ple states that only those personal details should be collected that are strictly nec-
essary to perform the desired functionality. There are other important principles
– such as, transparency, free and informed consent, ensuring data security mea-
sures, purpose limitation – in the context of digital privacy. Nonetheless, in this
thesis we primarily focus on data minimisation in relation to authentic personal
data. As little data should be revealed as possible because personal information
that has already been collected and is thus processed by other parties, is difficult
to control for multiple reasons. First of all, you have, in general, no or just limited
access to data stored at other parties. Second, stored information gets easily du-
plicated and forwarded, making control evenmore difficult. Finally, although legal
restrictions apply, they are often controversial and they are hard to enforce.
Authentic data is information verifiably asserted by an entity. In person, the
authenticity of an assertion is often implicit: If I assert something to you and you
see me saying it, then it is clearly asserted by me. However, if you see a document
3signed by me, the only way for you to verify that it holds my (handwritten) sig-
nature is to have prior knowledge of my authentic signature to compare with the
one on the document. Also in electronic communication the verification of ori-
gin requires some prior knowledge. An electronic signature is bound to a piece of
information and an entity’s (cryptographic) public key. Anyone who knows the in-
formation and the public key should be able to verify the signature; however, only
this entity should be able to produce it. So, authenticity of data can be confirmed
by verifying the signature on the data through an entity’s public key. Of course, this
requires the knowledge of this public key and its unique relation to the given entity.
This relation is asserted by a trusted party, the Certificate Authority, in the form of
a public-key certificate.
What can go wrong when using conventional (non-PET) digital tools? A pass-
port, for instance, is typically issued by a national government administration and
meant to be verified at the border control and by the staff at airports. A biometric
passport includes a chip carrying the same personal details of its holder as those
printed in the document. Therefore, such a passport enables not only physical
but also electronic verification. This increases the speed and reliability of authen-
ticating the holder’s identity and the stored data, and makes it possible to check
efficiently that the present identity document is not on a blacklist of revoked pass-
ports. But electronic processing of these data also enables to store information
about passengers. There is no user control in place in this respect. All the data ex-
tracted from the chip can also be stored at the verifier.2 If we compare this with
traditional, paper passport verification, there is a big difference. Unlike the old
process, not only eligibility is checked – e.g. to cross a border – but also activities of
citizens can be stored, linked and possibly traced. Furthermore, we may not trust
verifiers equally. A verifier can be the border guard authorities, but also a whisky
shop checking that a customer is older than 18 years old.
One important PET is the technology of Attribute-Based Credentials (ABCs).
This technology allows the construction of electronic documents resembling a pass-
port, an airline ticket or a boarding pass. Their authenticity can be confirmed: Each
of these credentials are issued by someofficial entity and, knowing the entity’s pub-
lic key, anyone can verify the authenticity of the information in them.
ABCs can provide an elegant solution without the drawbacks described above.
If an electronic passport was implemented as an ABC, the user could reveal differ-
ent pieces of information from the same credential by using the so-called selective
disclosure functionality. A border guard may see all attributes from the passport,
while a shop assistant only gets to see the customer’s date of birth, or even just the
fact that the customer is over 18.
Attribute-Based Credentials are not new. The technology was proposed more
than a decade ago [Bra00, Ver01, CL01, ?]. What is new is that smart-card tech-
2Why not store it when storage is cheap and the personal information may turn out to be useful in
the future? This latter way of thinking can lead to a so-called function creepwhen data are used for other
purposes than the ones they were collected for.
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nology has improved so much that now their chips can perform all required cryp-
tographic computations. Consequently, we can think of a system in which each
user has such a card, an ABC card, working like a wallet. It can carry independent
credentials, such as an identity card, a bank card and loyalty cards. When using
these credentials, one can disclose personal information, or attributes, selectively
from them as mentioned above. Many of these attributes are not identifying, in
fact they can be completely anonymous, such as ‘the residence of city ...’ or
‘over 18’.
Moreover, ABCs preserve favourable properties of the human verification of a
paper document. When you are showing your passport at the border control or in
a shop, the government agency that issued it does not know that you are using it
right now. Also, if you use your passport in two different shops to prove that you
are over 18, they cannot link these activities.3 Similarly, if you used an ABCpassport
you could satisfy the same requirements digitally: issuing unlinkability andmulti-
show unlinkability. Provided that you use only anonymous attributes, the issuer
cannot relate the use of your passport to its issuing instance. Neither can shops
link your anonymous activities to each other.
These properties have special importance on the Internet when you intend to
access some application or service online. To do that, you often need to ‘prove’
something about yourself. To sign in to a web site, you need to prove that you own
a username. This is usually done by typing and sending your password. Another
example is when you have to prove that you are over 18 years old. Currently, there
are two solutions for that; both of them are poor for different reasons. First, you
have to click on a button on the web site “I’m over 18” – this clearly provides no
assurance to the service provider. A second solution to prove that you are over
18 is that you have to log in to a system in which you have already registered and
supplied evidence about your age. Having identified you, the service provider can
check your record in its own database. In this process it learns not only that you
are over 18 but also who you are. This clearly contradicts the data minimisation
principle and thus it is not privacy friendly.4 Not only your age but for instance
membership would also be desirable to be provenwithout revealing any other per-
sonal information.
Identity management (IDM) has been developed in enterprises and universi-
ties. It was natural to store the main attributes of employees and students (identi-
fier, name, position, etc.) and control their access rights within the given context.
Later IDM faced newchallenges when e.g. companiesmergedor the internal IT sys-
3We can assume that shop assistants do not care memorising all the names or passport numbers
they encounter. Alternatively, we can visualise the idea by always covering all irrelevant fields in a pass-
port when showing the document. In fact, the latter idea was also physically realised by the Qiy Foun-
dation recently: https://www.qiy.nl/en/respect-privacy/ [last accessed: October 26, 2014].
4To see that there exists a more privacy-friendly solution, it is sufficient to say that if you had re-
vealed in two cases only the fact that you are over 18, the two activities could not be linked to the same
individual. However, this is possible if you have to log in.
5tems became required to be available from outside through the Internet. Another
challenge arose when universities collaborated with each other and started allow-
ing external students to get access to their own resources when they visited other
institutes. This resulted in extending IDMtechnologies, systemsbecame federated.
Meanwhile users created one account after another for many web sites, includ-
ing web shops, e-mail services, blogs, government sites and social networks. Each
of these accounts required a new pair of a username and a password, which results
in turn in deficient password practices [FH07]. A still unresolved problem on the
Internet is how users can log in securely and conveniently.
A possible solution is to borrow similar techniques as enterprises apply. Iden-
tity management, with a central system, can handle user registration, authentica-
tion and user access. But who should be this central authority on the open In-
ternet? This would mean such a power hub that cannot be desirable because of
security and privacy reasons. Nevertheless, we see currently such a trend on the
web. Huge online companies, including Google, Facebook, Apple and Amazon,
provide an increasing number of identity services, often called ‘social login’. They
authenticate users for third parties. This is convenient for users because they have
to remember fewer usernames and passwords. Furthermore, users can enjoy the
single sign-on (SSO) functionality on a computer. A user, who has already logged in
to one service, can access another one without having to authenticate again. How-
ever, users, being constantly traced and profiled, become increasingly dependent
on these companies.
Besides these straightforward issues, there are a lot of security, privacy and us-
ability challenges that have to be solved in our information-driven society. After
defining concepts in the context of IDM, Chapter 2 discusses these challenges.
In the rest of the thesis we attempt to build an identity system in which many of
these issues are overcome. To this end, we first recall the essential properties of
Attribute-Based Credentials in Chapter 3 in a structured and practical way. Also in
this chapter we briefly describe the performance results of the state-of-the-art ABC
smart-card implementations of this technology. Then Chapter 4 solves a practical
cryptographic problem: How can a secure channel be established between an ABC
card and a verifying terminal. This channel has to protect against eavesdropping
and it also has to guarantee that only legitimate terminals get access to informa-
tion on the card. Next, Chapter 5 puts forward a new cryptographic technique,
the designated verifier ABC proofs. Surprisingly, this very different approach can
also play the role of a secure channel. Finally, using ABC cards, in Chapter 6 we
propose ABIdM, a user-centric identity management paradigm with which indi-
viduals online and offline can gain access to resources in a privacy-friendly, secure
and user-friendly way.
Many results in this thesis stem from the wonderful collaboration within the
IRMA5 project. Some of the contributors with whom I worked a lot were Maarten
5https://www.irmacard.org [last accessed: October 26, 2014].
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Everts, Jaap-Henk Hoepman, Bart Jacobs, Wouter Lueks, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij,
Ronny Wichers Schreur and Pim Vullers.
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1.1 ResearchQuestion
The aim of this research is to gain a better understanding of identity management
in closed (enterprise, university) and open (Internet) environments, and to provide
a possible new technical approach that outperforms the current technologies in
terms of security, privacy, and possibly also usability. This goal can be translated
into the following objectives:
• To analyse current IDM technologies and to find weaknesses by challenging
themwith real-life scenarios in relation to security, privacy and usability, and
to formulate essential requirements for improvement. An important consid-
eration is trust and its reduction towards trusted third parties (TTPs) within
an identity management system.
• Todevelop techniques that can satisfy someof those requirements. This stage
certainly includes the study of available research results. These results and
the technique to be developed are expected to be cryptographic in nature;
preserving security while trust requirements are being reduced can typically
be solved by cryptography.
• To implement or make a prototype of the most suitable technique on a suit-
able platform in order to test its feasibility for practical purposes.
• To reconsider the weaknesses and requirements found at an earlier stage of
the research and to examine the gaps between the prototype technology and
the intended, improved identity management infrastructure.
• To design an infrastructure, based on the prototype, to enhance current iden-
tity management technologies in terms of security, privacy, and possibly, us-
ability.
Before we can state the research question, we need to be more specific about
the cryptographic approach. We select Attribute-BasedCredentials as the scientific
starting point for our development process. Belowwemotivate our choice.
An individual’s digital identity is made up of attributes, atomic pieces of per-
sonal information. On the one hand, an individual ‘gives away’6 some of his or her
attributes to be stored in a particular system. The view of the system about this
individual, which is said to be his or her identity there, is the collection of all at-
tributes related to him or her. On the other hand, during authorisation only a small
subset of these attributes provides the base for the system to decidewhether access
is granted or denied to a certain resource. Therefore, it is excessive to retrieve the
whole identity instead of only the relevant attributes when an access decision has
to be made.
6How the personal data is released and collected is irrelevant here.
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The ABC technology takes a different view of identity and authorisation. It en-
ables attributes to be issued and stored at the data subject (the individual); more-
over, only the relevant and often non-identifying subset of these attributes needs to
be shown in the context of a particular verification and authorisation instance. The
individual cannot change his or her attribute values; this provides assurance to sys-
tems that use attributes for making access decisions. However, there is no way for
these systems to relate otherwise anonymous (non-identifying) attributes to digi-
tal identities. This duality is the main strength of ABCs: security for the systems,
privacy for individuals.
Based on this decision and the objectives above, we establish themain research
question of the thesis:
How can a new system be built based on attributes that solve the most essential security
and privacy problems in the context of digital identity and access management?
This central question is divided into sub-questions addressed by the chapters
of the present thesis:
Chapter 2 What are the main challenges when centralised identity provisioning
technologies transform into identity management technologies that need
to satisfy complex requirements for the benefit of individuals and service
providers on the open Internet? Or from a progressive point of view: What
should new approaches be able to satisfy?
Chapter 3 What are the main cryptographic processes in Attribute-Based Creden-
tials and why is the smart card technology a suitable choice for implementing
an ABC client? How can the technology be demonstrated to be useful in prac-
tice? How do the twomain ABC technologies compare?
Chapter 4 How can a secure channel be established with an anonymous ABC card
for the issuing and verification protocols? As a secure channel requires au-
thenticity on both sides a sub-question arises: How can an anonymous client
be authenticated? Is it possible to achieve for both the user and the verifier to
remain anonymous?
Chapter 5 How can the ABC verification protocol be adapted to an evenmore lim-
ited infrastructural environment (1. minimal interaction and 2. no certifi-
cates), such as Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags, where a secure
channel is not possible or not practical to be established?
Chapter 6 How can ABCs be put in practice as the main building block of a user-
centric and privacy-friendly identitymanagement system? Why is it practical
and privacy-friendly to use attributes instead of identities? How can a new
attribute-based technology help solving the security and privacy problems
present in current identity management systems?
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1.2 The Structure of the Thesis
Figure 1.1 serves as a reading guide to this thesis. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide
the starting points by giving an overview of identitymanagement technologies and
by describing Attribute-Based Credential protocols in an accessible way, respec-
tively. Based on these ABC protocols, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 propose new cryp-
tographic approaches for an ABC client to securely communicate with terminals.
Lastly, Chapter 6 provides an infrastructure based on the techniques studied in the
previous chapters that addresses many issues from Chapter 2. Although we sug-
gest a linear reading order, we strived to make each chapter comprehensible even
without reading the rest of the thesis.
Figure 1.1: Dependencies among chapters.
Chapter 2 explores the state of identity management. First, it studies the main
concepts in the field, such as digital identity or trust. Second, it analyses the
current technologies from security, privacy and usability aspects by pointing
out the main problems still unresolved. Third, it formulates recommenda-
tions for possible improvements and suggests open research questions.
This chapter is an updated version of the paper “Identity Crisis: Security, Privacy
and Usability Issues in Identity Management” [AHS13] by Jaap-Henk Hoepman,
Johanneke Siljee and the author.
Contribution
My contribution in this chapter is to establish an overview of the state-of-the-art
in identity management and relate traditional technologies to the contemporary
industry solutions. Furthermore, I actively participated in analysing technologies
from security and privacy perspectives.
Chapter 3 gives a technical introduction to Attribute-Based Credentials. A con-
ceptual description gives an idea howmathematical constructions can realise
ABCs. Using two well-known methods, by Stefan Brands [Bra00] and by Jan
Camenisch and Anna Lysyanskaya [CL01, ?], we demonstrate and compare
themain functions and cryptographic protocols. The chapter concludes with
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a short description about the performance of themost recent smart-card im-
plementations of these two schemes. [MV11, VA13]
This chapter is an updated and widely extended version of the theoretical part of
the paper “Efficient Selective Disclosure on Smart Cards Using Idemix” [VA13] by
Pim Vullers and the author.
Contribution
My contribution in this chapter is providing a conceptual and technical overview
of ABCs that partly enabled efficient implementations of the client side of ABC
protocols and led ultimately to the IRMA pilot project.
Chapter 4 focusses on an important, anonymous authentication problem in rela-
tion to the smart-card implementationof Attribute-BasedCredentials. As pri-
vacy is a main consideration in the ABC technology, releasing personal infor-
mation in the form of attributes during a selective disclosure protocol has to
be protected. Therefore, a secure channel is required for the transportation of
this information. In order to establish such a channel, the anonymous smart
card and the verifying terminal have to ensure that they communicate with
each other which necessitates mutual authentication. The chapter defines
this problem and solves it by proposing two different kinds of cryptographic
protocols for setting up a secure channel between an anonymous smart card
and a terminal.
This chapter is an updated and extended version of the paper “A secure channel
for attribute-based credentials [short paper]” [AH13] by Jaap-Henk Hoepman and
the author.
Contribution
My contribution in this chapter is the definition of the security model for estab-
lishing a secure channel between an anonymous smart card carrying ABCs and an
issuing or verification terminal, the design of two cryptographic protocols and the
security proofs of these protocols in the given model.
Chapter 5 describes a new notion in the context of Attribute-Based Credentials,
the designated verifier proof. Like digital signatures which provide message
recovery, this cryptographic technique enables a designated verifier to re-
cover selectively disclosed attributes from a zero-knowledgeproof. Any other
party learns no information. Interestingly, this technique provides an alter-
native for a secure channel, discussed in the previous chapter, in case of a
simple selective disclosure (i.e. containing attributes only from one creden-
tial).
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This chapter is anupdated version of the paper “Designated Attribute-Based Proofs
for RFID Applications” [ABL12] by Lejla Batina, Wouter Lueks and the author.
Contribution
My contribution in this chapter is the formulation of the problem and merging
techniques of different fields (‘Randomized Schnorr’ and discrete logarithm rep-
resentation problem). Furthermore, the final protocol design and the security
proofs are joint work with the co-authors.
Chapter 6 proposes an identity infrastructure based on Attribute-Based Creden-
tials. One instance of such an infrastructure is called an ABC ecosystem. We
describe the concept of attribute-based identity management, i.e. IDM in
which all participants manage users’ identities by means of their attributes.
This chapter is an updated and extended version of the paper “Credential Design
in Attribute-Based Identity Management” [AJ13] by Bart Jacobs and the author.
Furthermore, this chapter is based on the collaboration among all participants
within the IRMA project.
Contribution
My contribution in this chapter is the design of an attribute-based identity man-
agement system being realised by Attribute-Based Credentials. The new notions
and proposals described in the chapter are joint work primarily with Bart Jacobs
and secondarily with the whole IRMA team.

Chapter 2
Identity Crisis: Security, Privacy andUsability
Issues in Identity Management
Identity management consists of the processes and all underlying technologiesfor the creation, management and usage of digital identities. In practice, it cov-
ers the process of establishing the identity of a remote entity (a human user, a
device or a system), managing access to services by that entity, and maintaining
identity profiles concerning that entity. Throughout this thesis wemainly focus on
human users, although most part of the description can also refer to entities in a
more general sense.
Identity management (IDM) is an essential component for the successful de-
velopment and growth of user-centric Internet services in which users are not only
passive observers but active participants of systems. Without general IDM frame-
works, public trust inweb-based services and applications will deteriorate [Cam05].
Identity theft and privacy violations are an increasing problem (e.g. [Fin14]), while
keeping track of multiple accounts and passwords is cumbersome and frustrating
for users and results in insecure password practices (such as re-using the same ac-
count names and passwords at many services) [Cav06]. Secure, reliable and user-
friendly IDM is also considered fundamental in establishing trust, for instance in
e-commerce applications [Sch11].
Unfortunately, IDM is also a confusing concept, mainly because the different
stakeholders involved (users, service providers, enterprises, mobile operators, etc.)
have different views and requirements. This has resulted in quite a number of dif-
ferent approaches towards providing IDM. Several competing systems exist, most
of which are in fact under active development. Their features change from time to
time, adding to the confusion surrounding identity management.
The historic development of IDMpartly explains how this confusion arose. The
scope of identity management used to be a single organisation, such as an enter-
prise or a university, managing a limited set of services and employees, specific to
one application or ICTplatform. Currently, this is no longer true. Organisations de-
liver ICT services to their customers and employees of other organisations as well.
This turns IDM into a complex process that has to deal with many applications
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spanning multiple organisations and multiple contexts, instead of one application
within one organisation [Roy13].
The user perspective has also grown in importance. With the increasing pres-
ence of organisations on the Internet, and with the creation of a slew of web appli-
cations, such as social networks, users start having their own demands for IDM
on the web as well (cf. [KO02, JZS07]). For users, registering to a large number
of services and then managing and remembering different user accounts on such
web sites are cumbersome. Entering personal information, like name, address and
phone number over and over again with every e-commerce site should be avoided.
And finally, the identity management systems (IMSs) that support the use of web
applications in a variety of contexts should be privacy friendly by providing control
for users over their personal data.
We do not claim that ubiquitous federated identity management (see Sec-
tion 2.1.1) is universally desirable. In fact, in many cases a small, closed-world
setup is preferable from a security point of view. Privacy also cannot be defined in
such a universal system as privacy requirements are very much culturally depen-
dent and they change over time [BC11]. Nevertheless, it would often be desirable
to have a flexible, well-understood IDM architecture that can be instantiated with
specific federation and/or privacy requirements, in which the appropriate security
and usability requirements are satisfied as well.
Current systems for identity management do not meet these requirements yet.
Apart from the fact that properly implementing an IMS spanning multiple organi-
sations is very complex, there are more fundamental problems already on the con-
ceptual level; see Section 2.2. These systems suffer from several shortcomings that
need to be addressed before they can be considered truly secure, privacy friendly
and usable. Some of these issues are well known, while others are much less un-
derstood. In this chapter we provide a comprehensive account of problems and
offer recommendations to resolve or to mitigate them in order to end the current
identity crisis.
2.1 Defining identity management
We do not define an entity, but it is understood as a separable unit that can act by
itself; for instance, an entity may be a human being, a computer, an organisation,
or even a browser session.
In this thesis we define identity within a scope [JWD08] in a technical way as
follows.
Definition 2.1. The identity of an entity within a scope is the set of all charac-
teristics that have been attributed to this entity within that scope. An identifier
uniquely identifies an entity within a specific scope.
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We will return to the distinction between identities and identifiers later on in
Section 2.2.1. The characteristics of an entity are also called attributes; wewill elab-
orate on them in muchmore detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 6.
Definition 2.2. Identitymanagement consists of the processes and all underlying
technologies for the creation, management, usage and destruction of digital iden-
tities.
In a typical identitymanagement systemwecan distinguish three parties: users,
identity providers (IdPs), and relying parties (RPs)7. The user (U) requests a service
from the RP that relies on the IdP to provide authentic information about the user.
These parties are represented by technical components that cannot be held legally
accountable. We therefore use the notion of domain to represent a legal entity (a
natural or juridical person) that is responsible and accountable for the activities of
the technical component it operates.
Several types of systems exist to administer identity [PM03, BMH05]. We dis-
tinguish identity provisioning systems (still in widespread use within enterprises)
from identity management systems [Cav06]. In the first case, a centralised system
manages identities across systems, applications and resources, usually within one
organisation or governmental body [CP09]. In the second case, an individual may
have multiple IdPs at different organisations and controls which IdP is selected to
provide identity information to a RP. Sometimes such schemes are called feder-
ated identity management systems. We explain this concept in more detail in Sec-
tion 2.1.1.
Within the domain of (federated) IDM, we choose to make the distinction be-
tween network-based identity management and claims-based identity manage-
ment (see Figure 2.1), because their difference in architecture has an impact on
the security, privacy and usability issues associated with them (cf. [SJ10]).
In a network-based identitymanagement system, the procedure to access a ser-
vice and to determine the identity and attributes of the visiting user roughly runs
as follows. When the user visits the RP, the RP asks the user to authenticate herself
at the IdP. The IdP performs this authentication, and if successful, gives the user
a token that the user forwards to the RP. The RP verifies the token, and if valid,
accepts the user as authenticated. To obtain further identity information about the
user, the RP contacts the IdP directly, using the token as a pointer to the user pro-
file stored by the IdP. In some cases, the user mediates this exchange of informa-
7Relying parties are also known as service providers (SPs) or Verifiers while IdPs as issuers. We use
the terminology depending on the context and sometimes in an ad hoc manner.
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Figure 2.1: Types of identity management systems.
tion between IdP and RP. Examples of network-based IMSs are OpenID8, Facebook
Connect9, the Liberty Alliance10 and Shibboleth11.
In claims-based identitymanagement systems [BBB+11], a RP specifies the user
information it needs in order to grant the user access. The user decides if and how
it will comply with that request, by obtaining so-called claims from IdPs. A claim is
a statement about a user (similar to an attribute assertion in SAML2.012), expressed
(and signed) by an IdP. To obtain such claims, the user needs to authenticate her-
self to the IdP, and after receiving the claim from the IdP, the user forwards it to the
RP. In claims-based IMSs, user control is a core feature and built in into the system
architecture. A natural extension of claims-based IDM is to make the user’s client
to store certain claims in advance. As a result, the IdP can be excluded from the
authorisation process. When we discuss privacy considerations, we will see that
off-line IdPs give more privacy for users (see Section 2.4.2).
The crucial difference with network-based IMS is that there is no direct ex-
change of information between RP and IdP possible, giving the user more control
over the exchange of her identity information. Network-based systems, such as
Shibboleth, may have the option to exchange attributes through the user (instead
of using the so-called back-channel), but in these systems the RP decides whether
to use this option. Even though there exist policy tools, such as uApprove13 for
network-based IMSs that allow a user to deny or give consent to releasing her at-
8http://openid.net/developers/specs/ [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
9Facebook Connect is a login mechanism based on the OAuth authorisation protocol. http://
developers.facebook.com/blog/post/2008/05/09/announcing-facebook-connect/ [last accessed:
October 26, 2014]
10Liberty Alliance has become a part of the Kantara Initiative http://kantarainitiative.org/ [last
accessed: October 26, 2014]
11http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/ [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
12https://www.oasis-open.org/standards and http://saml.xml.org/saml-specifications
[last accessed: October 26, 2014]
13Developed for Shibboleth by SWITCH: http://www.switch.ch/aai/support/tools/uApprove.
html [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
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tributes to a RP, the actual attribute assertion exchange may still take place by the
RP and IdP communicating with each other directly. To sum up, in network-based
IMSs user control is an add-on and optional, while in claims-based IMSs it is in-
herent.
Examples of claims-based IMSs are the now obsolete14 Windows Card-
Space [Mal06], which Microsoft is replacing with the more privacy/friendly U-
Prove [Bra00, Bra10], and other privacy/friendly concepts from the academic com-
munity, such as Identity Mixer, or Idemix [CL01, ?, IBM12]. In the case of U-Prove
and Idemix, claims are in fact anonymous, and are not transferred to the RP di-
rectly. Instead, the statement in the claim is proven to the RP in a zero-knowledge
fashion. This further protects the user’s privacy, because it makes the user unlink-
able between two interactions with a relying party. These two technologies are
called Attribute-Based Credentials [CKL+11]; see a detailed discussion about them
in Chapter 3.
2.1.1 Federated identity management
The concept of federated identity management is sometimes cause for confusion.
At times the term is used to describe the collaboration of several RPs to use a single
IdP, all within the same domain. In our view, such a setup is the standard form of
identitymanagement, in which no real federation takes place. Instead, we define it
similarly to Maler and Reed [MR08].
Definition 2.3. Federated identity management is a setup in which identity is
shared across (security) domains.
A Directory Service (DS) in the federated IDM context, which is often called the
Where-Are-You-From (WAYF) service, ensures that a user is directed to its own IdP
when accessing a service from another domain. Within such a federation, addi-
tional agreements can be made for further optimisation, e.g. to have a centralised
authentication authority. The so-called Circle of Trust (CoT) is the set of domains
that belong to one federation. Note that a domain can belong to several feder-
ations and therefore can belong to several Circles of Trust. Figure 2.2 shows the
differences.
Example federations include national education and research federations based
on Shibboleth (e.g. eduroam15, Switzerland’s SWITCH16, UK Access Management
Federation17, Australian’s AAF18, USA’s InCommon19) and the Kantara Initiative20.
14See announcement: http://preview.tinyurl.com/MSCardSpace [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
15https://www.eduroam.org [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
16http://www.switch.ch [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
17http://www.ukfederation.org.uk [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
18http://www.aaf.edu.au [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
19https://incommon.org [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
20http://kantarainitiative.org [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
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2.1.2 Related work
Several other studies have stressed the importance of privacy, security and usability
of identitymanagement, each focusing on specific issues or looking at the problem
from a particular perspective.
Laws of Identity
The seven laws of identity [Cam05] present a compelling set of requirements that a
system for IDM needs to obey. The laws were created by Kim Cameron and refined
‘in the Blogosphere’. Belowwe list all of them:
#1 User Control and Consent: Digital identity systems must only reveal informa-
tion identifying a user with the user’s consent.
#2 Limited Disclosure for Limited Use: The solutionwhich discloses the least iden-
tifying information and best limits its use is the most stable long-term solu-
tion.
#3 The Law of Fewest Parties: Digital identity systemsmust limit disclosure of iden-
tifying information to parties having a necessary and justifiable place in a
given identity relationship.
#4 Directed Identity: Auniversal identitymetasystemmust support both ‘omnidi-
rectional’ identifiers for use by public entities and ‘unidirectional’ identifiers
for private entities, thus facilitating discovery while preventing unnecessary
release of correlation handles.
#5 Pluralism of Operators and Technologies: A universal identity solution must
utilise and enable the interoperation of multiple identity technologies run by
multiple identity providers.
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#6 Human Integration: A unifying identity metasystem must define the human
user as a component integrated throughprotected and unambiguous human-
/machine communications offering protection against identity attacks.
#7 Consistent Experience Across Contexts: A unifying identity metasystem must
provide a simple consistent experience while enabling separation of contexts
throughmultiple operators and technologies.
Kim Cameron’s Identity Metasystem [CJ07] is an open selector/based digital
identity framework, based on the seven laws. CardSpace was Microsoft’s instan-
tiation of the IdentityMetasystem, but has been discontinued, as discussed earlier,
and is being replaced by U-Prove. However, U-Prove is built on another paradigm.
While the IdentityMetasystem connects individual identity systems to allow seam-
less interoperation between them, U-Prove is an identity system itself.
Other RelatedWork
Pfitzmann and Hansen [PH10] collect and develop a consolidated terminology
about the fundamental concepts in relation to digital identity and identifiability21.
Using this terminology as a starting point, Veeningen et al. [VDWZ11] develop a
formal model and analyse the relations among identity-related properties. Besides
the technical problems of identifiability and anonymity, there are many research
directions in identitymanagement in relation to security and privacy, such as legal,
psychological, security-related, and implementation projects that are discussed in
this section.
De Hert [DH08] argues that a legal paradigm shift is necessary in connection
withprivate data. Inhis view, retailers, governmentsand other organisations should
accept that private information is ultimately owned by the individual who has to
be assigned the control over his private data. He also insists that privacy should
be a part of the legal framework as well as a fundamental aspect when designing
new systems that comprise personal data. The General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), superseding the current EU Data Protection Directive (DPD), is a huge
step in this direction.22 The new law not only protects citizens’ privacy more ex-
tensively, but also enforces foreign companies that process data of EU residents to
comply with. Besides regulation, Landau et al. [LLVGW09] emphasise the impor-
tance of liability incentives for stakeholders in IMSs.
Dhamija and Dusseault [DD08], considering incentives in a broader technical
sense, provide guidelines about how to design a decentralised web identity man-
21This effort started in 2000 and after the 34th revised version it stopped with the early death of Prof.
Dr. Andreas Pfitzmann in 2010.
22DPD or Directive 95/46/EC [Eur95]. The GDPR provides a unified law to regulate the processing
of private data within the European Union (EU). At the moment of writing (May 2014) the European
Parliament has adopted GDPR’s first reading, while the official first reading of the Council is expected to
take place possibly in autumn 2014. The Regulation can thus the earliest be adopted in early 2015 and
entering into force in 2017, while in all other cases its adoption may take much longer time. [Kos14]
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agement system that will take all participants’ motivation as well as their capabil-
ities into account. They assert furthermore, that the aspect of usability, allowing
users to take appropriate (privacy) decisions, is essential in order to achieve wide
acceptance and secure usage of such systems.
However, one of themost challenging research tasks is to build privacy/friendly
IMSswith goodusability properties. Technical research recommendsusable privacy-
/enhancing solutions. Jøsang et al. [JZS07] propose a scheme that includes a per-
sonal authentication device, or PAD, that can support both secure single sign-on
(SSO) and protection against phishing attacks. A similar tool, a “smart client”, is
predicted to gain increasing importance that assists the discovery of appropriate
IdPs in complex federated systems [MR08]. Such a device might also assist in a
usable solution for mutual authentication in which not only users are required to
provide credentials, but IdPs and RPs are also authenticated to the users [DD08,
JZS07, LLVGW09].
But do people know and care about their digital privacy? According to the sur-
vey by Turow et al. [TFM05], public awareness about what private information can
be stored and resold by RPs is very low and the customers’ view is more optimistic
than reality. Nevertheless, customers do care about their private data and they are
willing to take privacy into consideration in purchasing decisions when informa-
tion about the privacy statement of the retailer is easily accessible and sufficiently
user friendly [TECA07].23 The same result is described in the study of O’Brien and
Torres [OT12] in the context of a social network. The majority of Facebook users
change their privacy settings according to their needs but users in general rarely
read the “too long and uninteresting” privacy policy. There is a demand for a clearer
and shorter policy to improve users’ trust.
Although federated identitymanagement solutions are widely employed in cor-
porate and academic environments, many problems still arise. These systems can
provide convenient user functions (such as SSO or automated form-filling), how-
ever, the single layer of authentication decreases systemsecurity [AM07]while it in-
creases the value of user credentials (as it provides access tomore resources) [DD08].
Privacy issues emerge in many new technical contexts as well. Pearson [Pea09]
collects design guidelines for cloud computing services withproper privacy protec-
tion and she describes some open questions (e.g. policy enforcement, determina-
tion of data processors, constructing privacy design patterns). Another emerging
research field is the challenge of building life-long privacy [PBP10] that includes
the expansion of solutions to most areas in life and very long-term data security
too.
The fundamental technical means for IDM, privacy/enhancing cryptographic
tools [CM07] and anonymous credentials [Bra00, CL01] in particular, are available
to build privacy/enhancing systems with anonymous but accountable users. In
23See further details at the on-line section ‘Economics of Privacy’ (http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/
~rja14/econsec.html [last accessed: October 26, 2014]) by Ross Anderson and the book ‘The Eco-
nomics of Privacy’ by Brandimarte and Acquisti [BA12].
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the European ABC4Trust24 (earlier PRIME25 and PrimeLife26) project, building on
those technical components, Camenisch et al. [CSFH+05] develop elaborate sys-
tems that provide more control for users about their personal data by automated
negotiation processes. In this thesis we reconsider the building blocks and propose
a practical and flexible setup that preserves the main privacy and security features
of anonymous credentials; see Chapters 3 and 6.
Eclipse’s Higgins27 – with a practical open-source approach – is a project in
progress that is aiming to implement a user/centered identity framework for di-
verse platforms with a consistent user interface.
The Future of Identity in the Information Society (FIDIS)28 Network of Excel-
lence provides a wealth of information on the topic, see for instance [BMH05] for
a systematic review of identity management systems (see a further discussion in
Section 6.7.3 on page 132). Based on their experiences within the FIDIS project,
Cameron et al. [CPR09] propose a framework for a user/centric, privacy/friendly
IDM, with a focus on ensuring interoperability. Their proposal is very much in line
with the US National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace [Sch11].
2.2 Fundamental issues
There are several fundamental problems with IMSs that arise from the illusive na-
ture of the concepts of identity and trust. Also, too little consideration has been
given to the different types of access rights that must be enforced through identity
management, as they prove to have an impact on the trust relationships between
the parties involved. Because of their fundamental nature, these issues apply to all
current models of identity management, and not just the current implementation
of such models. We discuss these issues in this section.
In the remainder of the chapter, we study fundamental concepts and secu-
rity, privacy and usability issues in the context of the current identity management
practice.
2.2.1 What is identity?
To begin with, we turn to the concept of identity itself (cf. [BM10]). The first thing
to note is that identity is not absolute. According to Definition 2.1 an identity de-
scribes an entity within a specific scope. For example, you may have one identity
within the scope of your job, containing information such as your employee num-
ber, and another identity within the scope of your family, containing information
on the food you like. Identities are therefore only valid and understandable within
24https://abc4trust.eu/ [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
25https://www.prime-project.eu [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
26http://primelife.ercim.eu [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
27http://www.eclipse.org/higgins/ [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
28http://www.fidis.net [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
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a specific scope. If an identity contains many characteristics, it may uniquely iden-
tify a particular entity within a scope. However, with only a few (otherwise not
identifying) attributes, many entities are likely to match.29
It immediately follows that entities have, in general, multiple identities. These
identities may partly overlap, but can also be mutually inconsistent. The author
has for instance blue eyes in all scopes, but goes by different names, nicknames, in
different scopes. In extreme cases, people are known to live parallel lives. Some-
times, hardly anybody knows that particular identities in different scopes belong
to the same entity.
Identity is not unique. Even within a single scope, people may have several dif-
ferent identities. Within the scope of a family a person may not only be a father (to
his children) togetherwith all the corresponding characteristics but also a husband
(to his wife). Moreover, the identity of an entity is perceived differently by different
people, or perceived differently by the same people at different times or in different
scopes. Someonemay be trusted by one person, but not by another, or only within
a certain scope.
To uniquely identify entities, one needs to rely on identifiers, not on identities.
This distinction between identity and identifier is important. The confusion about
these terms is understandable, because in common parlance identity is almost
synonymous with personal name, which in turn is understood to be an identifier.
Note that also identifiers (such as a user name) are only valid and guaranteed to be
unique within a scope.
Digital identities, in the virtual world, can be connected to entities in the real
world, but this connectionmay be loose. For example, computers behind an IP ad-
dress may be replaced or people may change internet service providers. Likewise,
functional roles within companies may look, to external observers, as entities with
a particular identity, but different people may actually be assigned to such a role
over time.
Identity is also dynamic. Assertions about someone’s age change when time
passes. Your financial situation changes over time, so do your friendships, your
convictions and beliefs. IMSs must deal with such changes efficiently, and must
avoid keeping old, invalid data.
Identities may exist long after an entity ceases to exist. The lifetime of an iden-
tity does not correspond to the lifetime of the associated entity. Most of the time
identity information is not updated or deleted after it has become inapplicable.
This introduces a privacy risk. But sometimes claims about an entity actually need
to be kept long after the entity itself disappears. For accountability reasons, Relying
Parties store usage information for a period of time, sometimes several years. The
situation is reminiscent to the difference in lifetimes between keys and certificates
(themselves a possible part of an identity). A certificate needs to be kept long after
the key it certifies has expired, to allow parties to verify the signatures made with
that key.
29The concepts of k-anonymity and ℓ-diversity study these aspects of privacy. [Swe02, MKGV07]
2.2. Fundamental issues 23
Identity is not only what you want to reveal about yourself, but also what others
conclude, believe and find out about you. In fact, most of a person’s identity is of
this type. Such datamay bewrong, become invalid over time, bemisrepresented or
be misguiding, etc.. In other words, an identity does not necessarily correspond to
reality. Moreover, it shows that an identity has many owners:30 It is not only owned
by the entity it describes (aka data subject), but also collected and owned by others.
A fine example of this is your medical records being collected by GPs, specialists
and other health-care personnel. Health records are often the responsibility of the
GP. You may have the right to view them, but you do not necessarily have the right
to change them. This has important privacy ramifications.
Instead of an entity having one single identity containing all characteristics
taken from all scopes, it is more natural to view an entity as a collection of mul-
tiple identities (a set of sets; cf. Figure 6.1 on page 108), each with its own scope.
This is also consistent with the idea that privacy guarantees that information about
a person does not leak from one scope into another [Nis04].
When scopes merge (e.g. if organisations merge) identities may clash.31 If an
entity has an identity in both scopes they may not get merged at all, and as a result
the new scope perceives two entitieswhere there is only one. For example, a person
may have an account with two different RPs that require the user to use different
IdPs. How should this person determinewhat her identity is in the new scopewhen
the two RPs merge? Or when the two IdPs merge?
The fact that identities may live on long after the entity ‘dies’ can result in a
wealth of personal information stored in many places. This leads to privacy risks
for users that are somehow related to this entity. Itmay also result in IdPs giving out
incorrect claims, damaging their reputation. Furthermore, claims (that link some
identity information to an identifier) may continue to exist indefinitely, even after
the identity information itself is deleted. When the claim of an old identity still
exists and a new identity is created with the same identifier, these twomay seem to
refer to the same entity, while this is not the case.
To summarise, managing identities does not onlymean handling new and fixed
identities within one scope, but also handling the complex situations of changing
identities in changing scopes, and managing the different perceptions of an iden-
tity within the same scope.
30The discussion is closely related to that about data subjects, data controllers and data processors
in the context of the Data Protection Directive [Eur95].
31For instance, Microsoft and Facebook are companies that provide identity services in enter-
prise and social contexts. When these corporations acquire other companies (Skype and What-
sApp, respectively) active in the identity sphere, not only may identities clash but identities be-
longing to the same entity from different scopes can merge. This raises further (privacy) concerns.
Sources: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-13343600 and http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2014/
02/facebook-to-acquire-whatsapp/ [last accessed: October 26, 2014].
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Recommendation A theoretically solid yet practical model should be developed
for identity underlying identity management, and IdPs and RPs should make ex-
plicit how that model applies to their systems of identity management.
Identity management systems should distinguish between the lifetime of an
identity, and the lifetime of claims derived from that identity. They should also
provide a way to remove obsolete identities (or part of identities) and to invalidate
out-of-date claims.
For instance, to deal with dynamic identity aspects, it would be convenient if a
person could get an attribute certificate for the date of birth, which could then be
used to prove that the person is older than 18 (without revealing the real age).
2.2.2 Different types of access
Identity management systems are being used to enforce different kinds of access
rights. In essence, one can distinguish between membership and ownership of a
resource. These access rights have different risk profiles, and therefore assume dif-
ferent trust relationships betweenusers, identity providers and relying parties. This
difference in access rights is not straightforward and it can result in unacceptable
risks.
IMSs were first applied in organisations (to centralise access rights manage-
ment to business applications) and education (to grant students access to the com-
puting facilities, the digital library and the wireless network). In both cases, the
identity management systems are used for deciding whether a certain user is a
member of a group. In the first case it decides whether the user is a member of the
group that has access to some business application. In the second case it decides
whether the user is a student of a certain university. The resource being controlled
is not owned by the user, and any risks or resource damage due to using the identity
management system lies completely with the relying party, not the user.
More and more, identity management systems are also being used to enforce
ownership of a resource. Important examples are online banking, your primary
email, and to a lesser extent your blog and social networking accounts. Illegal ac-
cess to your bank account will hit you with a direct financial loss. Malicious en-
try to your email account may have indirect consequences, including the ability of
impersonating you at other services. Access to your blog and other systems may
enable a criminal to ‘steal’ your identity, which may hurt you in many other ways
(e.g. your reputation). In this case, the risk of using the identity management sys-
tems lies completely with the user.
Howdoes this affect the use of identitymanagement systems? To enforcemem-
bership, identity management needs to assume different trust relationships than
to enforce ownership. In the first case, the relying party needs to trust the iden-
tity provider to reliably authenticate its members. In the second case, it is the user
that needs to trust the identity provider to reliably authenticate herself. These trust
relationships need to be enforced either by technological means, or through mu-
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tual agreements like service-level agreements (SLA) with associated penalties. In
either case, an identity management system to enforce membership is inherently
different from an identity management system to enforce ownership.
Also the risk level associated with using identity management differs. In the
case of granting students access to university resources, the damage associated
with abuse (and therefore the risk of using identity management systems) is quite
low. Except for extreme, denial-of-service cases, the university does not suffer any
direct actual loss of non-students having access to the resources. This is the same
for any subscription-based digital service, such as online music or a newspaper,
etc. Because the marginal cost of the copy is essentially zero, there is no direct loss
if non-members have access as well. The losses incurred by such services are the
result of fewer sales.
Granting access to business applications (and the associated data in particular)
has a higher risk profile. Not because of loss of revenue, but because the data is
often confidential. It could cause enormous financial damage when it becomes
public. Similarly, there is a difference in risk level associated with granting access
to a bank account and granting access to a blog account.
Recommendation The impact of dealing with different types of resources on IdM
deserves further study. For instance, related distinctions that one could make here
are on rivalry and durability of a resource. A rivalrous resource cannot be used
at the same time by another user, whereas access to a nonrival resource does not
exclude such access by others (cf. commonproperty resources). Durable resources
do not degrade or get used up, whereas non-durable do degrade or can be used
only once (cf. the difference between ‘bits’ and ‘atoms’). It is interesting to explore
the economic literature to see whether even more types of resources and goods
can be discerned, and how they influence the trust assumptions in (and the risk of
using) identity management.
2.2.3 Trust assumptions
We have been using the ambiguous concept of trust in previous sections, with-
out giving a definition. We will not present a thorough discussion of the notion of
trust in this thesis though, but refer to Hardin [Har04], O’Hara [O’H04], Lacochée
et al. [LCP06] and Jaquet-Chiffelle and Buitelaar [JCB09]. For our exposition the
following informal definition based on that of Deakin and Michie [DM97] is suffi-
cient.
Definition2.4. When an actor trusts another actor, he is willing to assume an open
and vulnerable position. He expects the other to refrain from opportunistic be-
haviour even if there is the possibility to show this behaviour.
Inmore technical terms, entityA trusts entityB ifA relies on the fact thatB can
break the security or privacy policy ofAwithoutA’s cooperation or knowledge.
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Building trust
Trust can only be built over time. For this, the RP needs to be sure it is talking to the
same entity (and the otherway around) in different sessions. In order to do so, both
parties need to retain information from session to session. Unfortunately, in many
of the current identity management systems, the user does not maintain any state.
Moreover, the RP is completely relying on the IdP to ensure that the link between
different visits of the same user is reliable32.
The ‘proof key’ of CardSpace [Mal06] does not solve this issue; it only prevents
an adversary from using a security token obtained illegally33. The binding is only
guaranteed as long as the IdP is honest. If the IdP releases the private proof key or
if the IdP itself uses that proof key, the user agent (UA) is no longer involved. The
problem could be solved if the UA and the relying party each stored a part of a key
pair and verified the link directly without external help.
Trust assumptions are ill understood
By using an IMS, one implicitly agrees to participate in several complex trust rela-
tionships between the parties involved. Some of the trust relationships involved in
identity management are the side effects of more fundamental security and feder-
ation problems, that we will discuss separately later on (see Sections 2.3.4).
The user trusts the IdP not to act on its behalf without his explicit consent. In
many systems for identity management, the IdP essentially signs in to a RP, on
behalf of a user. It could easily do so, even without the user being present. Clearly,
the user does not want the IdP to do this. The general impact of this concern is
unclear, though in practice, an IdP that betrays the trust of usersmay be soon out of
business. Additionally, the user expects the IdP not to release personal information
unless explicitly asked by the RP and with the permission of the user.
The relying party trusts the federation not to extend the Circle of Trust (without
its consent). Depending on the application, a RP may rely on an IdP to provide
attributes honestly regarding the user accessing the service. Based on these at-
tributes the RP may decide to grant access to the user or not. A common example
is granting access to a wireless campus network to all students, including those
that come from other universities. In this application, the IdP will tell the network
32This is also a problem with current public-key infrastructures (PKIs), in which the RP also does
not keep state and trusts the certificate coming with an authentication instance to ensure a long-term
binding between several encounters with the same user over a long period of time.
33It works as follows: the proof key pair is generated by the IdP. The IdP sends the private proof key
to the user agent (UA), encrypted using the public key of the UA. The public part is also sent to the
UA, together with the security token. The entire message is signed by the IdP. Using the private key it
received earlier, the UA generates a signature over the combination of token and public proof key, and
sends that to the RP. The signature proves to the RP that the UA knows the corresponding private proof
key.
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whether the user is a student or not. The Circle of Trust (CoT) could be extended
when a new university joins the scheme. In this case the federation will delegate
the responsibility to classify newmembers as students to the newly connected IdP.
Based on the decision of this new IdP, the network (by necessity) will grant these
users access to its network. The decision to grant access to a user is thus in the
hands of the new IdP, which may be undesirable (cf. Section 2.3.4).
Other trust assumptions involved in IDM. The most basic trust relationship un-
derlying identitymanagement (and this is usually well understood) is the following.
• The RP trusts the IdP to make a particular claim about a particular user.
Although the following trust relationship is equally important and fundamental,
this assumption is much less straightforward.
• The user allows the IdP to make a particular claim about her to a particular
relying party, and allows the relying party to accept such claims from this IdP.
These trust relationships are also dynamic and context dependent: A user may at
some point decide not to use any longer the services of an identity provider, and
therefore the trust relationship no longer exists. Moreover, the user may only allow
the relying party to accept certain claims from the identity providerwithin a certain
context. For example, if a user only accesses a service fromwork, or during the day,
the relying party should not accept claims about the user during the night, or when
it appears the service is accessed from an Internet kiosk.34
Every trust assumption is a potential security problem, as the trusted party can
break the security policy of the other party. From a security point of view, it is
preferable to rely on as few trust assumptions as possible.
Recommendation A better understanding is needed in relation to the trust as-
sumptions among the parties involved in an identity management system. More
implicit or explicit trust assumptions should be collected and studied, and it should
be determined whether they can be mitigated or avoided by other (e.g. technical)
means.
2.3 Security Issues
Current identity management frameworks have implemented techniques, meth-
ods and policies to securely handle identity information. However, several vulner-
abilities remain.
34One possibility to capture this notion is via attributes related to the environment (context) which
are taken into consideration in the access decision; cf. Section 6.7.2.
28 2. Identity Crisis: Security, Privacy and Usability Issues in Identity Management
2.3.1 The identity provider is a single point of failure
Identitymanagement systems require the user and the relying party to place a large
amount of trust in the IdP (see also Section 2.2.3). A wealth of identity information
is stored at IdPs, and users can do nothing but simply trust the IdP to preserve their
privacy and properly secure their identity information [DD08]. But still, mistakes
can be made and privacy-sensitive information can become public35. This makes
the identity provider a single point of failure.
Possibly even more worrisome is the fact that currently in most identity man-
agement systems the IdP has all information it needs to log in at related RPs as a
registered user (see Section 2.2.3). This means that anyone that has access to this
information at the IdP can log in as a user to the related RPs; for example, em-
ployees of the company hosting the IdP or hackers that break into the IdP systems.
Depending on the service, the impostor could order things to make the legitimate
user pay money, transfer money from the user’s bank account or get insight into
personal information, such as the user’s electronic health record. The RP has no
means to distinguish the impostor from the real user.
This feature can also be (ab)used to turn an IMS into a system for mass surveil-
lance. If the identity provider happens to be the government (and many govern-
ments offer IdP services and actively try to extend their use in other domains), then
the government has immediate access to all your data stored at services that accept
this IdP. Using such an IdP to manage your identity at your bank, your ISP or other
relying parties is not recommended in such systems.
The possibly extensive collection of data stored at an IdP can also be used to
perpetrate identity fraud. If information about a user stored at the IdP becomes
public due to e.g. , theft, hacking or implementation flaws, this data can be used to
fake an identity when registering for a new service.
The impact of this issue increases as more and more systems get federated and
a single IdP is used to access a large number of services. Such an IdPmay abuse its
powers, maliciously accessing many services, before a user notices. If the RP and
the IdP do not properly log authentication requests and access control decisions,
both the RP and the IdP may claim that the other party was to blame, and the user
will not have any evidence to determine what actually happened.
Recommendation To prevent this issue, it is necessary to put the user in con-
trol of information that is released from the IdP [Cam05, BSCGS07]. This should
happen not only by policy, but in a technically enforced way in the identity man-
agement system. It should not be possible for the IdP to log in to a RP claiming to
be a user. The IMS should enforce the requirement that the user controls part of
the data necessary to log in to the RP.
35Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, “Chronology of Data Breaches” http://www.privacyrights.org/
data-breach [last accessed: October 26, 2014].
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Figure 2.3: Yahoo sign-in seal (with the portrait of Beethoven with green back-
ground as the personal seal).
2.3.2 The risk of phishing has increased
Most current identity management systems only provide a way to authenticate the
user, but it is not possible for the user to authenticate the IdP or the RP [DD08]. This
is a necessity to be able to prevent phishing attacks, in which attackers trick users
into revealing identity data and credentials. With identity management becoming
more widespread, phishing attacks based on getting IdP login credentials increase
as well (cf. [Fin14]).
When HTTP redirects are used (as for example in OpenID, in OAuth or in Face-
book Connect) phishing attacks are even easier to launch36. It is as simple as creat-
ing an illegitimate but attractive website that redirects to a false copy of the IdP to
capture the user’s credentials.
An example countermeasure to phishing attacks using fake IdP websites is the
Yahoo sign-in seal;37 see an example in Figure 2.3. This is a personalised image or a
short text phrase that appears each time a user logs in to a Yahoowebpage from the
same computer onwhich the seal was created. The presence of the seal enables the
user to distinguish the real Yahoo sign-in page from a false page. This solution only
works on a single device, as Yahoo identifies it by storing tags in multiple places on
the computer38.
Recommendation To prevent phishing attacks, it is very important that users can
(and will) authenticate the RP and the IdP. Mutual authentication therefore needs
to be incorporated in identity management systems, in such a way that the user is
not required to install special software or to use one and the same computer all the
time (as is the case with Yahoo sign-in seal or Microsoft CardSpace). Furthermore,
36 “Beginner’s guide to OpenID phishing”, http://preview.tinyurl.com/openid-phishing, [last
accessed: October 26, 2014].
37 https://protect.login.yahoo.com/ [last accessed: October 26, 2014].
38“How does Yahoo Sign In Seal Work?” by Gabe Wishnie, http://preview.tinyurl.com/mvxu6kl,
[last accessed: October 26, 2014]. The
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authentication of the IdP and RP by the user should be more user friendly than
checking their SSL certificate manually. Apparently, there is no single, usable and
secure fix to prevent phishing in all cases.
2.3.3 What is the optimal size of a key chain? – or – How many
identities should a user have?
One of the main advantages of identity management for end-users is single sign-
on: not having to remember all those user names and passwords, except for the
log-in token for the IdP. From this perspective, it would be great to have just one
IdP: only one user name/password (or another authentication token) and that’s it.
Obviously, this is not feasible. Not only because users may not trust that sin-
gle IdP to have access to all their services (see Section 2.3.1). Even if users do trust
a single IdP for that, using only one IdP means that if that IdP is compromised, all
identity data is compromised immediately aswell. It is therefore advisable for users
to distribute their identity information over multiple IdPs. Furthermore, different
RPs typically require different IdPs. Financial institutions, for example, have other
requirements and preferences than car rental agencies with respect to an IdP. The
first may want to set up their own IdP to be able to control the security of authenti-
cation, while the latter is satisfied with using a third-party IdP. Can we then settle
for one IdP for personal use, one for work, and one for each financial institution?
This seems to be a workable yet quite arbitrary subdivision.
The question is: How many identity providers does a user need? What is the
best compartmentalisation of the digital identity mess? We need to understand
the advantages and risks of using a certain amount and distribution of IdPs and
federations, in terms of security, usability and business.
Recommendation To be able to determine which and how many ‘identities’ are
optimal, a model that captures these relevant aspects needs to be developed. To
our knowledge such a model does not exist yet.
2.3.4 Federations are risky
In cross-domain settings, one organisation may assign roles to certain individu-
als, while another organisation assigns access rights to roles. This is typically done
in federation settings: One university classifies certain people as staff or students
of that university, while other RPs rely on that classification to mediate access to
resources like the library, classes or the student restaurant.
This gives rise to a compliance defect [Ell99]: The IdPmay interpret the seman-
tics of the role (e.g. when someone is classified as a student) differently from the
RP, which leads to a situation where a person gets access to a service that he or she
is not supposed to access. The reverse (being denied access) is a problem as well.
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The issue described above is an instance of a more general one. Traditionally,
access to a resource or service is mediated through a ‘reference monitor’ (cf. an
access matrix [Lam74]). In a federated identitymanagement system, this reference
monitor is in a sense distributed over several parties. The underlying question is
how to do this ‘split’. In the simplest case, this question surfaces as the question:
Where to keep the access rights?
A separate issue is the control over the Circle of Trust (CoT). By establishing a
federation among several IdPs, the CoT is similarly extended. RPs connected to a
certain IdP may have limited control over this, and therefore have limited control
over the risks that they are exposed to because of the extension of the CoT; see also
Section 2.2.3.
Recommendation When implementing or joining an identity federation, RPs
need to carefully consider where to keep andmaintain the access rights. Moreover,
they need to judge the consequences when the Circle of Trust is extended without
their knowledge or consent.
2.4 Privacy issues
Identity management systems are used to facilitate millions of user transactions
on the Internet each day. They mediate between users and relying parties, handle
a lot of personal information, and often register who does business with whom.
This has obvious privacy consequences. We discuss these issues in detail below.
2.4.1 Linkability across scopes
Like AdSense39 and DoubleClick40, identity management systems have the poten-
tial to track a single user over all the websites she visits.41
To maintain privacy, it should be possible for users to be anonymous or use
pseudonyms at RPs, and to choose IdPs that do not link all user transactions at
all RPs together, and so do not keep records of everything each user has been do-
ing. Many identitymanagement systems implement at least part of these solutions,
which is why the UK Information Commissioner has recognised federated identity
management as a PET.42
However, not all identity management systems do. An example is DigiD, the
Dutch national authentication provider that enables authentication of Dutch cit-
39https://www.google.com/adsense/ [last accessed: October 26, 2014].
40http://www.google.com/doubleclick/ [last accessed: October 26, 2014].
41Google acquired AdSense (2003) and DoubleClick (2007-2008). Google later changed its privacy
policies (2012) by unifying them; and by doing this, a user’s all activities can be used for advertisements
throughout Google’s services.
42See the document here: http://preview.tinyurl.com/InfComPET [last accessed: October 26,
2014].
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izens when communicating with Dutch government institutions. DigiD uses the
BSN (Burgerservicenummer, Citizen Service Number) to identify a user: After au-
thentication, DigiD sends the BSN to the RP. This number uniquely identifies
each user, and does not allow for anonymity or pseudonymity at all. As indicated
in [MVS08], expanding the scope ofDigiD to incorporate not only governmental or-
ganisations but also the private sector has many advantages. However, as already
mentioned, in its current form DigiD does not allow for pseudonymity as the BSN
is always used as identifier. Such an extension of use of DigiD for the private sector
is not acceptable as it violates the user’s privacy when all RPs always receive the
BSN as user identifier. This enables them to track people and possibly learn who
the user is.
Another example stems from the need to retain user permissions at RPs when
a user moves from one home organisation (and thus IdP) to another. For example,
the educational sector is talking about such an identifier to track students through-
out their entire school life. Federations often solve this by implementing one static
user attribute (often a pseudonym identifier) that a user can ‘bring’ to another IdP.
This ‘feature’ severely limits the privacy of users, as the static attribute links all user
actions at all its previous and current IdPs and one (but often many) RPs.
This also involves a paradigm shift from identity management relying solely on
identifiers. It has become standard practice to require a user to identify herself be-
fore granting access to a service. Inmany cases this is unnecessary. For example, in
order to be allowed to buy alcohol, someone only needs to prove that he or she is
over 16 years old (or 18 or 21, depending on local laws). Such ‘attribute’ or ‘creden-
tial’ based forms of privacy-friendly identity management do exist in theory but
are rarely applied in practice. (As an attempt to change this, we describe a practical
approach called attribute-based identity management in Chapter 6.)
Recommendation Whenever using identity management systems, one should
always try to implement maximum anonymity and pseudonymity where possi-
ble. A solution for expanding DigiD to the private sector, for example, is to use
pseudonyms that are based on DigiD as identifiers. Each user will have a different
pseudonym with each RP, and no pseudonym should leak any information about
the underlying BSN. A possible method for generating pseudonyms is making a
hash of the BSN together with (the domain name of) the RP.43 Alternatively, if it
needs to be possible to trace the pseudonym back to the original BSN, various en-
cryption methods can be used [MVS08]. Furthermore, a privacy-friendly method
for retaining access rights at RPs when changing IdP is necessary.
43This is a similar approach to the construction of service-specific pseudonyms in the German eID
system; see e.g. [PWVT12] and Section 6.7.3.
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2.4.2 IdP knows all user transactions
In current identity management systems the IdP is involved each time a user re-
quests access at a RP. Therefore, the IdP can keep track of all these user actions
(although sometimes the specific RP involvedmay be kept hidden from the IdP). In
most systems the user is not even involved in the exchange of her identity informa-
tion between the IdP and the RP. But even in a claims-based identity management
system, such as CardSpace, where the user needs to give consent before identity
information is transferred, even though the IdP does not need to know exactly who
the RP is, the IdP often needs to generate the assertion online and therefore knows
about all user transactions.
It seems PKI is the solution to this issue. Here a Certificate Authority (CA) iden-
tifies and authenticates a user only once, and then certifies the user’s public key.
The user can then authenticate herself to a RP by signing data with her private key,
which the RP can verify using the corresponding public key. In this case the CA is
not directly involved in the user authentication by the RP, but is still the trusted
third party. There are two important drawbacks of this solution. First, the user al-
ways needs to have her public-key certificate available when logging in, and thus
PKI-based identity management often violates the 8th Law of Identity about loca-
tion independence (see Section 2.5.1). This problemarose also in Identity Selectors
as used inCardSpace, where all identity selection solutionswere hardware-specific,
OS-specific or even browser-specific. Second, the same user key (along its certifi-
cate) is used at each RP, making the user’s transactions traceable.
Recommendation Weneed to develop an identitymanagement system that does
not require IdPs to see all user transactions, without violating the 8th Law of Iden-
tity. This apparent paradox may be solvable by relying on personal hardware (like
tokens, smart cards), or by developing mobile and cloud-based identity manage-
ment concepts. A possible solution is described in Chapter 6 which relies on smart
cards and attribute-based credentials [Bra10, IBM12, CKL+11, VA13].
2.4.3 Proportionality and subsidiarity often violated
In the EU,most of the data protection or privacy laws are based on the principles of
proportionality and subsidiarity. Proportionality stipulates that the amount of per-
sonal data being collected is proportional to the goal for which it is being collected.
Subsidiarity demands that the same goal cannot be achieved in a more privacy-
friendly way.
This is implemented in the EU’s Data ProtectionDirective [Eur95] (see also Sec-
tion 2.1.2) as Articles 6 and 7. Article 6 can be summarised with the notion of ‘data
minimisation’. It entails a set of requirements such as purpose specification, use
limitation, accuracy and completeness of the data, and deletion and anonymisa-
tion of the data as soon as they are no longer needed for the purpose that led to
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their collection. Article 7 lists all the legal grounds, including the consent of the
data subject, based on which one is allowed to process data.
Often, websites and services violate these principles. One does not need, for
instance, to identify someone to determine his age. Subscriptions for a service can
certainly be handled anonymously. An online newspaper does not need to know
who accesses the system, all it needs to know is whether that person is entitled to
read the news online (cf. [Ell99]).
Recommendation Less is more. RPs should be precise about the personal infor-
mation required to offer a service, and should not ask for more information ‘just
because they can’. An important approach is to consider anonymous ways to offer
the same service.
2.5 Usability issues
Usability plays an essential role in security and in the protection of private data as
many attacks, such as phishing and social engineering, target users instead of com-
puters [And08, Chapter 2]. Besides these issues, identity management encounters
further difficulties. We discuss those challenges in this section.
2.5.1 The 8th Law of Identity: Location Independence
The seven laws of identity [Cam05], as discussed in Section 2.1.2, present a com-
pelling set of requirements an identity management systemmust satisfy. However,
one important usability aspect is missing: location independence. A number of
current identity management systems depend on persistent data stored locally at
the user’s machine. Instead, a user should be able to access a RP using the identity
management system not only from her own PC, but also from her laptop at work,
her smart phone and a computer at a cybercafé e.g. in Hong Kong. This location
independence should be accomplished in a secure and privacy-friendly manner.
Note that although some identity management systems fail to implement loca-
tion independent access, many other identity management systems do provide it.
However, they have other privacy and security issues that we have discussed, such
as IdPs that know all user transactions (see Section 2.4.2).
We therefore propose the 8th Law of Identity:
Definition 2.5 (Location Independence). The identity system must allow a user
to create, manage and use her identity independently of her current location and
current device in use.
Recommendation Identity management systems should not rely on any persis-
tent data stored locally at the user’s machine. However, implementing the 8th Law
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of Identity should not lead to the security and privacy issues that current location
independent identity management systems have.
We foresee two emerging technologies that can support identity management
with regard to this law: mobile communication and cloud computing. A mobile
phone can for instance assist a user in authentication as a second communication
channel or it can act as a trusted computing and storage device. Data required to
perform authentication can, on the other hand, be distributed to locations in the
‘cloud’ that are securely and privately accessible for the user.
Hardware tokens that can easily be carried around canbeused to achieve higher
levels of security at authentication than are currently possible with cloud comput-
ing or mobile phones; but possibly with less user convenience.
2.5.2 “Who am I today?”
As discussed in section 2.2.1, users may have several identities, even within a sin-
gle scope. This distinction in identities manifests itself when people have several
different responsibilities, or, in other words, may have several different ‘roles’. Ex-
amples may help to clarify this issue.
When signing a document, a notary can choose to sign this as a notary or as a
private person. The distinction is legally significant. The CFO of a company may
use an electronic banking system either to enter a personal or a business transac-
tion. An ICT system administrator may sign in to a system either as ‘root’ (which
allows him to run OS-level applications and scripts) or as an ordinary system user
(that allows him to only execute end-user applications).
We see that users can have different roles that allow them to do different things
within a certain service. Furthermore, the impact of user actions depends on their
role: A signature of an accountant or a notary represents more legal value.
Current identity management systems do not make it easy for users to manage
such different roles. Basically, users are forced to maintain and manage several
identifiers to separate these roles. But this may lead to confusion. For instance, if
a user has previously signed in at its IdP using a particular identity, and the user
and the service support SSO, the user may automatically be signed in using this
same identity when accessing a different service some time later. This is potentially
dangerous: If the CFO has signed in as CFO earlier, he may not want to execute a
personal transaction while still being signed in as CFO.
For many current identitymanagement systems these very common usage sce-
narios pose a problem. There is noway to indicate as which role or which identity a
user wants to access a particular service, especially if she has accessed that system
in both capacities before. One of those identities may be selected automatically
(in a single-sign-on context), most likely without the user knowing why or how to
change it.
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Recommendation Identity management systems should provide a way for users
to see and select their identity with which they ‘sign in’ even if explicitly signing
in is not asked for, because the user has already authenticated with an IdP that is
recognised by the RP. Asking users each time which role (at which IdP) they want
to use is cumbersome for the user, and therefore not a good solution to this issue.
So, alternative approaches need to be investigated.
2.5.3 When complex transactions requiremultiple credentials
A special case of the previous issue is that of transactions that require the cooper-
ation of many services, possibly of multiple RPs. This is for example the case in
service-oriented architectures (SOAs), where one application consists of multiple
software services. The problem arises if the user needs to present credentials for
more than one service, and the credentials depend on the role the user assumes.
The user needs to have all the credentials required to perform the transaction, but
can only present them if she has logged in using the right role. Also in this situation
the user has no means to select her role or identity for a particular session.
Recommendation Clearly, this is part of a more general problem of implement-
ing chains of transactions, in which identity management plays only a partial role.
But perhaps identity management systems could provide a way to automatically
determine the full set of required credentials and the minimal role the user can
assume that covers those credentials.
2.5.4 User profilemanagement
When a user accesses a service, this often involves the processing of personal infor-
mation. Someof that informationmaybe stored at the IdP, while other information
is stored at the RP because it is service specific and the RP needs the information
for e.g. marketing research, or because the RP does not trust the IdP to store the
required information. More often than not, many RPs store the same information
for a particular user. How can such a scattered profile be managed and be kept
up to date by a user? Should a user always be allowed to update such information
(consider for example the counter-example of medical records)? The question is
whether identity management systems will be able to simplify user profile man-
agement both for the end users as well as the RPs and IdPs.
Recommendation This issue is resolved by following the emerging trend towards
the convergence of profile, identity and authorisation (or access) management into
a single system for identity management. Such a system would also be beneficial
for users, as it allows them to manage personalisation of many different services
in a central location. This way, changing a single setting once will change the be-
haviour of all services consistently. This enables a ubiquitous personal experience
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across many different services. We see a similar trend in social networks, such as
Facebook, LinkedIn and Google. These companies stimulate their users tomanage
their profiles in their services and possibly, share those data with other systems.
The emerging trend of personal data lockers or personal data brokers could be
used to enable users to manage their identity information and keep it up to date.
The personal data locker is a cloud-based service where users maintain their own
data and control who has access to it. This way a user can give a RP access to per-
sonal data attributes independently of an IdP.
Note, however, that although identity management is positioned as the solu-
tion for the cumbersome maintenance of identity information, the nature of cer-
tain businesses (see Section 2.3.4) and the nature of identity itself (as discussed
in Section 2.2.1) limit the implementation of management of identity information
across organisational domains.
2.6 Conclusions & Recommendations
Identity management not only comprises identification and authentication, but
also access management and user profile management. Stakeholders such as end-
users and relying parties require identity management systems to be able to span
multiple organisations, to be user friendly, privacy friendly and secure. Current
systems for identity management are not able to accomplish this.
As we have seen in this chapter, security, privacy and usability are not ade-
quately addressed in current identity management solutions. This renders current
systems for federated identity management inapplicable for ‘high-value’ services,
such as electronic banking, that consequently remain to rely on their own home-
grown systems for access control.
Federation, as well as the more fundamental concept of identity, and its con-
sequences regarding scope, responsibility and trust, is still not understood. More
fundamentally, the term federation is used confusingly within the field causing fur-
ther uncertainty.
The issues of identity management systems presented in the chapter cause the
current identity crisis. In order to resolve the identity crisis, we recommend to fur-
ther investigate the following main observations made in this chapter.
• A proper and practice-oriented model for identity underlying identity man-
agement should be developed, and IdPs and RPs should make explicit how
that model applies to their systems of identity management.
• Building on that model, the trust relationships between the parties involved
in the identity management system should be investigated and formalised.
• To prevent phishing attacks, it is very important that users can (and will) au-
thenticate the RP and the IdP. Mutual authentication therefore needs to be
incorporated in identity management systems in such a way that the user is
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not required to install special software or to use one and the same computer
all the time.
• To enhance user privacy we recommend that users can remain anonymous
or use pseudonyms at RPs, and to have IdPs that do not link all user trans-
actions at all RPs together. Although identity management systems already
implement at least partly these solutions, not all do so. We need an iden-
tity management system that does not allow IdPs to see all user transactions,
without violating the 8th Law of Location Independence (which states that
identity management systems should not rely on any persistent data stored
locally at the user’s machine).
• Identitymanagement systems should provide away for users to see and select
their identity with which they ‘sign in’ even if explicitly signing in is not asked
for.
• Identity management systems should provide a way to automatically deter-
mine the full set of required credentials for a certain service, and theminimal
role the user can assume that covers those credentials.
• Finally, we need identity management systems that put the user back into
control and that support the user in maintaining a user profile that can be
used (in a controlled manner) by business from several organisational do-
mains.
Most of these recommendations are not trivial, and to implement them requires
a substantial research, development and standardisation effort. Moreover, to re-
solve the identity crisis, stakeholders need to work on this together. We believe the
growing need for a proper, well-founded, identity management solution is worth
the effort.
Chapter 3
ABCs: FromCryptography to Implementation
“[O]ften the most important
contribution a scientist can make is
to discover a new way of seeing old
theories or facts”
Richard Dawkins [Daw06]
In the previous chapter we studied identity management (IDM) and introducedthe main participants: identity providers, users and service providers (or relying
parties). An important functionality in IDM is authentication, that is, the process
inwhich the user’s identity is verified. Authentication in a broader sensemeans the
verification that some identity information is true about a user.
In this chapter we focus on Attribute-Based Credentials (ABCs) by discussing
the main cryptographic building blocks, protocols and implementations.44 Our
step-by-step description shows the abstract cryptographic goals and how they are
realised in two major technologies (U-Prove and Idemix, see below more details).
This parallel discussion makes it easy to see the similarities and differences be-
tween them. The abstraction and the gradual approach have also helped our uni-
versity group to create efficient smart-card implementations of these technologies
and later to put ABCs in practice in an experimental, pilot infrastructure (cf. Chap-
ter 6).
3.1 Introduction
ABCs enable a special type of authentication. First, the ABC authentication does
not necessarily identify the user, only provides authentic assertions about the user.
Second, despite the reduced amount of information, the service provider canmake
an established access decision. Third, the whole process is user centric. All data is
under the user’s control that needs for the authentication, so she does not need to
involve the identity provider while authenticating at a service provider. Fourth, au-
thentication instances are not only possibly non-identifying (as mentioned above)
but also unlinkable. This improves the user’s privacy. Clearly, the notion of au-
thentication here is different from usual mechanisms, such as a login process to a
website with a username and the corresponding password.
44ABCs can be described in various ways. We choose an intuitive approach.
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The Attribute-Based Credential (ABC) technology uses also different names for
the main roles. An identity provider in the context of ABCs is called an issuer. Is-
suers verify identity information of the user and create credentials for her. The way
issuers perform identity verification is mostly out of scope here. Using these cre-
dentials, the user can authenticate at a service provider, called a verifier.
Identity information can be divided into attributes, mostly used for user au-
thentication at verifiers in an ABCs system.
Definition 3.1. An attribute is any indivisible piece of personal information that
can be described by a bit-string, such as an identifier, a qualification or a property
of an entity.
An attribute formally can be described as its name and its value45. The attribute
value is a bit-string, but cryptographically we work with integers; how the encod-
ing happens is irrelevant as long as it can be carried out by all participants and
is collision-free. Mostly, we say ‘attributes’ referring to both attribute names and
attribute values, as long as it is clear from the context. Although in this chapter
it does not matter what kinds of entities (individuals, devices, sessions, etc.) are
described by the attributes, our primary focus in the thesis is attributes related to
human users.
Informally, an Attribute-Based Credential is a cryptographic container of at-
tributes that provides security assurance for all participants in the system. Most
importantly, the user cannot forge credentials or change the attribute values. Fur-
thermore, to guarantee non-transferability and to bind a credential to its carrier
device, the following method is applied. One of the attributes is in fact a secret key
that is only known to the user’s device. Since this key never leaves the device but
is required when the user authenticates to a verifier, credentials cannot be trans-
ferred. Relying on these features, a verifier can be convinced that a user’s attributes
in an authentication process come from the issuer, and as long as the verifier trusts
the issuer with respect to these attributes, the attributes actually hold for the user.
An ABC can be described by the following components:
• the credential’s name;
• the secret key;
• the pairs of attribute names and values;
• the issuer’s identity; and
• the issuer’s signature.
Figure 3.1 shows a simplified view of an Attribute-Based Credential. Throughout
this thesis we often describe a credential only by its name and the attribute names.
The issuer’s identity is mostly implicit though in some examples we do make that
explicit too. A user can have several credentials on her device, e.g. , ‘citizen identity’,
‘driving license’, ‘airline loyalty’; see several examples in Chapter 6.
45We do not distinguish various types of attributes
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Figure 3.1: A schematic view of an Attribute-Based Credential.
Attributes are stored on the user’s device within ABCs. This device has to take
part in two important types of interactive, cryptographic protocols: issuing and
verification. Issuing is a protocol between the issuer and the user’s device. As a re-
sult, a new credential gets stored on the device. This process is comparable to steps
3 and 4 in claims-based IDM in Figure 2.1 on page 16. Verification is an authentica-
tion process during which the user reveals and the verifier receives a subset of the
attributes from the user’s device; cf. steps 1, 2 and 3 in the same figure.
ABCs are never shown in their entirety but only some components – and most
importantly attribute values – are disclosed from them. Conceptually, any set of
attributes on the user’s device can be revealed. This is cryptographically realised
by multiple selective disclosure (SD) protocols.46 In fact, as many SD protocols
are required within a verification as the number of credentials containing the re-
vealed attributes. A SD protocol involves two parts: The user’s device discloses a
subset of attributes from a particular credential and it proves to the verifier that
these attributes are indeed in the credential. Figure 3.2 shows the attribute flow in
an ABC system from the perspective of the credential carrier device: issuing and
showing. (This latter function is the main building block of the verification proto-
col.) Abstractly, a verifier receives the following pieces of information as a result of
a selective disclosure protocol:
• the credential’s name;
• the disclosed pairs of attribute names and values;
• the issuer’s identity; and
• a proof that the user has a valid credential of this name containing the dis-
closed attributes.
46The technique to compose several selective disclosure proofs into one proof of knowledge is briefly
discussed in Section 4.6 on page 83.
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Figure 3.2: ‘Credentials are issued, attributes are shown.’ (Signatures are illustrated
as watermark to show how a credential signature effects a proof with disclosed at-
tributes.)
For instance, a possible result is the following proven statement: “My ‘residence
permit’ credential is signed by the GBA (the Dutchmunicipal administration) and I
disclose two attributes: ‘gender’ =‘male’ and the ‘city of residence’ =‘Nijmegen,
The Netherlands’.” Note that this statement is not identifying in general because
there are lots of people to whom this assertion holds.
It is clear that unlikemany IDMtechnologies, ABCs enable the verifier to receive
authentic data from the issuer without directly communicating with it. Evenmore,
the issuer does not need to be involved in the transaction whatsoever.
In this thesis we consider two major ABC technologies, Microsoft’s U-
Prove [Bra10] and IBM’s Idemix [IBM12]. U-Prove is based on Stefan Brands’
proposal [Bra00] and Idemix on the works of Jan Camenisch and Anna Lysyan-
skaya [CL01, ?]. Although there are similarities between the two technologies in
terms of their constructions and some of their security and privacy properties,
there are important differences. They operate with different cryptographic as-
sumptions in different types of groups and they provide different functionality.
Most importantly, Idemix provides intrinsically more privacy for the users.
So far, we did not specify what the user’s device is. Such a device has to per-
form the following tasks. First, it has to store secret keys, attributes and credentials.
Second, it has to protect this information. Third, it needs to perform all necessary
computations securely. Fourth, it has to communicate with the issuers and veri-
fiers. And finally, it has to be usable, that is, ‘reasonably easy’ to operate with for
users.
To select a suitable device in a specific ABC system, one has to carry out a thor-
ough analysis with respect to usage and the possible attack scenarios. Neverthe-
less, we decide to focus on smart cards because it is a natural choice in terms of
security. Typically, a smart card has tamper-resistant secure storage and it is also
resistant (to a large extent) against side-channel attacks during cryptographic com-
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putations. Furthermore, people are familiar with smart cards and with their vari-
ous applications (e.g. bank cards, public transportation cards, loyalty cards). Fi-
nally, the smart-card technology is a viable choice for the user’s device, since pro-
totypes have shown [MV11, VA13] that all client-side ABC computations can be im-
plemented on a smart card. The running time of a selective disclosure protocol is
around one second with the current technology, making ABC-based authentication
in many contexts practical.
Besides the benefits of a smart card, there are also inherent challenges. A smart
card cannot act on its own and it does not have a user interface. Therefore, it re-
quires an additional device for communication purposes. This is either the user’s
own device that she has to carry around or it is a potentially untrusted card reader
terminal. Such a terminal may maliciously display modified information to the
user that she cannot verify. In spite of these difficulties we believe that smart cards
are suitable ABC client devices. We address some of the challenges in the rest of the
thesis; see terminal certificates in Chapter 4 and Section 6.3, andmobile phones as
personal card readers in Section 6.6.2.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. First preliminaries and building
blocks are described in Section 3.2. Then issuing and verification protocols are ex-
plained in Section 3.3. Finally, efficient smart-card implementations are presented
in Section 3.4.
3.2 Preliminaries
Before we discuss credential protocols in the next section, we describe the essen-
tial building blocks that we will need.47 The main cryptographic problems and as-
sumptions are discussed in Section 3.2.1, then the original and generalised Peder-
sen commitment are studied in Section 3.2.2. The last three sections are devoted
to themain cryptographic tools to create and use Attribute-BasedCredentials: spe-
cific credential signatures (Section 3.2.3), zero-knowledgeproofs of knowledge (Sec-
tion 3.2.4) and blind signature protocols (Section 3.2.5).
3.2.1 Cryptographic problems
In this subsection we study groups in which the discrete logarithm (DL) and/or
the RSA problem is known to be difficult, and we also define the representation
problem.
Discrete logarithm in a prime group The difficulty of solving the discrete loga-
rithm (DL) problem is one of the most fundamental assumptions on which con-
temporary public-key cryptography can develop primitives. We define it here al-
47This section provides a functional description of ABCs without security proofs.
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though just in an informal fashion48. Let G be a group in which the group oper-
ation can be performed efficiently. Given an element g ∈ G that generates cyclic
subgroup 〈g〉 inG of order q.49
Definition 3.2. The discrete logarithm problem (DL problem) takes the following
form: Given g ∈ G and h := gx, find x ∈ Zq .
The DL assumption in a given group is the assumption that the DL problem is
hard in this group. We will refer to groups as DL groups in which the DL problem
is considered to be computationally infeasible.
Examples of prime groups in which the DL assumption holds include: 1. Let
G = Z∗p where p is prime and g ∈ G for which the order of 〈g〉 is q|p − 1 also prime
(their bit-lengths are e.g. |p| = 1024, |q| = 160); and 2. A group of points with a
special point addition operation on an elliptic curve defined over a finite field (of
characteristic 2 or a large prime). In both types the order of the cyclic group 〈g〉
is assumed to be known. (In this chapter we work in integer prime groups with
the multiplicative notation. In Chapter 5 we work with an elliptic-curve group.)
The parameters for such systems can be described by the group, the generator, the
order of the subgroup: (G, g, q). In the next paragraph we consider groups in which
the DL problem is hard but the order of 〈g〉 is not prime. Actually, the order is
hidden in this case.
Strong RSA The strong RSA problem is related to the well-known RSA prob-
lem [RSA78], that is, the problem of finding eth root in a group Zn where n = p · q
(p, q primes).
Definition 3.3. The RSA problem takes the following form: Given modulus n, ex-
ponent e ∈ Z and element y := xe mod n, find x ∈ Zn.
This problem is believed to be hard as long as the prime factors p and q are un-
known. In fact, these factors are also called a trapdoor (or secret key, depending on
the context), because they allow the efficient computation of x in the RSA problem.
Note that the RSA problem is to find the unique solution x (mod n) of the equa-
tion y ≡ xe (mod n). The strong RSAproblem, introduced simultaneously byBaric´–
Pfitzmann [BP97] and Fujisaki–Okamoto [FO97], has many solutions because it
does not fix the exponent e. The group in which this problem is believed to be
hard is the quadratic residue subgroup50 QRn of Z
∗
n.
48See e.g. [MOVR97, KL08] for more details.
49Note that because the square-and-multiply algorithm requires only at mostO(log q) group opera-
tions, exponentiation can also be efficiently computed.
50A quadratic residue r in Z∗n resembles a square number in the set of integers: there exists some
s ∈ Z∗n such that r ≡ s
2 (mod n). In this thesis, and in Idemix [IBM12], the integer n is a product of two
distinct (secret) safe primes p, q, i.e. p = 2p′ + 1, q = 2q′ + 1 where p′, q′ are also primes. The setQRn
of all quadratic residues in Z∗n forms a cyclic subgroup of Z
∗
n. The order of Z
∗
n is |Z
∗
n| = (p− 1)(q − 1) =
4p′q′ and the order ofQRn is |QRn| =
(p−1)(q−1)
4
= p′q′, and these orders are assumed to be secret.
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Definition 3.4. The strong RSA problem takes the following form: Given modulus
n and b ∈ QRn, find integers a and e such that e ≥ 2 and b ≡ ae (mod n).
The strong RSA assumption states that it is computationally infeasible to find a so-
lution of the strong RSA problem, as long as the prime factors of n are unknown. As
in the case of the RSA problem, the order of the group is assumed to be not known
by either of the system’s participants except for the entity who knows the prime
factors of n.
Since the quadratic residue group is cyclic, there exists a generator g ∈ QRn
that spans all (p−1)(q−1)4 elements in QRn. Like in a conventional RSA system, the
entity who knows the prime factors of n can efficiently compute51 the b1/e (mod n)
for any given b ∈ QRn and e ∈ Z. More interestingly, according to the assumption,
in such a group the discrete logarithm assumption also holds: For given a, b ∈ QRn
it is hard to find e. (If this did not hold, the strong RSA problem could be solved
by fixing a.) Therefore, similar cryptographic schemes can be developed in such a
group as in a prime DL group.
Representation problem The discrete logarithm problem can be generalised to
the representation problem; instead of only one generator, several generators are
given in this case.
Definition 3.5. Given a group G of order q, generated by g, in which the DL as-
sumption holds. Let a tuple of generators (g1, . . . , gL) ∈ 〈g〉L be fixed. Then the tu-
ple (x1, . . . , xL) ∈ ZLq is said to be a representation ofH with respect to (g1, . . . , gL)
if
H =
L∏
i=1
gxii .
The exponents of a tuple of elements uniquely determine the value H . However,
givenH ∈ 〈g〉 and generators g1, . . . , gL, there are lots of representations.52
Definition3.6. The representationproblem takes the following form: Given a gen-
erator g of the cyclic groupG, (g1, . . . , gL) ∈ 〈g〉L andH ∈ 〈g〉, find a representation
(x′1, . . . , x
′
L)with respect to (g1, . . . , gL) (i.e. whereH =
∏L
i=1 g
x′i
i ).
The representation assumption in a group is the assumption that the representation
problem is hard in this group. First, we observe that this problem can be stated in
a prime DL group as well as in a strong RSA setting. Second, it can be proven that
51In an RSA group where the modulus is n = pq, computations in the exponent are performed
(mod (p − 1)(q − 1)) because of Euler’s theorem. We will omit modulo notation in the exponents for
readability.
52Let the order of group 〈g〉 be ω := |〈g〉|. Then, assuming that the exponents are reducedmodulo ω,
the number of distinct representations isωL−1: L−1 exponents, say the firstL−1, can be chosen freely
from {0, . . . , ω − 1} and the last one is uniquely determined by them. Note that computing this last,
unique exponent is a DL problem. In this way one gets all representations and all of them are distinct.
Using the notation above, in a prime group ω = q, in a strong RSA system ω = |QRn| =
(p−1)(q−1)
4
.
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finding a representation is as hard as the DL problem53. The main idea is that if
there is an oracle that can solve the representation problem for any H ∈ 〈g〉 and
(g1, . . . , gL) ∈ 〈g〉L, we can build a polynomial-time machine that can efficiently
solve the DL problem (g,H) in the following way. After selecting L random expo-
nents (r1, . . . , rL) and computing the generators (g1 = g
r1 , . . . , gL = g
rL), we call
the oracle and receive a tuple (x1, . . . , xL) for which H =
∏L
i=1 g
xi
i . Then the dis-
crete logarithm ofH can be computed as x :=
∑L
i=1 rixi since
H =
L∏
i=1
gxii =
L∏
i=1
(gri)
xi = g
∑L
i=1 rixi = gx.
3.2.2 Pedersen commitment
A commitment scheme is a cryptographic primitive used in several protocols, in-
cluding zero-knowledge proofs and Attribute-Based Credential systems. It enables
a party to commit to a value and show the resulting commitment to another party.
A commitment hides the value from the receiving party, while it binds the commit-
ter to this value, so that the committer cannot change it. A commitment scheme
has two phases: committing and opening. In the committing phase the commit-
ter chooses a value a and commits to it by sending C(a) to the receiver. As men-
tioned, C(a) hides a from the receiver. Later, in the opening phase the committer
reveals the value a and possibly provides some additional information required by
the scheme. With this information the receiver can confirm that a was indeed the
committed value. The binding property ensures that the committer could not have
changed the value of a between the commitment and the opening phases.54
With respect to the power required to break a given property, both binding
and hiding can be computational or perfect (the latter is also called information-
theoretic). A commitment that computationally hides a value would not protect
this value against a machine that has unlimited computational power whereas a
commitment with perfect hiding property would resist even such a machine. Sim-
ilarly, a scheme with computational binding could not prevent such a machine to
change the committedvalue. In the best case, a scheme provides either perfect hid-
ing with computational binding, or computational hiding with perfect binding.55
Weshow two fundamental examples of commitment schemes both beingbased
on the discrete logarithm problem.
53See a detailed proof in Stefan Brands’ thesis [Bra00, pp.58–62].
54The basic idea of commitment schemes can be demonstrated by a treasure chest as follows. The
committer puts a slip of paper with a secret value in it, then locks it with a key, and gives the locked
chest to the recipient. On the one hand, the receiver cannot open the box (hiding), on the other hand,
he can be convinced that the secret value cannot be changed (binding). Later the committer can reveal
the secret value and give the key to the recipient who can verify the committed value.
55Perfect hiding and binding in the same scheme cannot be achieved; see [Dam99].
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1. Given a DL group setup (G, g, q), let C(a) := ga. Because of the DL assump-
tion, this commitment hides the value a computationally. However, C(a)
perfectly binds the committer to the value a since there is a unique value a′
(mod q) for which C(a) = ga
′
. To open a commitment, the committer sim-
ply provides a. Note that if a is taken from a small set, this commitment is
inappropriate because the receiver could easily find out a by brute-forcing all
possible values.
2. Given a DL group setup (G, g, q) and an additional generator h ∈ 〈g〉. APeder-
sen commitment [Ped92] is defined as C(a) := gr · ha, where r ∈R Zq is cho-
sen uniformly at random. A Pedersen commitment perfectly hides the value
a ∈ Z∗q because for any a
′ ∈ Zq there exists r′ ∈ Z∗q such that C(a) = g
a′ · hr
′
.
However, finding r′ ∈ Zq after changing a ∈ Zq such that hr
′
= ga−a
′
· hr is a
DL problem and thus only computationally infeasible. Therefore, C(a) com-
putationally binds the committer to the value a ∈ Zq . To open a commitment
C(a), the committer has to reveal both a and r.
We see that to break the binding of a Pedersen scheme, a malicious committer
would have to be able to find a different tuple of exponents (a, r) and (a′, r′) for the
same commitment: C(a) = ga ·hr = ga
′
·hr
′
. This problem can also be described as
follows: Find another representation forC(a) besides (a, r), say (a′, r′), with respect
to the tuple (g, h). Because of the representation assumption, this problem is hard.
To motivate the following concept, we give some intuition about our applica-
tion. Our goal is to apply representations to construct Attribute-Based Credentials.
Exponents will be considered as attributes. But because attributesmay possibly be
taken from a small set (e.g. , ‘gender’, ‘nationality’), the view of a representation
problem in which all exponents are attributes could enable a malicious party to
brute-force all possible combinations and to find out personal information. There-
fore, the direct application of the representation problem would not necessarily
hide the attributes. The generalised version of the Pedersen commitment scheme
can prevent this issue. [Bra00, BL12]
Definition 3.7. Given a DL group setup (G, g, q) and additional generators
(g1, . . . , gL) ∈ 〈g〉L. The generalised Pedersen commitment to L values (a1, . . . , aL)
is defined as
C(a1, . . . , aL) = g
a ·
L∏
i=1
gaii ,
where a ∈R Zq is chosen uniformly at random. The opening of a generalised Ped-
ersen commitmentC(a1, . . . , aL) is (a, a1, . . . , aL).
By introducing an additional exponent a that is randomly chosen from the
whole exponent space, we achieve perfect hiding for the rest of the exponents
(a1, . . . , aL). The binding property of the generalised Pedersen commitment relies
on the difficulty of the representation problem; thus, it is computational.
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The generalised Pedersen commitment relies on the discrete logarithm as-
sumption. Definition 3.7 can also be adapted to the strong RSA setting, but the
additional exponent a has to be chosen carefully. Because the order of group 〈g〉 is
unknown (in fact, it is |QRn| as we have seen in footnote 50), the set that a is taken
from a very large interval (cf. ℓn and ℓ2 in footnote 64).
We showhowgeneralised Pedersen commitments are used to construct creden-
tial signatures in the next subsection.
3.2.3 Credential Signatures
We need a specific signature that enables the construction of ABCs. Most impor-
tantly, such a signature should sign a block of messages, i.e. attributes, instead of
only one message. The idea is that the signer will sign a Pedersen commitment in
which the exponents are the messages (attributes).
An Attribute-Based Credential can be realised as a (generalised) Pedersen com-
mitment signed by a credential issuer. Knowing the public key of the issuer, any
verifier can check the validity of a credential, and thus, of the attributes. Not only
verifiability, but also unforgeability and non-repudiation are true for such a digital
credential – just like to a conventional signature. Later we show howABC protocols
can be constructed based on the signature; see Section 3.3.
Let the attributes in a credential be denoted by a1, . . . , aL, numbers in a certain
interval. The encoding of the strings describing the attribute values and converting
them into the interval is out of scope.
Brands’ signature Brands [Bra00] proposes a signature that can be used for At-
tribute-Based Credentials. We briefly describe here the signature scheme and later
construct a credential protocol with it (Section 3.3).
The signer needs a system with public and private parameters. The signer has
two options with regard to the choice of the group he is using. He can generate
his own group in which the DL problem is hard, or he can use an existing group
G (e.g. in a larger infrastructure with known group parameters). In both cases the
signer’s system can be described as a DL group, a generator and the order of the
generator in the group: (G, g, q). The signer’s private key is x, x1, . . . , xL ∈ Zq and
his public key is h := gx with a public description of the group and the parameters:
(G, g, g1, . . . , gL) where g1 = g
x1 , . . . , gL = g
xL . Furthermore, the signer selects a
(standard) hash functionH.
A signature comprises two components. First, it includes a (generalised Peder-
sen) commitment to the attributes:
h′ := C(a1, . . . , aL) = g
a ·
L∏
i=1
gaii .
Second, it includes a pair of integers (c′, r′) ∈ Zq × Zq . Having the signer’s public
key, the system parameters and the signature, a verifier can validate the signature
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as follows:
c′
?
= H
(
h′‖gr
′
(h · h′)−c
′
)
.
The signature can be viewed in twoways. It is either a signature on the commit-
ment h′ or on the block of messages a, a1, . . . , aL. In the latter case, the signer relies
on the binding property of the generalised Pedersen commitment that guarantees
that the attributes cannot be altered.
We emphasise the distinction between the two options because when this sig-
nature is used as a credential signature, the issuer actually signs the attributes,
while the verifier checks the signature on the commitment. We note that since only
the user knows the value a and the issuer does not, the establishment of the signa-
ture is an interactive protocol between the issuer and the user; cf. a blind signature
in Section 3.2.5.
Camenisch–Lysyanskaya signature Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [?] propose an-
other signature scheme to construct Attribute-Based Credential, also based on a
Pedersen commitment56. The Camenisch–Lysyanskaya (CL) signature works in a
group in which the strong RSA assumption holds, i.e. in the quadratic residue sub-
groupQRn of Z
∗
n. Because the secret key is specific to the group, each signer has to
generate their own group.
The public key of the issuer, which is the output of the key generation algorithm,
is the RSAmodulus and some random generators from the quadratic residue group
QRn: (n, Z, S,R,R1, . . . , RL). The private key is the (safe) prime factors p, q of n.
57
Like in a Brands signature, a Pedersen commitment is applied to construct a
container for the attributes:
R′ := C(a1, . . . , aL) = R
a ·
L∏
i=1
Raii (mod n).
A CL signature on these attributes is a value A and two randomly chosen values, a
prime e and an integer v, i.e. (A, e, v), such that:
A ≡
(
Z
SvR′
)1/e (mod ϕ(n))
(mod n)
The verification is a rearranged version of the signature in which the eth exponent
rather than the eth ‘root’ is computed; in this respect it is similar to a traditional
RSA signature:
Z
?
≡ Ae · Sv ·R′ (mod n).
56This commitment over a hidden-order group was proven to be secure by Fujisaki, Okamoto and
Damgård [FO97, DF02]
57Additionally, the signer also generates a proof that the parameters were honestly computed. This
proof is attached to the public key; cf. [IBM12].
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Prover G, g, q, h = gx Verifier
Secret: x
w ∈R Zq
a := gw
a
−−−−−−−−→
c
←−−−−−−−− c ∈R Zq
r := c · x+ w (mod q)
r
−−−−−−−−→ a
?
= gr · h−c
Figure 3.3: The Schnorr identification is a proof of knowledge of x: PK{χ|h = gχ}.
Randomisation Randomisation of a signature is a computation in which a party
(not necessarily the signer) modifies a signature without changing the message
that it signs. The resulting randomised signature can be verified against the orig-
inal public key.58 Brands’ signature, to the best of our knowledge, cannot be ran-
domised. This puts some limitations on its use in ABC schemes; see unlinkability
in Section 3.3.5.
Using the fact that in a CL signature A is the result of an algebraic computa-
tion rather than a hash value (like in Brands’ signature), there is a simple and el-
egant way to randomise a signature. Randomisation is done by first choosing a
random integer r (from a large interval) and then by computing a new signature.
The randomised signature is (A, e, v) on the same commitmentR′ := Ra ·
∏L
i=1 R
ai
i
(mod n), where A := A · S−r (mod n) and v := v + er. Indeed, as it can be verified,
this (randomised) signature is also valid onR′ (that is, on the attributes):
A
e
SvR′ ≡ AeS−erSvSerR′ ≡ AeSvR′ ≡ Z (mod n).
3.2.4 Proof of knowledge
We briefly recall the concept of a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.59
Throughout the thesis we will use the notation introduced by Camenisch and
Stadler [CS97] to specify zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs in an abstract way. PK stands
for proof of knowledge and between curly brackets any Greek letters stand for vari-
ables that are known to the prover but not to the verifier, all other variables are
known to both participants.60
For example, Schnorr’s proof of knowledge [Sch91] of a discrete logarithm can
be described as PK{χ|h = gχ}; see Figure 3.3. Both the prover and the verifier
know G, g, q, h = gx (common input) but only the prover is privy to x ∈ Zq (pri-
vate input). The protocol runs as follows. The prover commits to a random value
58Randomisation is sometimes called blinding; e.g. [Ver01].
59For a more complete treatment we refer the reader to Goldwasser et al. [GMR89] or the tutorials
by Damgårdhttp://preview.tinyurl.com/DamgaardZK and by Camenisch http://preview.tinyurl.
com/CamenischDAA, [last accessed: October 26, 2014].
60We strive to use Greek symbols similar to those that they represent; such as, χ for x or α1 for a1.
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w ∈R Zq and sends the commitment a to the verifier. The verifier sends a ran-
dom challenge c ∈R Zq to the prover, who responds with r that she can compute
by using the challenge c together with her secret key x and random value w. The
verification equation a
?
= gr · h−c (in G) only holds if the prover knows x and she
computed correctly.
An (honest verifier) zero-knowledge proof of knowledge has to be complete,
sound and zero knowledge. Complete: A prover who knows x can convince the
verifier, i.e. the verification equation a
?
= gr · h−c holds. Sound: If the prover does
not know x, she cannot convince the verifier. Zero knowledge: The verifier does
not learn any other information just the fact that the prover knows x.
In practice, zero-knowledge proofs are often implemented using the Fiat–
Shamir heuristic [FS87]. In this case the proof is not interactive, the challenge c
is not provided by the verifier but computed as a hash value of the commitment
a from the first step and possibly some message m. First, this turns a proof of
knowledge into a signature scheme; e.g. Schnorr signature [Sch91]. In this case c =
H(a‖m), r from the non-interactive proof is a signature onm by the prover whose
public key is h. The signature can be verifiedby the equation c
?
= H(gr ·h−c‖m). Sec-
ond, when such a proof is applied for transactions, m is typically combined from
some fixed system description and a fresh, random nonce provided by the verifier
that cannot be predicted by the prover. This guarantees that the same proof cannot
be replayed in another system or in another transaction.
An ABC selective disclosure protocol is a proof of knowledge in which the cre-
dential’s secret key and some attributes remain hidden. In this way the verifier is
guaranteed that the user owns the credential (i.e. she knows all exponents includ-
ing the secret key); however, the verifier does not learn any information other than
the disclosed attributes (see Section 3.3.3 and 3.3.4).
3.2.5 Blind signature
A blind signature, proposed by David Chaum [Cha83], is an interactive protocol
betweena receiver and a signer that results in a valid signature at the receiver with-
out the signer learning the content of themessage or the resulting signature [Bra94].
To achieve this, the receiver first disguises the message before the signer signed it
and then the receiver unblinds it by removing the disguise to obtain the final signa-
ture. The resulting signature can be verified in the same way as it had been signed
without blinding.
In the context of ABCs, blind signatures are used for issuing credentials; the is-
suer is the signer and the user is the receiver. The user does not reveal her secret
key to the issuer but receives a valid credential signature of the issuer on her com-
mitment containing the secret key and the attribute values. Moreover, the issuer
does not get to see the resulting signature; thus, he cannot possibly trace the user.
Note that the threat of tracing based on the signature is only present if the signa-
ture cannot be randomised before verification. Aswe saw, this is the case at Brands’
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signatures but not at the CL signatures. Nevertheless, both signatures are issued by
applying a blind signature protocol in which neither the secret key nor the resulting
signature is known to the issuer (see the next section).
3.3 ABC protocols
Based on the building blocks we described in the previous section, we discuss two
constructions that realise Attribute-Based Credentials. Let us recall our objective.
Users in an identity management system (IMS) should be able to authenticate in
a secure and privacy-friendly way. But unlike in a conventional IMS, in which the
user has to authenticate to an identity provider who provides an (ephemeral) se-
curity token to access some service, the user can employ a credential dispensed in
advance at an issuer and use that to generate a fresh security token ‘on the spot’
revealing minimal but sufficient information to the verifier. We collect the main
security and privacy features and requirements of an ABC system:
(S1) Authenticity. The content of an ABC signed by the issuer cannot bemodified
and the verifier can verify the signature using this issuer’s public key.
(S2) Unforgeability prevents a malicious third party to forge a valid ABC.
(S3) Non-repudiation prevents the issuer to deny that the credential’s signature
was produced by him.
(S4) Non-transferability prevents the user to transfer her ABC to another user of
the system.
(P1) Offline issuer . The issuer of a credential is not involved in the verification
protocol.
(P2) Issuer unlinkability prevents an issuer to trace his credentials. More pre-
cisely, an adversary (e.g. a colluding set of issuers and verifiers) cannot decide
if an issuing protocol and a verification protocol belong to the same creden-
tial.61
(P3) Multi-showunlinkability. Verifiers cannot trace the activities of a user. More
precisely, seeing two verification protocols, no adversary (e.g. a colluding set
of verifiers and issuers) can distinguish the cases whether those protocols
were performed using the same credential or not.
(P4) Selective disclosure. Any subset of attributes from a credential can be re-
vealed and proven independently.
61(P2), (P3): Obviously, on the semantic level of attributes, revealed information canmake credential
activities linkable; e.g. disclosing your name in two transactions.
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(P5) Minimal information. During verification protocols no other information is
revealed to the verifier beyond the disclosed attributes, the credential names
and the corresponding issuers.
There are several methods that can realise ABCs based on the DL assump-
tion [Bra00, BL12], the RSA-assumption [Bra00], the strong RSA assumption [?],
and elliptic-curve DL assumption with pairing for one attribute [Ver01] and for
multiple attributes [CL04].
Abstract design process of ABCs Attribute-Based Credentials can be designed
following the cryptographic steps below:
1. Construct a suitable signature scheme:
(a) Consider a commitment scheme;
(b) Generalise the commitment scheme to a tuple of values instead of only
one value;
(c) Apply a signature on the commitment.
2. Develop ABC protocols based on the signature:
(a) Use a blinded version of the signature for issuing;
(b) Apply a proof of knowledge for selective disclosure.
Obviously, this simplified view does not always result in a good Attribute-Based
Credential scheme. However, on an abstract level this is the main idea behind
both technologies that we discuss in this thesis [Bra00, ?] and several more cryp-
tographic schemes proposed in the literature, e.g. [CL04, BL12, HM13].
Below we describe the issuing and selective disclosure protocols based on the
Brands signature, calledU-Prove technology [Bra10], and on theCL signature, called
Idemix technology [IBM12]. We discussed in Section 3.2.5 that an issuing protocol
is a blind signature by the issuer on the user’s attributes and secret key. A selective
disclosure is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of all hidden, non-disclosed at-
tributes from a credential. The number of attributes in a credential in all descrip-
tions is L ∈ Z+. To refer to the indices of the disclosed attributes, we will use the
notation of a disclosing set denoted by D ⊆ {1, . . . , L}. Therefore, attributes in a
showing instance can be organised in two sets: Attributes (ai)i∈D are sent to the
verifier before (or during) a protocol run, while attributes (ai)i/∈D are not revealed
but proven to be in a credential.
3.3.1 Issuing a U-Prove credential
We first describe U-Prove’s interactive issuing protocol [Bra00, Paq11].
During the system setup phase an issuer has to generate a DL group resulting
in G, g, q.62 Given the generator g ∈ G and the group order q, the issuer chooses a
62G is either a prime group or an elliptic-curve group. We use here multiplicative notation.
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Issuer p, q, h, g, g1, . . . , gL User
Secret: x, x1, . . . , xL (a1, . . . , aL)
w ∈R Z∗q
t := gw inG
t
−−−−−−−−→ a ∈R Z∗q , β, γ ∈R Z
∗
q
h′ := ga · hU inG
c′ :=H(h′‖gβ(h · hU )γ · t)
c
←−−−−−−−− c := c′ + γ (mod q)
r=c
(
x+
∑L
i=1 xiai
)
+w (mod q)
r
−−−−−−−−→ t
?
= gr(h · hU )−c inG
r′ := r + β + c′a (mod q)
Figure 3.4: U-Prove’s issuing protocol. The resulting signature is (h′, (c′, r′)). (Short-
hand notation: hU :=
∏L
i=1 g
ai
i inG.)
secret key x ∈R Zq (uniformly at random) and computes his public key h = gx. Fur-
thermore, he also selectsL secret exponents x1, . . . , xL ∈ Zq to compute additional
generators: g1 = g
x1, . . . , gL = g
xL .
The credential issuing protocol is a blind signature on the user’s attributes. It
hides a freshly generated secret key a and the resulting signature (h′, (c′, r′)) from
the issuer; see Figure 3.4. Note that the protocol can also be viewed as the is-
suer’s proof of knowledge of his secret key x corresponding to his public key h:
PK {(χ) | h = gχ} . The protocol runs as follows. The issuer commits to a random
value w and sends the commitment to the user. The user, instead of just sending a
random challenge, constructs c in a way that binds it to the issuer’s commitment t,
her freshly generated secret key a, and all the attributes a1, . . . , aL. Moreover, the re-
sulting challenge c enables the user to derive later a valid signature. After receiving c
from the user, the issuer computes the response, amodified version of the response
of a Schnorr proof of knowledge (Figure 3.3) that also includes the attributes and
all his secret exponents. Finally, the user can verify the proof and construct r′. The
resulting signature63 on h′ is (c′, r′) that can be verified as c′
?
= H
(
h′‖gr
′
(h · h′)−c
′
)
.
Finally, the user can store the signature which completes the issuance of the cre-
dential.
3.3.2 Issuing an Idemix credential
The Idemix issuing protocol is also a blind signature on the user’s attributes, the
issuer does not learn the user’s secret key and the final signature. Unlike U-Prove
where all the participants can possibly work in the same group, Idemix requires
distinct groups for all issuers. This is essential because each group has only one
63We remark that although we say, following Brands, that the signature is on h′, the real message to
be signed is the block of exponents (a, a1, . . . , aL). To regard h
′ as content enables one to verify the
signature without knowing the attributes. This is essential at the selective disclosure protocol.
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Issuer n, Z, S,R,R1, . . . , RL User
Secret: p, q (a1, . . . , aL) Secret: a
v′ ∈R I(ℓ1)
v′′ ∈R I(ℓ2)
U, PK1
←−−−−−−−− U := Sv
′
Ra (mod n)
Prime e ∈R [s1, s2]
A :=
(
Z
USv′′
∏
L
1 R
ai
i
)1/e
(mod n)
(A,e,v′′),PK2
−−−−−−−−−→ v := v′ + v′′
Figure 3.5: Idemix’s issuing protocol comprises twoproofs of knowledge; the result-
ing signature is (A, e, v) on R′. (For simplicity, we denote large intervals as follows:
I(ℓ) := {−2ℓ + 1, . . . , 2ℓ − 1})
secret key in an RSA setting. Thus, the issuer runs the key generation algorithm.
First, a (strong) RSA modulus n = pq is generated, where p′, q′, p = 2p′ + 1 and q =
2q′ + 1 are all distinct primes. Second, a random element of the quadratic residue
group modulo n is selected, i.e. S ∈R QRn. Third, further L + 2 quadratic residues
are generated (by raising S to random exponents): Z,R,R1, . . . , RL ∈R QRn. The
key generation algorithm outputs the issuer’s public key (n, S, Z,R,R1, . . . , RL) and
the issuer’s private key p, q.
Figure 3.5 shows64 the issuing protocol in Idemix. We use the abstract nota-
tion for the non-interactive proofs of knowledge PK1 and PK2. The user proves
by PK1 that she knows the representation of U with respect to the bases (S,R), a
randomiser v′ and her secret key a:
PK1 := PK
{
(ν′, α)
∣∣∣ U ≡ ±Sν′Rα (mod n)} .
In the response phase the issuer proves knowledge of d := 1/e (mod ϕ(n)):65
PK2 := PK
(δ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ A ≡ ±
(
Z
USv′′
∏L
1 R
ai
i
)δ
(mod n)
 .
Finally, the user checks that the resulting signature is indeed valid: Z
?
≡ AeSvRa ·∏L
1 R
ai
i (mod n). The secret key a from the commitment and the value v from the
resulting signature (A, e, v) remain hidden to the issuer at the end of the protocol.
64For the exact intervals, we refer the reader to the Idemix specification [IBM12, p.40] (some example
parameters are as follows: the bit-length of the modulus is ℓn = ⌈log2 n⌉ = 2048 and some technical
parameters derived from ℓn are ℓ1 = 2465, ℓ2 = 2723, [s1, s2] = [2596, 2596 + 2119]).
65Since the user does not knowwhetherA is a quadratic residue or not, the proof only demonstrates
thatA or −A is
(
Z
USv
′′ ∏L
1 R
ai
i
)δ
(mod n).
56 3. ABCs: From Cryptography to Implementation
3.3.3 Selective disclosure of a U-Prove credential
AU-Proveselective disclosure is a proof of knowledgeof a subset of the attributes in
a credential. Abstractly, the selective disclosure has two steps: First, the signature
itself is revealed and verified; second, a subset of the attributes is disclosed and
proven to be in the credential. Since the credential’s signature is revealed and it
cannot be changed by the user, it provides only one-time unlinkability; multiple
use of a credential is easily linked.
We briefly recall first the verification of a signature. Knowing the system pa-
rameters G, g, q, the issuer’s public key h and a signature (h′, (c′, r′)) sent by a user,
a verifier can check the validity of the signature by performing the following com-
putation: c′
?
= H
(
h′||gr
′
(h · h′)−c
′
)
.
The key observation to construct a selective disclosure protocol can be demon-
strated as follows. The Pedersen commitment h′, a component in the credential
signature, is bound to the credential’s secret key and the attributes.
h′ = ga ·
L∏
i=1
gaii .
If all the exponents (a, a1, . . . , aL) were revealed, the verifier could just ‘open’ this
commitment, that is, he could verify that these are indeed the committed values.
However, this is not the case, the secret key and possibly some of the attributes
remain hidden. If no attribute is disclosed, the user has to prove knowledge of all
the exponents in h′. If all attributes (a1, . . . , aL) are disclosed, hU =
∏L
i=1 g
ai
i can be
computed by the verifier. The user has to prove knowledgeof the discrete logarithm
of ga = h′/hU . Finally, if some attributes are disclosed and others not, the product
hU is logically divided into two terms:
hU =
L∏
i=1
gaii =
∏
i∈D
gaii ·
∏
i/∈D
gaii .
The first product can be computed by both participants, while the second product
can only be computed by the user. She proves knowledge of its representation with
respect to (gi)i/∈D.
A selective disclosure proof is the following zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
that hides the secret key and all non-disclosed attributes:
PK
{(
α, (αj)j /∈D
) ∣∣∣∣∣ gα ∏
i/∈D
gαii = h
′
∏
i∈D
g−aii in G
}
.
Figure 3.6 shows the realisation of the interactive proof. The user generates L −
|D|+1 random values and commits to themby sending t to the verifier. After receiv-
ing a random challenge c from the verifier, the user computesL−|D|+1 responses
r, (ri)i/∈D by using the secret key, the hidden attributes, the random values from the
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User p, q, h, g, g1, . . . , gL Verifier
Secret: a, a1, . . . , aL (h
′, (c′, r′)), (aj)j∈D
w ∈R Zq, ∀i /∈ D : wi ∈R Zq
t := gw
∏
i/∈D g
wi
i inG
t
−−−−−−−→
c
←−−−−−−− c ∈R Zq
r = ca+ w (mod q)
∀i /∈ D : ri = cai + wi (mod q)
r,(ri)i/∈D
−−−−−−−−−→ t
?
= gr
∏
i/∈D g
ri
i ·(
h′
∏
i∈D g
−ai
i
)−c
inG
Figure 3.6: U-Prove’s showing protocol in which a subset of attributes is disclosed
to the verifier. The index set of the revealed attributes isD.
commitment phase and the challenge. The verifier, upon receiving the response r
and (ri)i/∈D, checks the proof using the verification equation. Note that the proof
is a generalisation of the Schnorr identification (Figure 3.3): If all attributes are re-
vealed (D = {1, . . . , L}) only a is proven to be known in ga.
Example 3.8. Let us illustrate this proof with two extreme cases: all attributes are
disclosed or none. Firstly, the user discloses all the attributes from a credential; so,
D = {1, . . . , L} . In this case, she sends the attributes a1, . . . , aL to the verifier and
they perform the following interactive proof in which only the secret key remains
hidden:
PK
{
(α)
∣∣∣∣∣ gα ≡ h′
L∏
i=1
g−aii (mod p)
}
.
Knowing the attributes, the verifier can compute h′
∏L
i=1 g
−ai
i . The user proves that
she knows the discrete logarithm of h′
∏L
i=1 g
−ai
i with respect to g, that is, the se-
cret key a. Thus, the representation problem that we rely upon here has only one
component and therefore it is a discrete logarithm problem.
Secondly, we consider an empty proof, that is, the case where the user proves
only the fact that she owns a credential without revealing any attributes from it.
Then D = ∅ and the user has to prove that she knows a representation of h′ with
respect to g, g1, . . . , gL, that is, the secret key and all the attributes:
PK
{
(α, α1, . . . , αL)
∣∣∣∣∣ gα
L∏
i=1
gαii ≡ h
′ (mod p)
}
.
3.3.4 Selective disclosure of an Idemix credential
The Idemix verification protocol also comprises two parts. First, the user ran-
domises the credential signature, resulting in (A, e, v), and sends A to the verifier.
(Assume now that the user does not disclose any attribute.) Second, she proves
knowledge of all non-disclosed attributes, that is, the representation of the issuer’s
58 3. ABCs: From Cryptography to Implementation
public parameter Z with respect to (A,S,R,R1, . . . , RL):
PK
{
(ε, ν, α, α1, . . . , αL)
∣∣∣Z ≡ AεSν Rα L∏
i=1
Rαii︸ ︷︷ ︸
R′
(mod n)
}
.
The main idea of the selective disclosure proof is the same as that of U-Prove. In
the proof above the disclosing set was empty and the user proved her knowledge
of all exponents. If some attributes are disclosed, the verifier can reconstruct some
part of the product R′, namely
∏
i∈D R
ai
i . In this case the user has to provide the
following proof:
PK
{
(ε, ν, α, (αi)i/∈D)
∣∣∣∣∣ Z ·∏
i∈D
g−aii ≡ A
ε
SνRα
∏
i/∈D
Rαii (mod n)
}
.
Note that in the verification there is no distinct signature verification. The fact
that the user knows the representation of public key Z (with respect to the appro-
priate generators) provides sufficient guarantee that she indeed owns a credential
signature.
3.3.5 Unlinkability
Webriefly analyse unlinkability of user transactions. In this section we assume that
disclosed attributes do not make users traceable.
Both selective disclosure protocols provide issuer unlinkability for two reasons.
First, the issuer is not included in the verification protocol, so he does not need to
learn the fact that his credential is being used. Second, the issuing protocol is a
blind signature in which the resulting signature is not known to the issuer. There-
fore, even if the verifier and the issuer collude, they cannot correlate issuing and
verification instances.
The verification protocols in the two technologies are essentially different in
terms of the applied signature. The Idemix technology provides multi-show un-
linkability: Because a CL signature can be randomised, a user gives no ‘hint’ to
verifiers that would enable them to trace her. As we saw, the Brands signature, on
the other hand, can only be verified if its signature (h′, (c′, r′)) is revealed. Multiple
use of the same credential can easily be linked. A pragmatic technique to achieve
multi-show unlinkability, and in fact this is proposed in the U-Prove technology
overview [Bra10], is to extend the issuing procedure: The user receives not only
one but a batch of credentials on the same set of attributes. Having these creden-
tials and making sure that she never shows the same credential multiple times, the
user will be truly untraceable. Note that this solution requires the client device to
have additional storage space for the extra credentials.
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3.4 Performance of smart-card implementations
Smart cards are reasonable candidates to be ABC carriers being tamper resistant,
easy to carry around and able to execute cryptographic computations. Indeed,
several attribute-based credential schemes and related technologies have been re-
cently implemented on various smart-card platforms [Bic07, Bal08, SGPV09, TJ09,
BCGS09, MV11, VA13, BKPR14].
An important application in which the card performs all computations of ABCs
autonomously, enables the user perform transactions solely with her card. Our
work is mostly based on the implementations described in [MV11, VA13]; seemore
technical details about the implementations in Vullers’ thesis [Vul14]. The card
communicates through its contactless interface with the reader and the running
times include all communication overhead. The main performance results of the
issuing and selective disclosure with credentials of five attributes of U-Prove and
Idemix are summarised:
• U-Prove. The implementation has been done on a MULTOS smart-card plat-
form running on an Infineon SLE66 chip. The operations are performed in a
prime subgroup of the prime group Z∗p in which the elements are |p| = 1024
bits long.
– Issuing The issuing protocol of a credential, containing five attributes
(255 bytes each), takes about 5.5 seconds.
– Selective disclosure A selective disclosure that hides all attributes (so-
called empty proof) takes 0.9 second, while one that hides only two at-
tributes (i.e. three attributes are disclosed) runs in 0.6 second.
• Idemix. Idemix has also been implemented on a MULTOS smart card but
running on amore recent Infineon SLE78 chip. The operations are performed
in an RSA group where the modulus size is |n| = 1024.
– Issuing The issuing of a credential, containing five attributes (32 bytes
each), takes about 2.6 seconds.
– Selective disclosure An empty proof runs in 1.5 seconds, and a proof hid-
ing two attributes from the five in the credential takes just a bit less than
1.0 second.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from the results above. Attribute-
Based Credentials are becoming practical but not yet for all kinds of applications.
On the onehand, in identitymanagement systems, such as an eID system [BKPR14]
or the ABC ecosystem described in Chapter 6, privacy-friendly authentication is
becoming efficient enough relying on personal smart cards carrying full-fledged
ABC implementations. On the other hand, more dynamic applications still require
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faster running times. For instance, in public transportation 0.3 second is consid-
ered to be the maximum verification time, whereas this is between 0.6 and 1.5 sec-
onds in these results. Applications that would include both verification and issu-
ing within the same instance take at least 3.5 seconds. This is clearly too much
for payments, where an attribute would describe the amount in the user’s posses-
sion which has to be re-issued with a different amount after a transaction. In sum,
currently, attributes are appropriate for rather static scenarios and not for dynamic
ones; however, the results are promising and the smart-card technology is probably
growing sufficiently fast soon for any applications.
Chapter 4
A Secure Channel for ABCs
“[W]e assume that the users and
organizations are connected by
perfectly anonymous channels.”
Jan Camenisch and
Anna Lysyanskaya, 2001
Camenisch and Lysyanskayamake the following assumptions in their importantpaper [CL01] about anonymous credentials: “Throughout we assume that the
users and organizations are connected by perfectly anonymous channels. Further-
more, we assume that for each protocol an organization authenticates itself to the
user and that they establish a secure channel between them for each session.” The
question that we ask in this chapter is how this secure channel can be established
between a verifier (an organisation) and an (anonymous) user. Such a channel is
crucial to achieve confidentiality for any revealed information and authenticity to
protect against adversarial verifier or user behaviour.
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we gave a high-level view of Attribute-Based Credentials
(ABCs) and argued that they can be used in practice when the user’s side of the
protocols are implemented on personal smart cards. Our objective in this chapter
is to design a protocol that enables a verifier and a smart card to establish a secure
channel. To ensure that appropriate parties communicate with each other, such
a channel is set up after mutual authentication. The main challenge is that this
protocol should not impair the privacy features of ABCs, such as issuer and multi-
show unlinkability (see page 52). Cards have to remain anonymous yet they have
to be authenticated.
We focus here on local communication between a smart card and a verifier’s
terminal. The resulting techniques however can be applied in general for other
credential carrier devices and on the top of other channels independently.66
66In the case when an anonymous secure channel proposed in this chapter is combined with other
technologies, the risk of identifiability and profiling of the user on all other layers needs to be analysed
separately.
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A secure channel is essential for ABC proofs since a selective disclosure (SD)
protocol requires protection for the card-holder’s privacy against an eavesdropping
adversary for various reasons.
• Disclosed attributes: Attribute values are the actual personal information that
primarily has to be protected; e.g. identifying attributes should not be visible
to an eavesdropper.
• Verifier’s request: Attribute requests can be considered metadata yet they
may reveal valuable and privacy-invasive information; e.g. if a video service
provider asks for the attribute ‘over 18’, it leaks information about the sort of
movie a user is watching.
• Issuer’s signature: Information about the credential issuer is also metadata
that may give hints about the type of credentials and/or the values of at-
tributes; e.g. the signature in a credential issued by an employer potentially
reveals where an individual works.
Not only eavesdropping but also verifier requestsmay present threats. A verifier
should receive only such personal information that he is entitled to for a particular
service or resource. To protect against abusive requests, a verifier should access
only those attributes from a card that are necessary for a particular authorisation.
In practice, public-key certificates are issued to verifiers that contain a public key
and also authorises verifiers to request certain attributes. A card has to verify such
certificates, possibly use the verifier’s public key for the communication and adhere
only to legitimate attribute requests in the selective disclosure proofs.
Active attacks on the user’s side can put system security at risk. First, without a
secure channel, a classical man-in-the-middle attack can be set up. For instance,
acting as a card and using proofs from a real card, a rogue verifier could access
some service at another verifier. The same adversary could also inject proofs from
other devices that affect the authorisation decision of the verifier. Second, when
attributes from multiple credentials are required for an authorisation, the proofs
have to be linked to each other. However, ABC’s zero-knowledge techniques that
securely bind proofs involving multiple credentials are too expensive for some im-
plementation platforms, such as the current smart-card technology. In this case
only a secure channel can prevent an adversary to combine proofs originating from
different devices. (For instance, amembership attribute on one card could be com-
bined with an ‘over 18’ attribute on another card.) A secure channel that is bound
to one device on the prover’s side can prevent this, so-called card-pooling attack.
A secure channel provides additionally the benefit of a session that can link ver-
ification of attributes from already existing credentials on a card and the issuance
of new ones. A new credential relies then only on the existence of other credentials
of the owner. As a result, an individual can collect new credentials after authenti-
cation but potentially without identification.
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A tamper-resistant, personal smart card is a viable choice to carry ABCs
(e.g. , [Bal08, BCGS09, MV11, VA13]). As we saw in the previous chapter, the most
essential functionalities are feasible to implement on currently available smart
cards. Nevertheless, not all features can be achieved on these resource-limited de-
vices. Due to their complexity, proofs of equality of attributes in separate creden-
tials or property proofs about attributes (like, an attribute lies in an interval or is an
element of a set) require more RAM than available on some – otherwise suitable –
platforms. This work has mainly beenmotivated by the Idemix implementation on
aMULTOS smart card [VA13] within the I Reveal My Attributes (IRMA) project (dis-
cussed in depth in Chapter 6). In this systemusers’ smart cards cannot run equality
or property proofs.
Conventionally, to set up a key for a secure channel both participants identify
and authenticate each other. However, in the case of ABCs this is not possible.
To establish a channel with a verifier, a card cannot reveal a unique, card-specific
identifier because it would destroy the privacy properties of the ABC technology.
Hence, a new notion of validity is required to realise authentication. A card is re-
garded as valid (or authentic) if it holds a particular credential and thus it can per-
form a proof about it. The choice of this specific credential depends on the system.
For example, a national identity card would be considered as such if it can prove
that it carries an attribute-based credential issued by the state authority responsi-
ble for electronic identity cards. (Note that Direct Anonymous Attestation applies
a similar notion of authenticity. [BCC04])
4.1.1 Our Contributions
We introduce a securitymodel for establishing a secure channel betweenan anony-
mous ABC card and a terminal (Section 4.3), and we propose two protocols (Sec-
tions 4.4 and 4.5) that realise items 1a, 1b, and optionally 3b in the following list of
generic steps in the context of ABCs:
1. Perform authentication
(a) Establishing a confidential (and semi-authentic) secure channel
(b) Selective disclosure (and authentication) within the channel
2. Make authorisation decision based on selectively disclosed information
3. Provide service
(a) Accessing resource, application; or
(b) [Optional] Credential issuance within the channel
We propose to adapt the security model of [BR94] to ABC systems in which the
prover’s resources are very limited and the user is identified only to the extent of the
attribute proofs included. Both protocols we designed are practical and efficient in
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the sense that the computation and working memory overhead are comparable to
the resources ABC protocols require.
4.2 Definition
In the previous chapter we informally described the building blocks of ABCs. Here
we define more precisely an ABC scheme for the purpose of the establishment of
an underlying secure channel.
Within this model there are three types of participants in an ABC system: an
issuer, verifiers and users. Furthermore, we assume that issuers and verifiers re-
ceive their public-key certificates, containing their access rights to user attributes,
for each application.
Definition 4.1. An ABC scheme consists of seven probabilistic, polynomial-time
algorithms (GenSys,GenI,GenV, IssueI, IssueU,VerifyV,VerifyU) such that:
• GenSys(1k) 7→ System. Taking the security parameter 1k as input value, the
scheme manager runs this algorithm to set up the necessary PKIs, processes
and credentials. We assume hereafter that all participants know all public
information required to execute their algorithms.
• GenI(1k) 7→ (pkI , skI). The issuer runs this algorithm to generate his public
key pkI and private key skI .
• GenV(k) 7→ (pkV , skV ). A verifier runs this algorithm to generate his public key
pkV and private key skV . The public key is certified by the scheme manager
and the certificate also includes a description of the attributes that the verifier
is eligible to request from users.
• IssueI(skI , pkI ,Attributes) 7→ (). An issuing instance aims to provide a new
credential for a user and it contains two interactive protocols: IssueI and IssueU.
IssueI is run by the issuer after appropriate verification of the attributes to
be issued within the credential in relation to the user. The algorithm takes
as input the issuer’s key pair and the attributes. For our purposes it suffices
to assume that this algorithm does not have output. In an implementation,
however, the issuer may want to keep logs of all issuing executions.
• IssueU(pkI , skU ,Attributes) 7→ Cred. The user runs Issue
U, the counterpart in-
teractive protocol of IssueI. As a result a new ABC is issued on the user’s card
with the Attributes a1, . . . , aL in it. (Note that Cred is a private output to the
user, the issuer does not learn it despite the fact that it contains his signature.)
• VerifyV(pkI , skV ,D) 7→ (b, (ai)i∈D). The verification of an ABC comprises two
interactive protocols: VerifyV and VerifyU. The verifier runs VerifyV with the
issuer’s public key, his own secret key and a description of the index set of
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the required attributesD. At the end of the protocol, VerifyV outputs bit b (0 –
Reject or 1 – Accept), and the set of requested attributes.
• VerifyU(pkI , pkV , skU ,Cred,Attributes) 7→ (). This interactive protocol takes
all necessary input for an ABC selective disclosure (SD) proof and the veri-
fier’s public key (implicitly including the certificate with the description what
attributes the verifier is eligible to request).
There are several practical considerations that we briefly discuss here. A CA is a
distinct party that does not partake in protocols. There can even bemultiple CAs in
a scheme and an underlying PKI based on which all participants can verify public-
key certificates. For simplicity, we assume that there is only one issuer and all cre-
dential types are issued by this party. This makes the description cleaner because
wedo not need then tomanage public (credential) keys of issuers. In practice, there
are many issuers and their public keys are certified by CAs, so verifiers and users
can check credentials. It does not affect the scheme when it is generalised to mul-
tiple issuers. Each verifier’s public key pkV is certified by the CA. The content of a
verifier’s certificate is similar to a typical X.509 certificate’s content (including the
name of the verifier, a serial number, the public key, the CA and its signature, etc.)
with the above-mentioned extension that describes the verifier’s attribute access
rights. Also, attributes in a selective disclosure proof are always understood as parts
of some credentials and thus implicitly describe the credential type and the public
key of the corresponding issuer (cf. page 41). We do not consider card issuance as-
suming that each user has exactly one card with a root credential; see more details
in Section 6.4.1. In a practical system card provisioning has to be a well-defined
process. A credential Cred also includes the secret key skU and an expiry date but
that is irrelevant in the cryptographic description here. For our purposes it suffices
to assume that the VerifyU algorithm does not have output. In an implementation,
however, the user’s card should keep a secure log of all verifications.
A verificationprotocol is generally called a selective disclosure (SD), as only par-
tial information is revealed from an ABC. As we saw in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, the
protocol is a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof (or so-called signature
of knowledge [FS87, CS97]) that signs amessage, usually containing a fresh random
nonce provided by the verifier. We assume that the ABC technology’s proof is cor-
rect, sound and zero knowledge. Let us introduce the following, simple notation in
which all details (credential type, the issuer’s public key, etc.) are implicit:
SD
(
(ai)i∈D;n
)
,
where D is the set of indices i corresponding to the disclosed attributes in a given
credential and n is the message to be signed by the signature of knowledge. A se-
lective disclosure is called an empty proof if no attribute is revealed (i.e. D = ∅). In
this case, only the mere existence of a credential is proven.
In order to set up a secure channel for selective disclosure, a card and a veri-
fier have to mutually authenticate each other. However, since being ‘valid’ is dif-
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ferent on both sides, anonymous card authentication and verifier authentication
have to be defined separately. A card is considered to be valid (or authentic) if it
can show to carry a root credential and perform all eligibly requested selective dis-
closure proofs. A verifier is valid on the other hand if it owns a valid public-key
certificate.
4.3 Secure ABC Channels
To establish a secure channel underlying the ABC proofs, we make use of a former
technique. Although many authentication and key-exchange protocols have been
proposed at a very early stage of cryptography, Bellare and Rogaway [BR94] are the
first who studied authenticated key exchange rigorously. In their model partici-
pants are de-coupled and all communication is controlled by an active adversary.
To show security of an authentication protocol, one has to prove that the proba-
bility for the adversary to make participants accept the other’s authenticity is neg-
ligible unless all messages are conveyed according to the protocol. The main tool
to capture this notion is the so-called matching conversation. By attaching some
extra information to the mutual authentication protocol, the authors achieve ef-
ficient and provably secure key-exchange protocols. The adversary is so powerful
that she can query all secret session information from any participants. The secu-
rity of a key exchange protocol is defined as the indistinguishability of a fresh (not
queried) session key from a random string. In spite of the fact that the model has
been proposed for a symmetric-key setup, it can be adapted to our setting.
Verifiers in this study are trusted (so they are assumed to be not corrupted), the
adversary has access to many cards so that she can query them and even corrupt
them. Moreover, all the channels are controlled by the adversary when verifiers and
cards are communicating. The security requirements are as follows:
• Selectively disclosed attributes should remain hidden from an eavesdropping
adversary;
• Cards should answer queries only to authenticated verifiers;
• Cards should reveal attributes only when a verifier is eligible to request those;
• A verifier should only accept authentication originating from one valid card.
In this section we formalise these objectives.
4.3.1 Security Model
In this model, sessions of cards and verifiers aremodelled as oracles that follow the
protocol. The adversary is a polynomial-time algorithm that controls the whole
communication among oracles. The adversary’s goal is to win one of two games,
i.e. to break one of the following two security properties of the system. First, it tries
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to eavesdrop on revealed but encrypted attributes thus compromising confiden-
tiality. This is captured by the notion of indistinguishability of a session key and a
random string. Second, the adversary tries to forge authentication by convincing a
verifier that he is ‘talking’ to a valid card while this is not the case. This is captured
by the unfeasibility of counterfeitingmatching conversations. If an adversary has
only negligible advantage in both games, the protocol is a secure ABC authentica-
tion.
We define the system and the challenge for the adversary below.
System initialisation. Given a security parameter k, 1Gen
Sys
is run. There are m
verifiers and n cards wherem and n are polynomials in k. Verifiers run their setup
GenV to get their long-term private and public keys, and they receive their certifi-
cates ((sk1, pk1, cert1), . . . , (skm, pkm, certm)). Cards receive their credentials with
private keys and sets of attributes ((α1, C1, A1), . . . , (αn, Cn, An)) using the issuing
protocols IssueI and IssueU. Each card Ci has one secret key αi which is present in
all credentials on this card binding the whole set of attributes Ai to the card. All
parties receive their random tapes. Public files describing the whole communica-
tion transcript and attributes from corrupted cards are initiated by emptying them:
Tr := ∅,Acorr := ∅.
Cards. A card is considered to be valid if it can performVerifyU (including a proof
of the root credential) and it has not been compromised yet. The set of all attributes
on a card Ci is denoted byAi.
Verifiers. A verifier is valid if it has a valid public-key certificate certi and it can
prove knowledge of the corresponding private key. A verifier is only allowed to re-
quest attributes in a protocol instance VerifyV that he is eligible to according to its
access policy in certi. Cards verify the certificate and the access policy, and abort if
the verifier tries to query attributes it is not allowed to.
Oracles. Sessions of cards and verifiers are modelled as pairs of oracles. Πsa,b
is an oracle modelling party a being engaged in communication with party b in
session s.
Adversary. AnadversaryA is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that con-
trols the whole communication among all verifier and card oracles. It can read, re-
lay, modify, delay or drop messages, inject new ones, or even initiate whole new
sessions. It takes 1k as an input (security) parameter, choosesm,n (polynomials in
k) and runs the system initialisation. Then the adversary interacts with the oracles.
Transcript. The whole communication between the adversary and the oracles is
described by a public transcript file Tr that keeps track of all queries that the adver-
sary asks and all responses that oracles have sent. Interaction between the adver-
sary and an oracleΠsa,b is of the form (τi,mi, ri)where τi is an abstract timemoment
of the interaction based on which the records are sorted in the transcript,mi is the
query that the adversary submits, and ri is the response that the oracle returns. Af-
68 4. A Secure Channel for ABCs
ter the adversary receives the response, Tr is extended: Tr := Tr‖(Πsa,b, τi,mi, ri),
where ‖ is the notation for concatenation.
Protocol. A protocol aims to (1) establish a secure channel by setting up a ses-
sion key K (of length polynomial in k) to provide confidentiality for attribute re-
quests and selectively disclosed attributes; (2) bind the key exchange and the au-
thentication; and (3) authenticate the two parties to ensure validity. A protocol
describes how oracles have to act in a given situation. More precisely, each step
depends on the input from the adversary, the oracle’s state (that can be deduced
from the records of the transcript in which this oracle takes part), its secret ses-
sion values, and its random tape. An oracle has two special output strings that can
be appended to its response ri at any point of the protocol execution: KeyOK and
Accept. KeyOK shows that the oracle established a key as its private output and it
is also convinced that its counterpart has established the same key. Accept shows
that an oracle is convinced that its counterpart is valid. At the end of a protocol
run, besides Accept, a verifier oracle also outputs a list of attributes, denoted by A,
that the card has disclosed. (That is, A = (ai)i∈D in the output of Verify
V.) As we
already noted, the ABC technology is assumed to be perfectly secure (in terms of
unforgeability, non-transferability, unlinkability, etc.).
Adversary’s power. There are two types of adversaries. A benignadversary relays
messages according to the protocol (just like a wire). A corrupt adversary on the
other hand can also Corrupt a card oracle that has to reveal all secret information it
stores: ephemeral secret values of this session, its master secret key and all stored
attributes. A protocol will be defined as secure, if the only chance for an adversary
to make a verifier accept a card’s authenticity is to act benignly.
Matching conversation. For implementation reasons, a verifier is always the ini-
tiator of a conversation and a card is always a responder in a protocol. Further-
more, the card sends always the last message. A conversation of n¯ rounds between
a verifier oracle Πsa,b and the adversary can be described then as (τ0,m0, r0), (τ2,
m2, r2), . . . , (τ2n¯−2,m2n¯−2, r2n¯−2). A conversation of n rounds between a card ora-
cle Πtb,a and the adversary can be described as (τ1,m1, r1), (τ3,m3, r3), . . . , (τ2n¯−1,
m2n¯−1, r2n¯−1). The two lists of tuples are called matching conversations if these
descriptions meet the following requirements:
1. τ0 < τ1 < τ2 < . . . τ2n¯−1 < τ2n¯.
2. m1 = r0,m2 = r1, . . . ,m2n¯−1 = r2n¯−2.
(Although the indices suggest that no interaction took place among timemoments
with other oracles, this might not be the case.) An oracle is considered to be uncor-
rupted if it has not received the Corrupt query.
Revocation. Attributes are revokedby adding them toAcorr . By revoking all its at-
tributes, an entire card can be revoked. A revocation mechanism will be assumed
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to be ideal, that is, as soon as a card is corrupted, it results in immediate card re-
vocation.67
Experiment. After specifying security parameter k, we launch the adversary, and
let it initialise the system and communicate with oracles. First, it can run the query
phase, in which the adversary is allowed to issue q queries in total, where q is poly-
nomial in k. After the query phase, the adversary can select one of the challenges
in the test phase. In this phase, it can play one of the following two games.
Confidentiality Game. In the Confidentiality Game the adversary has to gain in-
formation about the session key K (of length a polynomial in k, typically k itself)
during a key exchange protocol. In the query phase the adversary is allowed to run
oracles and receive their output values. After this phase some of the oracles may
have output KeyOK. The adversary can run the test phase of the Confidentiality
Game at any time by sending Test(Πsa,b) where Π
s
a,b is an uncorrupted oracle. The
challenger picks a random bit b ∈R {0, 1} and sends either the session key K or a
random string of length k to the adversary depending onwhether b = 0 or b = 1, re-
spectively. If the adversary’s guess is denoted by b′, the advantage of the adversary
in the Confidentiality Game is defined as Adv
A
Conf = |Pr[b = b
′]− 12 | (over all possible
session keys).
Definition 4.2. A protocol is said to be a confidential key setup if the following are
true:
1. Under a benign adversary two participants in a matching conversation out-
put KeyOK and they both compute the same session key.
2. Any benign or corrupting polynomial-time adversaryA has negligible advan-
tage Adv
A
Conf to win the confidentiality game.
Authenticity Game. In the Authenticity Game the adversary has to attempt to au-
thenticate to a verifier in an illegitimate way: without a valid card or with multiple
cards. We can say that an authentication requires 1 valid card, so the number of
those cards must not be< 1 or> 1.
Definition 4.3. Let NoMatch denote the event that there exist a, b, s, t such that
oracle Πsa,b Accepted and there is no oracle Π
t
b,a that engaged in a matching con-
versationwithΠsa,b. LetCombine denote the event that the output listA of a verifier
oracle is coming from at least two cards from which (at least) one is uncorrupted,
i.e. A 6⊆ Ai (for either of the cards) and A 6⊆ Acorr .
The adversary is given oracle access to all instances and is allowed to issue
Corrupt queries. The adversary wins the Authenticity Game if
67We note that because of the ideal revocation assumption, we do not need a non-corrupt adver-
sary that can actively influence the communication bymodifying, inserting and deleting messages, but
cannot corrupt cards. As soon as a corrupt adversary corrupts a card, all attributes are assumed to be
revoked, so no authentication is possible with that card anymore.
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1. It manages to trigger the NoMatch event, or
2. It manages to trigger the Combine event.
The probability that the adversarywins the AuthenticityGame is denoted asAdv
A
Auth.
Roughly speaking, in the former case the adversary succeeds to forge authentica-
tion, while in the latter case she is able to combine selective disclosure proofs from
multiple cards.
Definition4.4. Aprotocol is said to be a secureABCauthentication if the following
are true:
1. Under a benign adversary a card and a verifier canmutually verify each other’s
validity in a matching conversation; and
2. Any corrupting polynomial-time adversary has negligible advantage Adv
A
Auth
to win the authenticity game.
Therefore, if a verifier accepts an ABC showing proof, the selectively disclosed
attributes are originating from one valid card. The same can be expressed by the
sets of attributes:
Corollary 4.5. If a secure ABC authentication protocol is given by which a card
successfully authenticates to a verifier, then either A ⊆ Acorr or A ⊆ Ai (where
Ai ∩Acorr = ∅).
4.4 Implicit Card Authentication
We introduce an efficient secure ABC authentication protocol in Figure 4.1, which
is called the implicit card authentication protocol or ICA. The verifier and a pre-
sumed card establish a key K that is used to provide a secure channel based on
K for the selective disclosure proofs. Note that unlike most authenticated key ex-
change protocols, the card’s validity can only be verifiedwithin the channel, which
explains the name of this protocol.
We assume that the verifier’s public key is an initial input value to the card.
Moreover, the card is also privy to the description of which attributes this verifier
is eligible to request. In practice, a public-key certificate is sent to the card, from
which it can extract and verify pkV and the attribute access rights. The verifier’s
private initial input is its secret key skV . We assume that the ciphertext space of
the public-key encryption E() is identical to the key space of the symmetric-key
encryption Enc(). Furthermore, we also assume that all participants have access to
random oracles f1, f2 and f3.
A verifier initiates the protocol ICA by sending a random nonce nV ∈R N cho-
sen uniformly at random from the nonce space N . Then, the card also gener-
ates a random nonce nC ∈R N from the same nonce space. It encrypts nC us-
ing the public key pkV and sends EpkV (nC) to the verifier. After receiving EpkV (nC),
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C
Card (pkV )
V
Verifier (skV )
1. nV
2. EpkV (nC)
seed = nV ‖nC seed = nV ‖nC
K = f1(seed) K = f1(seed)
s = f2(seed) s = f2(seed)
Key confirmation
3. n, request attributes
N = f3(n ‖ s) N = f3(n ‖ s)
4. attributes, SD
(
. . . ;N
)
Verifynew cred.
Secure channel (K)
Figure 4.1: Implicit card authentication ICA: A key exchange for ABC selective dis-
closure precedes card authentication.
the verifier can decrypt it and compute nC . Both participants can now compute
seed = nV ‖nC and store the derived values: the channel key K = f1(seed) and the
binder s = f2(seed). Note that only the verifier has already authenticated – being
required to use its private key. Explicit key confirmation ensures both participants
that they share the same secret key K. In practice, the seed has to be deleted on
both sides.
Within the established secure channel the two parties perform the selective dis-
closure proofs that eventually provide card authenticity. To initiate each selective
disclosure, the verifier sends a fresh, random nonce n ∈R N and requests some at-
tributes to be disclosed. A verifier is allowed to request a set of attributes residing in
one credential since cards are not assumed to be able to link proofs from different
credentials. The card checks that the verifier is entitled to request the attributes.
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If not, the card rejects the request. Otherwise, it computes N = f3(n‖s) and us-
ing it as a fresh nonce, the card generates a ‘normal’ ABC non-interactive selective
disclosure proof that reveals the requested attributes and proves that they reside in
the credential. The verifier checks the proof using the same N and stores the dis-
closed attributes in A. After all credential proofs with the required attributes were
requested and performed successfully, the verifier terminates and outputs Accept
and the setA of revealed and verified attributes.
4.4.1 Security Analysis
Let us consider the key establishment phase of protocol ICA and denote it as ICAkey .
It establishes a shared secret keyK between two parties in the presence of a corrupt
adversary as follows.
ICAkey protocol:
1. C ← V : nV
2. C → V : EpkV (nC)
3. C, V : K := f(nV ‖nC)
4. C, V : Key confirmation
During the system initialisation both participants receive the security parameter
1k and their own random tapes. Also, V ’s key pair (pkV , skV ) is generated, and C
receives pkV , V receives (pkV , skV ). To start a protocol run, the verifier generates a
nonce nV ∈R N (uniformly at random) and sends it to C. Then C also generates a
random nonce nC ∈R N , encrypts it with V ’s public key and sends EpkV (nC) to V .
Using skV , V can compute nC . Both parties, having access to a random oracle f ,
can compute the shared keyK from nV , nC byK := f(nV ‖nC). Finally, after explicit
key confirmation, both parties output KeyOK.
Note that this key-setup protocol can not provide card authenticity because
there is nothing that would authenticate C. The only thing we wish to prove that
the protocol is confidential, that is, seeing only the messages, an adversary is not
able to gain information about the established keyK.
Lemma 4.6. Assume that E() is a CPA-secure public-key encryption, EncK(·) is a
semantically secure (symmetric-key) encryption, and f is a random oracle. Then
ICAkey is a confidential key setup in the presence of a corrupt adversary.
Proof. Weprove that if we have access to an adversaryAIK that can break the secu-
rity of ICAkey , then we can build a polynomial-time algorithm Apke that can break
the semantic security of the public-key encryption E(). (The key generation algo-
rithm of E() is denoted by Gpke. Its output is a public-private key pair.)
First we describe the operations of both adversaries.
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• AdversaryAIK can determine the verifier’s nonce and learn the card’s output
(the encrypted nonce). The adversary’s task is to distinguish the true estab-
lished key from a random value (in the key space). The experiment withAIK
goes as follows:
1. The challenger runs key generation Gpke and sends pkV toA
IK ;
2. AIK outputs nV ∈ N ;
3. The challenger does the following:
(a) Generates nonce nC ∈R N and encrypts it;
(b) Generates a random bit bˆ ∈R {0, 1}, computes the challenge ch:
ch :=
{
f (nV ‖nC) if bˆ = 0
random (of length k) if bˆ = 1;
(c) Sends EpkV (nC) and ch toA
IK ;
4. AIK queries the random oracle f (at most polynomial times in k);
5. Finally, AIK sends her guess bˆ′.
AIK should have the power to corrupt cards. This is modelled by allowing
AIK to send a Corrupt query at any point in Steps 3 and 4. As a response the
challenger reveals nC and f (nV ‖nC). In this case the adversary has to go to
Step 2 in the algorithm, to query a ‘new card’. (The adversary is allowed to
submit at most q Corrupt queries where q is polynomial in k.)
• Adversary Apke tries to attack the CPA-security of the public-key encryption
E():
1. The challenger runs Gpke, stores the secret key and sends pkV toApke;
2. Apke sends twomessagesm0,m1 of the same length to the challenger;
3. The challenger picks a random bit b ∈R {0, 1}, computes the ciphertext
c = EpkV (mb) and sends c toA
pke;
4. Finally, Apke outputs a guess b′.
We show that if the advantage of AIK is not negligible in the first experiment
then the advantage of Apke is also non-negligible in the second experiment. As
usual, we show how adversaryApke can useAIK to break the security of the public-
key encryption.
1. The challenger runs Gpke, stores the secret key and sends pkV to Apke; Apke
sends pkV toAIK ;
2. AIK sends nV toApke;
3. Apke generates random nonces nC , n˜C ∈R N and sends them to the chal-
lenger;
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4. The challenger answers with a ciphertext c encrypting one of the nonces;
5. Apke computesK := f (nV ‖nC) and sends (c,K) toAIK ;
6. AIK sends random-oracle queries (at most polynomially many in k) to Apke
to whichApke replies as a random oracle;68
7. AIK replies with a guess bˆ;
8. Apke forwards the guess to the challenger, i.e. b′ := bˆ′.
If AIK sends a Corrupt query at any Step, Apke answers with nC , f (nV ‖nC) and
AIK has to go to Step 2. In this case,Apke sends a random guess b′ to the challenger.
In Step 5 there are two possibilities for the pair (c,K) depending on whether
the challenger encrypted nC or n˜C . It is either (EpkV (nC), f (nV ‖nC)) or (EpkV (n˜C),
f (nV ‖nC)) – and Apke does not know which is the case. In the former case the
session key corresponds to the encryption, while in the latter case f (nV ‖nC) is just
a random value in the light of the two nonces nV , n˜C . Every timewhenA
IK guesses
correctly,Apke also guesses correctly. IfAIK guesses incorrectly,Apke has negligible
advantage. Finally, when AIK corrupts, Apke just randomly guesses, which also
means negligible advantage. Therefore, the advantage of Apke against the public-
key encryption scheme is at least 1/q times the advantage ofAIK against ICAkey .
The algorithm above is a perfect simulation of the key establishment for adver-
sary AIK and it finishes in polynomial time. Since the E() is CPA-secure and the
advantage of Apke can only be negligible, the advantage of AIK is also negligible
(though q times as much) and thus ICAkey is a confidential key setup.
Because adversaryAIK cannot distinguish a fresh key from a random string (of
the same length), the ciphertext, encrypted with a fresh key, is indistinguishable
from the ciphertext encrypted with the random string. Therefore, the communica-
tion, encrypted with the semantically secure EncK(), after this key establishment
is indistinguishable from random communication for the adversary. (We observe
that in ICA s has the same property as the session key K as it is set up in the same
way using an independent random oracle.)
Corollary 4.7. ICA is a confidential key setup.
Nowwe have to show that ICA is authentic, that is, both the card and the verifier
get convinced about the other’s validity. The first is easier, since the verifier initiates
the interrogation by sending its certificate with his public key. The card checks
validity of the public key in the certificate. Afterwards, it uses the public key in
ICAkey to set up the session keyK. Using an explicit key confirmation subsequently,
68Operations of a random oracle: Start with an empty look-up table and answer queries with values
of fixed length as follows. 1. Generate random output to a new input value and store the pair of input
and output values in the look-up table; 2. Return the same output value as before if a queried value
occurs in the look-up table.
4.4. Implicit Card Authentication 75
the card can be guaranteed that the verifier is the owner of this valid public key, and
as a result, the verifier has authenticated to the card.
The second task is to show that the card also authenticates to the verifier and an
adversary’s only possibility to successfully authenticate to a verifier is to behave be-
nignly and relay all messages unchanged between a valid card and a verifier. More
specifically, to prove authenticity of ICA, we need to show that the probabilities of
NoMatch and Combine events are negligible.
The impossibility of NoMatch relies on the security of the ABC system. NoMatch
means that the adversary could create a set of valid ABC proofs (one of them based
on the root credential) without having a valid card that produced that. But this is
impossible because of the unforgeability of credential proofs in the ABC technol-
ogy.
The Combine event is triggered if selective disclosure proofs frommore than one
card are combined into one proof. The intuition behind the way we prove the un-
feasibility of Combine is as follows. First, we give the adversary power to learn the
session key and control all messages as they were sent in the clear. Second, we
define the so-called binding property that provides two guarantees. Particular SD
proofs are bound to each other in one ABC authentication and they are bound to
the key-setup phase. This ensures that the device participated in the key establish-
ment is the same as the one that produced all the proofs.
According to the Fiat–Shamir heuristic [FS87], a NIZK proof can be considered
as a signature that can sign an arbitrary message. When such proofs are used as an
authenticationmechanism, this message often contains a nonce chosen randomly
by the verifier. The binding property is defined by a game similar to a MAC exis-
tential forgery game, where transformed nonces play the role of MAC tags. Having
queried messages (nonces) during the query phase to an oracle, it outputs trans-
formed nonces of each of them. The adversary tries to create a new, valid pair of a
nonce and its transformed version in the test phase.
Binding Game. Let the nonce space be the same as the key space, i.e. N = 2|K|.
The nonce transformation is described by the map B : {0, 1}|N | × {0, 1}|N | →
{0, 1}|N |, where B has two input values, a secret value (seed) and a public value
(a nonce). The adversary’s goal is to produce an existential forgery of a valid output
nonce N on any nonce n of her own choice. In this game the adversary receives
even the session key K as input; this models her power to eavesdrop on and in-
ject in message flows in the secure channel. The two phases of the game go as
follows. The query phase comprises q rounds (where q is a polynomial in k). In
a round the adversary can choose a nonce n of her choice and the challenger an-
swers with N = B(seed, n). In the guess phase the adversary has to output a valid
pair of a nonce and a transformed nonce (nˆ, Nˆ). The adversary wins the Binding
Game if (nˆ, Nˆ) is valid and has not occurred in the query phase. The advantage
Adv
A
Bind = Pr[Adversary wins].
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Note that we require little from the adversary while she is very powerful. She re-
ceives the session keyK and she can query many transformed nonces; she receives
N = B(seed, n) for each nonce n of her own choice. She is not required to produce
a valid selective disclosure proof, only a new valid pair (nˆ, Nˆ).
Definition 4.8. A confidential key setup is said to provide secure binding if any
polynomial-time adversary has negligible advantage Adv
A
Bind in the Binding Game.
In ICA N = B(n) := f(n‖seed) binds the key-setup phase and the nonces. We
show that this binding is appropriate in general and doesnot damage the assurance
of freshness. Distributions 2. and 3. in the following lemma model the card’s and
the adversary’s views of f(n‖seed).
Lemma 4.9. Let the size of the nonce space and the output of a random oracle f
be N , a polynomial in the security parameter (so, the random oracle f : {0, 1}∗ →
N ). Then the distributions of the following random variables are indistinguishable,
where n, str ∈ N are uniformly distributed random variables:
1. n;
2. f(n‖str), where n is given; and
3. f(n‖str), where str is given.
Proof. Assume that there is a polynomial-time algorithm that can distinguish the
distribution of 1. and 2. That would give us a statistical test for f(·), which contra-
dicts to the assumption that it is a random oracle. Similarly, 1. and 3. are indistin-
guishable.
The distributions of f(n‖·) and f(·‖str) are the same because |n| = |str| and f
is a random oracle.
Corollary 4.10. The probability of guessing a randomly chosen value correctly in
case of any distribution in Lemma 4.9 is negligible in the security parameter k (in
fact, the probability is 1/2|N |).
Corollary 4.11. SD
(
. . . ; f(n‖str)
)
provides freshness and binding.
Proof. Freshness: If n is unpredictable for the card, then f(n‖str) is also unpre-
dictable by the equivalence of distributions 1. and 3. in Lemma 4.9.
Binding: The adversary has to produce a new pair of (n, f(n‖str)) for any n ∈ N
after at most q queries without knowing str. By distribution 2. in Lemma 4.9 and
by Corollary 4.10, the probability for the adversary to guess correctly is negligible
in the security parameter k (Adv
A
Bind ≤
1
2|N|−q
).
As wewill see from the next lemma, it is necessary to double the nonce space to
keep the same security level of the system.
Lemma 4.12. If |N | ≥ 2k, then the probability of Combine is negligible.
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Proof. If the adversary wants to trigger Combine, she has two disjoint possibilities:
To start with an uncorrupted card to get it produce a proof or to start with a cor-
rupted card to do that.
First case: The first selective disclosure proof SD
(
. . . ; f(n1‖seed)
)
is provided by
an uncorrupted card C. Thus, the adversary cannot know seed unless it corrupts
this card. By Corollary 4.11, the adversary has negligible probability to guess the
transformed nonce correctly and thus to trigger Combine. On the other hand, if the
adversary decides to corrupt C, this case in fact becomes the second case.
Second case: We can assume that the adversary knows all secret values of the
session: K, seed. Furthermore, she already has a few selective disclosure proofs
with attributes fromAcorr (i.e. fromacorrupted card). In order to trigger theCombine
event, she has to use an uncorrupted card C. Therefore, she needs a proof SD
(
. . . ;
f(n′i‖seed
′)
)
fromC where f(n′i‖seed
′) = f(ni‖seed), provided that she has a shared
secret seed with the verifier oracle which sent nonce ni. Since f is a random oracle,
a collision can happen roughly with 2−|N|/2 probability (because of the birthday
paradox).
In sum, the adversary’s advantage is about 2−|N|/2 ≤ 2−k which is negligible.
Lemma 4.13. If |N | ≥ 2k, then ICA is a secure authentication.
Proof. We first consider mutual authentication, then we show that the adversary
has only a negligible probability to win the Authenticity Game (page 69).
Verifier authentication: According to Lemmas 4.6 and Corollary 4.7, a card can
output KeyOK and Accept at the end of the key-setup phase. Card authentication:
A verifier can Accept by the end of the selective disclosure protocol that there is a
valid card in a matching conversation. It also can output A.
We have to show that no adversary can trigger the NoMatch or Combine events.
Assume that an adversary does trigger the NoMatch event, i.e. she can authenticate
to a verifier, but there is no matching conversation with a card. By Corollary 4.5
the verifier can be convinced that either all attributes are coming from corrupted
cards, or all of them are coming from one valid card. The verifier performs the
following steps. It checks all selective disclosure proofs in terms of the disclosed
attributes and their proofs, their freshness, and that they include the card validity
credential. Then the verifier checks each attribute whether it is in Acorr . If at least
one of them is in the set of corrupted card attributes, the verifier can be convinced
that the whole proof is made up of attributes from corrupted cards. Otherwise, the
attributes originate from one valid card.
The other chance that the adversary has is to trigger the Combine event. As
Lemma4.12 shows, this event has probability about 2−|N|/2 ≤ 2−k (all other events’
probability is of the order 2−|N|) and thus, the advantage of the adversary is negli-
gible.
Nowwe are ready to prove that ICA is a secure ABC session protocol.
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Theorem 4.14. Assume that a CPA-secure public-key encryption (Gpke, E(),D()) is
given to encrypt confidential messages to verifiers, a secure ABC technology is given
for selective attribute disclosure with ideal revocation, and a CPA secure encryption
EncK(·) is given for secure channels with arbitrary keys from the key space. More-
over, let f1, f2, f3 be random oracles with all participants (including the adversary)
having access to them and assume that |N | ≥ 2k where k is the security parameter
of the system. Then the implicit card authentication protocol ICA is a secure ABC
authentication protocol.
Proof. Clearly, two parties following the protocol can both Accept under a benign
adversary. Furthermore, the verifier receives all eligibly requested attributes that it
can output at the end of the protocol.
ByCorollary 4.7 andby Lemma4.13 togetherwith the assumption that |N | ≥ 2k,
Adv
A
Conf + Adv
A
Auth is negligible.
Hence, ICA is a secure ABC authentication protocol.
4.4.2 Practical Considerations
Having proven that the ICA protocol is secure (assuming some standard primi-
tives), we briefly discuss practical considerations.
As we already mentioned, the verifier’s public key pkV is not an initial input
value, rather it is a part of a certificate in the first flow. The signature on the cer-
tificate within one ABC system desirably belongs to one authority, making it more
efficient for the card to verify only one signature. An alternative, less efficient so-
lution is to build a PKI of certificate authorities. Furthermore, if we assume that
random oracles are instantiated as standard hash functions H(such as, SHA-2 or
SHA-3), ICA entails a few hashes on the card’s side. Presuming that an RSA signa-
ture scheme is applied for the certificates and RSA encryption is used to encrypt
the nonce nC for verifiers, the key setup of ICA (i.e. ICA
key) is also efficient, as it re-
quires only two exponentiations (a signature verification and a public-key encryp-
tion) and two hashes (during signature verification and creating a session key). In
ICA each credential proof requires an additional hash over the ABC computations.
Although the security proof does not require the symmetric-key encryption to
be authenticated, we propose to use authenticated encryption after the key estab-
lishment phase between a card and a verifier. An ABC proof gives certainty about
integrity, any changes prevent the proof to be verifiable. However, standard au-
thentication mechanisms guarantee easy handling of errors during flow transmis-
sion. Authenticated encryption can be achieved either by using an efficient prim-
itive, such as OCB [RBB03], or by a card- and implementation-specific solution –
in which for instance, APDUmessaging is already authenticated with a givenMAC
key and messages are sent encrypted with an encryption key. Depending on the
authenticated encryption mechanism, keys and initiating values have to be cho-
sen appropriately. In any case, they should be derived from the seed using a hash
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function. For instance, when separate encryption and authentication keys are re-
quired, they can be computed asKenc = H(0x00‖seed) andKMAC = H(0x01‖seed).
An explicit key confirmation is recommended after both parties can compute K.
However, this step can be merged with the first message within the secure chan-
nel in practice if the format of messages is sufficient to prove that the proper key is
used. For instance, the attribute request may be required to start with 80 zero bits
within the (authenticated) secure channel.
Nonces are not only necessary to prevent replay attacks in ICA, but they bind
also selective disclosure proofs to the key establishment, that is, to the secure chan-
nel. Therefore, nonces should be long enough to protect also against the birthday
attack and thus the nonce spaceN should be {0, 1}128 (or larger).
We proposed to use a root credential that is only issued to valid cards after a
rigorous verification procedure. The presence of such a credential, which can be
demonstrated using an empty proof, shows that a card is valid. However, since ABC
proofs are rather expensive in terms of time, it is often desirable to omit as many
selective disclosure proofs as possible. In a slightly modified trust model, verifiers
may rely on issuers to verify properly the root credential before they issue new At-
tribute-Based Credentials. In this case verifiers do not need to request a separate
validity proof. This is a decision that the given systemmanager and/or a particular
verifier can decide upon. Needless to say, if the verification aims at a service of
issuing new credentials on a particular card, card validity has to be verified and
issuance has to be carried out in the same secure channel as the verification.
4.5 Diffie–Hellman ABC Channel (ABCDH)
Although ICA is an efficient protocol to build a secure channel for ABC proofs, in
some applications it might be desirable to make an authentic (not only confiden-
tial) key establishment. Furthermore, the roles of a verifier and a card is very asym-
metrical in ICA, while in future scenarios participants may be provers and verifiers
simultaneously. For instance, two, possibly anonymous NFC-enabled phones au-
thenticate each other using some ABC technology. In this case their roles are sym-
metrical, both participants are provers as well as verifiers. We propose a protocol
that addresses these issues.
Unlike in ICA, in this protocol authentication of both parties happens in the
key establishment phase. But we also borrow techniques from the previous proto-
col. Binding key setup to the selective disclosure proofs helped to protect against
NoMatch and Combine events, and thus provided authenticity for the protocol. We
will again use the idea of deriving the session key and the binder from the same
seed.
To construct a new protocol, we will employ two techniques. First, we define
a new type of public-key certificate based on ABCs. Second, in order for the two
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C
Card
V
Verifier
xV ∈R Zq, hV = gxV
σV = SD
(
. . . ; f0(hV )
)
1. hV , σV
xC ∈R Zq, hC = gxC
σC = SD
(
. . . ; f0(hV ‖hC)
)
2. hC , σC
seed = hxCV seed = h
xV
C
K = f1(seed) K = f1(seed)
s = f2(seed) s = f2(seed)
Key confirmation
Diffie–Hellman
3. n, request attributes
N = f3(n ‖ s) N = f3(n ‖ s)
4. attributes, SD
(
. . . ;N
)
Verifynew proof
Selective disclosure
Figure 4.2: ABCDH protocol: ABC authentication and the Diffie–Hellman key ex-
change for selective disclosure.
parties to set up a session key, they use authenticated Diffie–Hellman (DH) key
exchange. Both parties will authenticate using zero-knowledge proofs.
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As mentioned above, we define first a new type of certificate, the attribute-
based public-key credential (ABPKC). Such a credential plays a similar role as a
conventional public-key certificate, but technically it is an Attribute-Based Cre-
dential. A CA issues ABPKCs containing at least the following attributes: (1) the
verifier’s public key and (2) its access rights Att_Acc – encoded as an attribute – to
particular attributes in ABCs on smart cards. As any other ABC, an ABPKC also pro-
vides the selective disclosure functionality. For various types of use cases a verifier
may have various attributes in its ABPKC. Consequently, a verifier can reveal its ac-
cess rights adaptively depending on use cases. For instance, it is not necessary for
a user to know that a service provider is eligible to request the ‘gender’ attribute,
when the current application needs only the ‘over 12’ attribute.
It is well known that the textbook Diffie–Hellman (DH) key-exchange proto-
col [DH76] is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. The reason for that is
that there is nothing that binds the ephemeral public shares to the two parties
who intend to establish a session key. While we do not identify cards and veri-
fiers, we are still able to authenticate them and their messages. Each public share
is signed by a selective disclosure, that is, by a non-interactive attribute-based zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge; see Figure 4.2. We assume that a DH group is given
(e.g. G = Z∗p, a prime subgroup 〈g〉 of G of order q, or alternatively q points gener-
ated by a point P on an elliptic curve over a finite field) and the participants know
all system parameters. Though we use multiplicative notation, the given protocol
can easily be adapted to additive groups.
As with the ICA protocol in Section 4.4, we assume some underlying secure
cryptographic primitives, such as random oracles (implemented as standard hash
functions), a symmetric-key (authenticated) encryption for the secure channel and
the ABC technology that supports selective disclosure of attributes. Notations are
similar to those in the previous section.
ProtocolDescription
The verifier generates his own secret DH share xV ∈R Zq and computes hV = gxV
in G. Using his ABPKC, he creates a (non-interactive) selective disclosure proof
σV = SD
(
(pkV , Att_Acc); f0(hV )
)
about attributes that describe his public key pkV
and his attribute access rights Att_Acc. The verifier uses f0(hV ) as the message to
be signed by the non-interactive proof. Finally, he sends his DH public share hV
and the proof σV to the card.
Upon receiving the verifier’s authentication and the public share, the card ver-
ifies the proof and the values, and stores the access rights Att_Acc – and possibly
the public key pkV as the verifier’s identifier although it is not essential for this pro-
tocol. It generates its own private share xC ∈R Zq and computes hC = gxC in G.
The card creates an empty proof of validity (with its root credential) using (hV ‖hC)
as the message to be signed: σC = SD
(
∅; f0(hV ‖hC)
)
. Finally, the card sends its
public share hC and the proof σC to the verifier.
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The verifier checks the proof. In particular, he checks that the proof σC is correct
and the message it signs does correspond to hV he sent previously.
According to the Diffie–Hellman key exchange, both parties can now calculate
seed = gxV xC and can derive their shared key K = f1(seed). They can perform an
explicit key confirmation. The verifier and the card carry out all the ABC selective
disclosure proofs within the secure channel protectedby keyK. Like in ICA, nonces
for the proofs are transformed using s = f2(seed) before they are signed by the
NIZK proofs.
Theorem 4.15. Given a group in which the Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH)
holds and the group description is known to all participants. Further, given a se-
cure ABC technology for selective disclosure with ideal revocation and a CPA secure
symmetric-key encryption is given for the secure channel. Moreover, let f0, f1, f2, f3
be random oracles with all participants (including the adversary) having access to
them and assume that for the nonce space holds the following: |N | ≥ 2k. Then the
ABCDH protocol is a secure ABC session protocol.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 4.14, with the following
modifications. Clearly, two parties following the protocol can both Accept under a
benign adversary. Furthermore, the verifier receives all eligibly requested attributes
that it can output at the end of the protocol.
1. The adversary does not have a valid verifier certificate. Thus, the only chance
for her besides faithfully relaying a verifier’s fresh message is to replay an ear-
lier message.
2. Similarly, the adversary cannot produce a fresh reply without a valid card.
3. After the second message, the adversary learns two public DH shares and
both of them are authenticated by selective disclosure proofs showing valid-
ity of each participant. Relying on the CDHassumption, the adversary cannot
compute seed and K.
4. After the explicit key confirmation both parties can output KeyOK.
5. Again, because of the CDH problem, s can only be computed by the two or-
acles in a matching conversation. An adversary has negligible probability in
the binding game for exactly the same reason as in ICA.
Therefore, ABCDH is confidential and authentic, and ultimately a secure ABC
authentication protocol.
In this model the verifier is still trusted, that is, the adversary cannot corrupt it.
However, in practice if this scheme is implemented, both participants have to have
access to the revocation list; so, in case the verifier’s ABPKC is revoked, the other
party should not accept the verifier’s selective disclosure anymore.
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Although the ABCDH protocol is not as efficient as the ICA, it is worth dis-
cussing it for multiple reasons. It demonstrates that on an abstract level the ver-
ifier and the prover (the card) can be regarded in a symmetric manner. Both of
themhave an ABC to prove validity and potentially to protect their privacy. In some
practical scenarios the verifier may not need to reveal its public key. Second, this
enables us to foresee applications that have not been considered yet. Examples
include machine-to-machine communication in the internet of things or ad-hoc
communication between individuals who do not trust each other and thus wish to
share as little information as possible in a given context. As devices become more
powerful in terms of storage and computation, this protocol becomes more feasi-
ble. Third, the use of ABCs as a new kind of public-key certificate is an innovative
approach that can boost the evolution of PKIs and their applications.
4.6 Related Techniques
In this section we make a brief overview of proposals to privacy-friendly authenti-
cation and key establishment.
4.6.1 Pseudonyms
Pseudonymshave beenproposed in [Cha85], further investigated in [LRSW00], and
realised by the Camenisch–Lysyanskaya signature [CL01] and Idemix [IBM12]. The
European ABC4Trust project [CKL+11] aims to incorporate pseudonymswith other
attribute-based credential systems, such as U-Prove [Paq11].
As a user’smaster secret keyα is included in all credentials, it can play an impor-
tant role in each proof. A pseudonym is a randomised commitment to α that a user
can create. A pseudonym is bound to the credentials, and thus to the user as well,
but it does not reveal anything about the key or about the user’s identity. Once it
is revealed, it cannot be changed during a selective disclosure protocol, preventing
users from abusing their credentials. (For instance, mischievous users could com-
bine attribute proofs related to different users.) Therefore, a pseudonym is similar
to a public key within a proof session, but there are practically an infinite number
of pseudonyms corresponding to a secret key, which allow for unlinkability among
separate sessions. Applying pseudonyms, however, requires equality proofs, that is,
zero-knowledge proofs that the same secret key αwas used in the pseudonym and
in the selective disclosure proofs. A selective disclosure and credential issuance
require a secure channel that can be established in a more straightforward way if
pseudonyms are allowed in a particular implementation. Nevertheless, care has to
be taken to bind key establishment and proofs. We propose therefore that imple-
menters of such systems verify that they can achieve a secure ABC authentication
protocol in our model.
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4.6.2 German eIDModel
The German e-identity project [PWVT12] enables citizens to provide privacy-
friendly proofs based on attributes, such as ‘over 18’ age proofs. However, it em-
ploys a different approach to achieve anonymity for particular identity cards. Each
card has a public key (so-called chip authentication key) that enables authentica-
tion or channel establishment. A public key is not assigned to a single card, but a
batch of cards. Therefore, batches can be identified, but not cards (or card holders).
To achieve an appropriate level of anonymity, batches should not be too small. On
the other hand, too big batch sizes result in organisational problems in case of a
card with a corresponding private key gets compromised. In this case not only this
particular card, but all cards in the batch have to be revoked.
In the German eID technology the chip-authentication key is not directly ap-
plied in the key-establishment phase as it uses a password-based key-agreement
protocol, the so-called PACE. This protocol, assuming that the card and the verifier
share the card owner’s password, enables the derivation of a high-entropy session
key from a low-entropy password. Bender et al. [BFK09] give a security proof that
the protocol is secure under standard and “close-to-standard” assumptions. (See
further considerations about the German eID in Section 6.7.3.)
4.6.3 Anonymous Authentication
There are several techniques proposed for anonymous authentication. They are in
general aimed to allow eachmember of a group to prove that they are indeedmem-
berswithout letting a verifier know their identity. The general securitymodel is that
an attacker should not be able to distinguish proofs provided by different members
of the group. A possible realisation of these requirements is a group signature, first
proposed by Chaum and van Heyst [CVH91]. Ever since their introduction group
signatures have been an active field of research. A similar method with slightly dif-
ferent security requirements (e.g.more protected anonymity formembers) are ring
signatures, described by Rivest et al. [RST01]. A third approach is anonymous au-
thentication presented by Lindell [Lin07] uses a conventional encryption scheme
and requires several dummy encryptions by the verifier.
Membership in groups can be described as special cases of attributes since a
group can be identified by a particular attribute. Therefore, ABCs and thus our
schemes can be considered to provide a more general approach.
4.6.4 General Credential-Based Authentication
In the context of trusted computing, Camenisch et al. propose the Direct Anony-
mous Attestation (DAA) [BCC04] (standardised) technique. Using it, a trusted plat-
formmodule within a host device can interact with its host and a remote computer
to produce an anonymous proof about the authenticity of the host computer. DAA
uses the CL signature similarly to the Idemix technology described in Chapter 3.
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TheCAIDandCAKE (credential-authenticated identification and key exchange)
protocols by Camenisch et al. [CCGS10] are introduced for authentication and key
exchange using credentials. These protocols are proven to be secure in the univer-
sal composability framework. Although the motivation and the results are closely
related to ours, the present study assumes little about the resources of users’ de-
vices (e.g. very simple policy, limited computational capability, minimal infrastruc-
ture). Therefore, those results cannot be applied directly for our requirements, al-
though further research may suggest adaptability.
4.7 Conclusion
Selective disclosure and dependent credential issuance (i.e. one based on already
existing credentials; see 6.4.1) are important mechanisms of attribute-based cre-
dentials to provide security and privacy simultaneously. ABCs are building blocks
of future privacy-friendly electronic identity systems. This chapter showed how
to build a secure channel for the selective disclosure mechanism between a veri-
fier and a possibly anonymous smart card carrying ABCs in the presence of a very
powerful adversary.
First, we have described a security model to enable us to make security proofs
with standard cryptographic primitives and assumptions. Second, we have shown
twoprotocols that are secure in this framework. One of these protocols ismore effi-
cient, the other one can be generalised to new scenarios in which devices (a prover
and a verifier) authenticate each other anonymously in a symmetric fashion.
We assumed that proper revocation mechanisms exist that can handle abuses
of ABCs. Although there exist cryptographic techniques for revocation, most of
them are not efficient enough for smart-card implementations. Feasible and easily
applicable privacy-preserving revocation techniques are crucial in the deployment
of ABCs, but they are yet to be developed (see references and a new approach in
Section 6.6.1).
Authentication has been considered as a general notion. Rather than simply a
proof of identity, authentication is a proof that certain predicates hold for an en-
tity. When a secure channel is built on this notion of mutual authentication, par-
ticipants can be convinced that the entities at the other end meet some require-
ments in terms of these predicates. Privacy-respecting applications will need secu-
rity analyses in a similar model as the one shown in this chapter. As wementioned,
ABCDH can be the first step towards many new such protocols.

Chapter 5
Designated Verifier Proofs
In this chapter we attempt to adapt techniques of Attribute-Based Credentials forthe RFID context. There are prototypes that show that (even passive) RFID tags
are capable of performing a few point multiplications in an elliptic-curve cryptog-
raphy (ECC) setting,69 which is the most demanding operation in the ABC proto-
cols. That gives motivation to exploit some of the beneficial privacy properties of
ABCs, U-Prove’s selective disclosure proof, in particular.
The communication and computational capacity of RFID tags are much more
limited than other devices, and the cryptographic modelling also works differently.
This is reflected in the design we propose and also the security and privacy proofs
we provide. We follow Vaudenay’s model[Vau07] and prove that our scheme pro-
vides narrow-strong privacy for the tags, relying on the representation and the De-
cisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) assumptions.
So far, we have worked with credentials as signed Pedersen commitments, as
we discussed it on page 53. Accordingly, a selective disclosure proof included two
conceptual parts: a signature verification and a proof of representation (i.e. proof
of knowledge of a subset of the exponents in the Pedersen commitment).
In this chapter we will exclude credential signatures and make the following
modifications. We assume that each RFID tag is initiated with a Pedersen com-
mitment I, functioning as its identifier, and the tag stores all exponents. Further-
more, identifier I gets stored in a database to which verifiers get access (in fact, the
database can be public, although it needs to be authentic). Verification of a tag
comprises then the disclosure of I, the confirmation that I is in the database, the
disclosure of some attributes and a proof of knowledge of the representation of I.
Because of the proposed designated verifier functionality, only a legitimate verifier
will be able to receive I, to derive the disclosed attributes and to verify the proof. To
sum up, only designated verifiers can confirm authenticity of a tag, and they have
to access a authentic database instead of verifying a signature.
69Five point multiplications on an RFID tag of the hardware design described in [LBSV10] can be
performed in less than 500ms, where the area for the elliptic curve (EC) computations is under 15,000
gates, the frequency is 700KHz, the power is 13.8µW, and the energy for each point multiplication is
1.18µJ.
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The proposed technique provides an alternative to setting up a secure channel
(discussed in Chapter 4) for an ABC selective disclosure protocol between a prover
device and a reader terminal. The designated verifier protocol is integrated within
the interactive zero-knowledge proof and does not require additional communica-
tion rounds. The described scheme is suitable for simple setups in which each tag
has only one ‘credential’ (i.e. commitment), a protocol run requires little commu-
nication and no additional infrastructure (e.g. PKI) is desired.
5.1 Related work
A zero-knowledge proof [GMR89] gives certainty about a statement’s validity. For
instance, the Schnorr identification protocol [Sch91] (described in Figure 3.3)
proves that an entity knows the secret exponent corresponding to his public iden-
tity. This proof technique assumes that the verifier receives the identity before (or
during) the interaction. Similarly, in the context of ABCs, a selective disclosure
proof also assumes that the verifier knows the disclosed attributes that are to be
proven in a credential. That means that any party interacting with the prover or
eavesdropping on the communication channel between the prover and the verifier
can learn the claim and the proof. Since in the RFID contexts interrogation is direct
and prior verifier authentication is usually not possible, this is not desirable. Des-
ignated verifier proofs are interactive protocols, in fact extended zero-knowledge
proofs, in which only a designated verifier can obtain valuable information. More-
over, this technique preserves simulatability of zero-knowledge proofs, and there-
fore, verifiers cannot convince third parties with regards to the prover about the
information they were given.
Restriction of verification has a long history in cryptography. Undeniable sig-
natures were introduced in 1989 by Chaum and van Antwerpen [CVA90] and have
been enhanced to zero-knowledge proofs of ownership by Chaum [Cha91]. An un-
deniable signature cannot be verified without interacting with its signer. Further-
more, during the proving protocol no external parties learn anything about the va-
lidity or invalidity of the signature. Jacobsson et al. [JSI96] propose a more general
notion, the designation of verification that a statement is true. The idea is that the
prover generates a zero-knowledge proof that can only be produced by her and the
verifier. Since the verifier knows that he was not the one who created the proof, he
becomes convinced about the validity of the statement. However, he cannot con-
vince any third party that the proof was produced by the prover and not by him-
self. Saeednia et al. [SKM04] improve the notion of designated verifier signatures,
in which not only the verifier but anybody can simulate transcripts of valid proof
conversations. They also propose an efficient designated verifier signature using
the Fiat–Shamir heuristic [FS87]. As in all these techniques, also in our scheme the
prover is in control over who can verify her proofs.
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In the context of RFID systems, public-key cryptography (PKC) is essential for
achieving user’s privacy [Vau06, Vau07]. ECC has typically been the preferred set-
ting for creating PKC-based protocols because of its computational advantage to
other techniques (e.g. DL in the multiplicative group of a finite field or RSA). Nu-
merous protocols were designed aiming at security and privacy of RFID systems
based on the EC point multiplication [BCI08, LBSV10]. Starting from an authenti-
cation of a single tag, a number ofmore complex protocols emerged such as group-
ing proofs [Jue04, BLS+11] and hierarchical proofs [BSSV12].
Designated verifier proofs in relation to RFID systems were first proposed by
Bringer et al. [BCI08]. They present a scheme that alters the Schnorr identification
by incorporating the verifier’s public key. First, the protocol conveys not only the
proof but also the identifier of the prover tag; second, only the designated verifier
can learn the proof and the identifier. Thus, it prevents possibly malicious readers
and eavesdropping adversaries from discovering the identifiers of RFID tags.70
We further extend the scheme for RFID tags to be able to operate with attributes
and to perform selective disclosure proofs. More specifically, we generalise the
scheme of Bringer et al. [BCI08] by allowing multiple attributes to be included in
an identifier. This is achieved by using a (generalised) Pedersen commitment. A
prover in a designated verifier selective disclosure proof can reveal any subset of
attributes similarly to ABC proofs. However, unlike those proofs, only a designated
verifier can extract disclosed attributes and verify the proof.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 Cryptographic Preliminaries
In Chapter 3 we stated the DL and the representation problems. Here we recall
thembutwith the additive notation in an ECC setting. LetE be an elliptic curve de-
fined over a finite field F2k . Fields of characteristic 2 aremore suitable for hardware
implementations, and for RFID tags in particular, than fields of odd characteristic.
Nevertheless, ECC protocols conceptually apply to arbitrary fields. Let (G,+) de-
note a cyclic group of prime order p of points on the curve E, generated by a point
P . Weuse capital letters, likeA andP , to denotepoints on the elliptic curve. Scalars
are written using lower case letters. We write kP to denote the point P added k
times to itself. Finally, we denote by x ∈R Zp if x is chosen uniformly at random
from the set Zp. For more details we refer the reader to e.g. [Kob87, HWF09].
The discrete logarithm problem (Definition 3.2 on page 44) and the representa-
tion problem (Definition 3.6 on page 45) with EC notation are as follows:
Definition 5.1. The EC discrete logarithm problem (ECDL problem) takes the fol-
lowing form: Given P ∈ G andQ := xP ∈ G, find x.
70Since Bringer et al.’s technique randomises the themessages that a tag sends from external parties’
point of view, they call their scheme the “Randomized Schnorr”.
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Definition 5.2. Given an EC group G and elements P1, . . . , PL ∈ G. Then (x1, . . . ,
xL) ∈ ZLp is said to be an EC representation of Q if Q =
∑L
i=1 xiPi with respect to
(P1, . . . , PL).
The EC representation problem takes the following form: Given P ∈ G and
Q =
∑L
i=1 xiPi ∈ G, find a tuple (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
L) ∈ Z
L
p for which Q =
∑L
i=1 x
′
iPi. (We
omit the adjective ‘EC’ whenever it is clear from the context.)
Both the ECDL problem and the EC representation problem are assumed to be
hard (i.e. no polynomially bounded adversary can solve these problems). We note
that while the DL problem has a unique solution, the representation problem has
plenty of different ones (in fact, pL−1 cf. footnote 52).
We also need an additional assumption about the difficulty of the following
problem.
Definition 5.3. TheDecisional Diffie–Hellmanproblem (DDHproblem) takes the
following form: Given a generator P , and the points A = aP , B = bP and C = cP ,
where a, b ∈R Zp, determine whether c ≡ ab (mod p).
5.2.2 Selective disclosure revisited
A selective disclosure protocol enables a prover (or user) to show some of the at-
tributes from her ABC, or here from her Pedersen commitment, and to prove the
rest of the attributes in a zero-knowledge fashion. The disclosing set determines
which attributes are revealed. Just to recap: A disclosing set D ⊆ {1, . . . , L} is a set
of indices of the disclosed attributes.
As we mentioned above, a U-Prove selective disclosure scheme in fact com-
prises two steps: (1) a signature verification; (2) a proof of representation. Here
we only focus on step (2), since U-Prove’s credential signature is not applied in this
setting; rather the verifier checks whether I is in the trusted system database DB
of valid identifiers. The proof of representation is concerned with those attributes
that are not revealed. All disclosed attributes have to be sent through the commu-
nication channel to the verifier. To make this explicit and to adapt the protocol
to the RFID context, we have made some modifications in the description of the
scheme in Figure 5.1 in comparison with that in Figure 3.6. We use ECC notation;
we include the identifier and the disclosed attributes in the response phase rather
than in the common input; and we re-write the verification equation to express the
identifier I (corresponding to h′ in U-Prove). These adjustments make it clearer
to extend the protocol to our designated verifier proof while they do not affect the
security properties. Hereafter, we refer to the proof of a representation as ‘U-Prove
selective disclosure’.
It is clear that the identifier as well as all revealed attributes are easily accessible
for an eavesdropper if we cannot presume an underlying secure channel. Also, a
rogue verifier terminal could interrogate the prover and receive this information.
Our goal is to prevent the possibility of these malicious scenarios.
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Prover Verifier
x0, . . . , xL P0, . . . , PL
I =
∑L
i=0 xiPi
∀i /∈ D : αi ∈R Zp
A :=
∑
i/∈D αiPi
A
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
c
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− c ∈R Zp
∀i /∈ D :
ri := c · xi + αi (mod p)
I,(xi)i∈D ,(ri)i/∈D
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Verify the identity and disclosed attributes:
I
?
= c−1(
∑
i/∈D riPi − A) +
∑
i∈D xiPi
Figure 5.1: Adapted version of U-Prove’s selective disclosure scheme; cf. Figure 3.6.
(We mention that there are L + 1 point multiplications and that the Schnorr iden-
tification is a special case of this scheme where L = 0 and D = ∅.)
5.3 Designated verifier selective disclosure
5.3.1 Participants
A system includes an issuer, RFID tags and designated verifiers. An issuer sets up a
system and initiates RFID tags. Each time when a tag has been set up, its identifier
is stored in a database DB and the corresponding secret values are stored on the
tag. When a tag is interrogated by a designated verifier , a selective disclosure pro-
tocol takes place. The protocol is zero-knowledge so that the verifier does not learn
anything except the identifier of the tag. After the interaction, the verifier looks up
the resulting identifier in DB and considers the tag valid if it can be found there.
An external party (an adversary or an illegitimate verifier) does not acquire any
valuable knowledge from the interaction. We mainly focus here on authentication
protocols and not issuing.
5.3.2 Designated Verifier Identification (DID)
First we briefly describe an intermediary scheme that we call the designated ver-
ifier identification (DID) scheme. It is a simple generalisation of Bringer et al.’s
“Randomized Schnorr” [BCI08] scheme (in which L = 0), similar to how the DL
problem generalises to the representation problem; see Definition 3.6 on page 45.
In its pure form this protocol should not be applied since it is less efficient than
the “Randomized Schnorr”, but achieves the same identification. (Essentially, this
is an ‘empty proof’ in which no attributes are revealed, only the fact is proven that
the representation of I is known to the prover.) Yet it is a stepping stone to the ex-
tension of this scheme in which a tag can reveal not only its identifier but also any
subset of its attributes to a designated verifier.
The designated verifier identification scheme allows a prover to prove the knowl-
edge of a representation and to reveal its identifier I to a designated verifier with
public key V . Verification and the computation of I can only be performed by a
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Prover P0, . . . , PL Verifier
x0, . . . , xL, I =
∑L
i=0 xiPi V = v ·
∑L
i=0 Pi v
α0, α1, . . . , αL, β ∈R Zp
A1 :=
∑L
i=0 αiPi
A2 := βV
A1,A2
−−−−−−−−−→
c
←−−−−−−−−−− c ∈R Zp
∀i ∈ 0, . . . , L :
ri := c · xi + αi + β (mod p)
r1...rL−−−−−−−−−−→ Compute the identifier and verify its validity:
I = c−1(
∑L
i=0 riPi − A1 − v
−1A2)
Figure 5.2: The designated verifier identification (DID) protocol. The Randomized
Schnorr scheme is a special case, for which L = 0. (There are L + 2 point multipli-
cations on the prover’s side.)
legitimate verifier, that is, one that is privy to the corresponding secret key v. The
scheme has the following algorithms:
• GenI(k) outputs Sys (depending on security parameter k) such that Sys =
(k,G, P0 = P, P1 = p1P, . . . , PL = pLP ) (where P is a generator in an ECC
groupG and p1, . . . , pL ∈ Zp). The scalars p1, . . . , pL are erased.
• GenP(Sys) outputs (I, skP) such that I =
∑L
i=0 xiPi and sk
P = (x0, . . . , xL) ∈
ZL+1p . Additionally, I is stored in database DB of valid prover identifiers.
(Only the issuer is assumed to have write access to this database.)
• GenV(Sys) outputs (pkV , skV) such that skV = v and pkV = V = v ·
∑L
i=0 Pi.
The verifier’s public key V is published and available for all participants in the
system.
• The DID protocol is shown in Figure 5.2
This protocol is a modified version of an interactive zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge of a representation of I with respect to the generators (P0, . . . , PL). Two
changes are required on the prover’s side and one on the verifier’s side. The prover
needs an additional commitmentA2 to a random value β using the verifier’s public
key V . This random value β is also added to each responses. The knowledge of the
secret key vmakes it possible for the designated verifier (only) to cancel β
∑L
i=0 Pi
and eventually compute the prover’s identifier. The protocol is complete – i.e. an
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honest prover can convince a legitimate verifier – because of the simple fact that
A1 + v
−1A2 =
L∑
i=0
αiPi + v
−1βV
=
L∑
i=0
αiPi + v
−1βv ·
L∑
i=0
Pi
=
L∑
i=0
αiPi + β ·
L∑
i=0
Pi
=
L∑
i=0
(αi + β)Pi;
and therefore, the verifier can indeed compute the identifier I:
c−1
(
L∑
i=0
riPi −A1 − v
−1A2
)
= c−1
(
L∑
i=0
(c · xi + αi + β)Pi −
L∑
i=0
(αi + β)Pi
)
= c−1
(
L∑
i=0
cxiPi
)
=
L∑
i=0
xiPi
= I.
5.3.3 Designated verifier selective disclosure (DSD)
Weare ready to describe the designated verifier selective disclosure (DSD)protocol.
We need two new concepts: an entitlement set and an attribute point.
Definition 5.4. An entitlement set E ⊆ {1, . . . , L} is a set of indices of attributes
that a verifier can legitimately extract from tags. A verifier has the secret keys cor-
responding to the indices from his entitlement set.
Note that an entitlement set places a comparable restriction on the verifier as
the attribute access policy in a public-key certificate in Chapter 4.
Let us introduce the notion of attribute points. In the DSD scheme, defined
below, verifiers can compute attribute points rather than their values directly. The
issuer creates a public look-up table of possible attribute values xi ∈ ZP and points
Ci = xiPi. Thus, this table is available for all verifiers. We illustrate this with amock
table of the attribute ‘blood type’ with attribute values and attribute points (sorted
by the attribute value here for readability):
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Prover Verifier
x0, . . . , xL P0, . . . , PL v, (vi)i∈E
∀i ∈ D : Vi = viPi
I =
∑L
i=0 xiPi V = v ·
∑L
i=0 Pi
α0, . . . , αL, β ∈R Zp
A1 :=
∑L
i=0 αiPi
A2 := βV
Bi := (αi + β)Vi ∀i ∈ D
A1,A2,(Bi)i∈D
−−−−−−−−−−−→
c
←−−−−−−−−−−−− c ∈R Zp
∀i ∈ 0, . . . , L :
ri := c · xi + αi + β (mod p)
r0...rL−−−−−−−−−−−−→ First verify that the identifier
is correct:
I := c−1(
∑L
i=0 riPi − A1 − v
−1A2)
Then for each j ∈ D ∩ E compute
attribute pointCj :
Cj := (cvj)
−1(rjVj − Bj)
Figure 5.3: The designated verifier selective disclosure (DSD) protocol in which at-
tributes in D are disclosed. (There are L + 2 + |D| point multiplications on the
prover’s side.)
blood type
attribute value C
A+ 0x23D...A0
A- 0xEAA...2B
B+ 0x3CC...D1
...
0- 0x170...66
The DSD scheme cryptographically enforces verifiers to receive at most those
attributes that they are entitled to.
• GenI(k) outputsSys such thatSys = (k, P0 = P, P1 = p1P, . . . , PL = pLP, (EV ))
(where P is a generator in an ECC groupG, p1, . . . , pL ∈ Zp, and (EV ) is the set
of all verifiers’ entitlement sets). The scalars p1, . . . , pL are erased.
• GenP(Sys) outputs (I, skP) such that I =
∑L
i=0 xiPi and sk
P = (x0, . . . , xL) ∈
ZL+1p . The identifier I gets stored inDB. (Again, only the issuer is assumed to
have write access to databaseDB.)
• GenV(Sys) outputs (pkV , skV) such that skV = (v, (vi)i∈E) (elements of Zp)
and pkV = (V, (Vi)i∈E) where V = v ·
∑L
i=0 Pi and Vi = viPi. The verifier’s
public key (V, (Vi)i∈E ) is published and available for all participants in the
system.
• The DSD protocol is shown in Figure 5.3
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This protocol is an extension of the DID protocol; it is not only a proof of knowl-
edge of a representation, but also the selective disclosure of any subset of the at-
tributes. The idea behind a designated selective disclosure is that the capability
of computing disclosed attributes is not ‘all-or-nothing’, it is determined indepen-
dently for each attribute. A public key V is used to designate the identifier, and
separate public keys Vi are used to designate each attribute i. For instance, it can
happen that a verifier is entitled to receive a tag’s identifier and the first attribute
(e.g. the ‘blood type’ above), but not entitled to the rest of the attributes (e.g. other
medical data), even if the tag disclosed all attributes.
In comparison with the DID scheme, two changes are required, one on the
prover’s and one on the verifier’s side. The tag computes Bi for each disclosed
attributes in the commitment phase. The verifier computes the attribute points
Ci, based on which he can retrieve the actual attribute values (from the attribute
look-up table).
The identifier I computed in the same way as in DID. The selectively disclosed
attribute points can correctly be computed:
(cvj)
−1(rjVj −Bj) = (cvj)
−1((cxj + αj + β)Vj − (αj + β)Vj)
= (cvj)
−1cxjVj = xjPj
= Cj .
5.4 The security of DSD
As we see, the DSD protocol is complete, that is, a valid tag can reveal its identifier
and attributes to a verifier. In this subsection we discuss the security of the proto-
col. First we show that the scheme is zero knowledge, that is, the verifier does not
lear any additional information except the identifier and those attributes that are
revealed and are in his entitlement set. Second, using Vaudenay’s model we prove
that the DSD protocol is secure and provides narrow-strong privacy.
5.4.1 Zero-knowledge
Theorem 5.5. The designated verifier selective disclosure (DSD) protocol is (honest-
verifier) perfect zero knowledge.
Proof. We show that an honest, designated verifier does not learn any secret value
from a prover, only the fact that it has a valid identifier (I) with any disclosed at-
tributes (Ci). We assume thatD = E .
As usual, we prove that the verifier himself could simulate valid proof tran-
scripts. Simulated conversations take also the designated verifier’s private keys as
input.
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Real conversation:
• Input: c ∈ Zp, x0, x1, . . . , xL, P0, . . . , PL, V,D, ∀i∈D : Vi.
• Simulation:
1. Choose random α0, . . . , αL, β ∈R Zp
2. SetA1 :=
∑L
i=0 αiPi, A2 := βV, ∀i∈D : Bi := (αi + β)Vi
3. Set ∀i∈0,...,L : ri := c · xi + αi + β (mod p)
• Output: (A1, A2, ∀i∈D : Bi, c, (r0, . . . , rL))
Simulated conversation:
• Input: c ∈ Zp, I, P0, . . . , PL, V, ∀i∈E : (vi, Vi) and any Ci.
• Simulation:
1. Choose r0, . . . , rL ∈R Zp
2. ComputeA :=
(∑L
i=0 riPi
)
− cI
3. ComputeBi := riVi − cviCi ∀i∈E
4. Choose β ∈R Zp
5. ComputeA2 := βV and A1 := A− β
∑L
i=0 Pi
• Output: (A1, A2, ∀i∈E : Bi, c, (r0, . . . , rL))
Since α0, . . . , αL, β are chosen uniformly at random (in Zp), ri’s and A1, A2 are uni-
formly distributed in a real execution. In simulated conversations the distribution
of ri’s is uniform by definition, thus the distribution of the points Bi is uniform
as well. Because of the uniformity of β, A1, A2 are also uniformly distributed in a
simulated conversation. In sum, given the system parameters and the values to
be proven, a verifier (for which D = E) can compute a tuple that has exactly the
same distribution as real conversations. Therefore, the simulation (as well as the
zero-knowledgeness) is perfect.
Interestingly, it is clear from the proof (see Step 3. of the simulation) that a
verifier can only simulate proofs with disclosed attributes from his entitlement set,
i.e. he needs the corresponding secret attribute key.
5.4.2 Securitymodel
Besides being complete and zero-knowledge, a designated verifier scheme also
has to satisfy two distinct requirements: security and privacy. The former roughly
means that it is impossible for an adversary to impersonate a valid tag, while the
latter means that an adversary cannot trace particular tags because it cannot even
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distinguish legitimate tags from simulated ones. Below we focus on security and
privacy in more detail.
Just as Bringer et al. [BCI08], we follow the security model proposed by Vaude-
nay [Vau07]. In Vaudenay’s model privacy is derived from the fact that an adversary
is not able to deduce identity information from interaction messages. Also, an ad-
versary cannot trace or identify tags without corrupting them. In his model, Vau-
denay describes how adversaries can interact with a set of tags. Besides offering
methods for communicating with and choosing from the tags as well as communi-
cating with the reader, the model also exposes two types of oracle calls. The level
of access to these oracles defines the type of an adversary.
The first additional oracle is the Result oracle. As it is typical in RFID identifica-
tion protocols, the reader draws one of the following two conclusions at the end of
the protocol. It either concludes that the tag it communicated with has been suc-
cessfully identified as the tag with identity I, or it reports failure. The Result oracle
will return only the success/failure status of the reader. In our protocols we do not
allow this type of query. This is called a narrow adversarial model as opposed to a
wide one, in which the adversary is allowed to make such queries.
The second additional oracle is the Corruption oracle. This allows the adversary
to corrupt a tag and as a result learn all its secret values. We consider only strong
attackers, i.e. attackers that can obtain the secrets of any tags they choose. In the
privacy game, further attacks on the privacy of these tags are allowed afterwards,
while they are (of course) explicitly prohibited in the security game.
The active adversary has the power to corrupt tags and run (designated verifier)
identification protocols and her goal is to identify successfully (i.e. impersonate
a tag) to an honest verifier. More specifically, we now give games to define the
security model.
Definition 5.6 (Security Game). Assume that there exists a system of t tags that
can be interrogated via the authentication protocol, then the game consists of two
phases:
1. In the first phase, the adversary is allowed to interrogate any tag multiple
times. Furthermore, she is allowed to corrupt any tags of her choosing. (The
number of queries is bounded polynomially by the security parameter k.)
2. In the second phase, the adversary communicates with the verifier to imper-
sonate one of the uncorrupted tags of the system.
A designated verifier identification scheme is secure if no adversary can win the
Security game above with non-negligible advantage.
Intuitively, the notion of privacy for these types of RFID protocols means that
it is not possible to link two different instances of the protocol involving the same
tag. This property is often referred to as unlinkability. In Vaudenay’s model it is
captured as follows. Even though the adversary is given the identifiers of the tags
she interrogated at the end of the query phase of the privacy game, she cannot
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distinguish between the setting in which it communicates with actual tags and the
setting in which she communicates with simulated tags. Note that in the latter case
the simulator does not know the identifiers. Hence, any information leak on the
identifiers can be used by the adversary to gain advantage. A system has narrow-
strongprivacy if no adversary canwin the following game against a challenger with
non-negligible probability.
Definition 5.7 (Narrow-StrongPrivacy Game). Assume that there exists a system
of t tags that can be interrogated via the designated verifier identification protocol.
First, the challenger chooses a random bit b ∈R {0, 1} and depending on it, he runs
different experiments:
• If b = 0, the adversary is allowed to directly talk to any tag of her choice.
• If b = 1, the adversary is not allowed to interrogate tags directly but the chal-
lenger, without interacting with the actual tags, simulates them.
Then in the corruption phase, the adversary can receive all private information of
the tags by corrupting them. At the end of the game, the adversary must guess the
value of bit b.
Note that if the adversary cannot distinguish real communications from simu-
lated ones even when knowing all secret and public information of the tag, she is
also unable to trace specific tags. This explains the notion of privacy in this setting.
5.4.3 Security
To prove the security of the DSD scheme, we will use the description of U-Prove’s
selective disclosure given in Figure 5.1.
Theorem 5.8. Assuming that U-Prove’s selective disclosure scheme is secure against
active impersonationattacks the designated verifier selective disclosure (DSD) scheme
is also secure against active impersonation attacks.
Proof. We show how an adversary against the DSD can be used to break the secu-
rity of U-Prove’s selective disclosure scheme. To do so, we build an adversary B that
essentially translates between these two systems. Suppose we are given an adver-
saryA that wins the active impersonation game against the DSD scheme. We show
how to construct an adversary B that wins the active impersonation game for the
U-Prove selective disclosure scheme. Thismeans thatB can produce a valid (one of
the identifiers from the database), previously not corrupted identifier with a proof
of representation with respect to the base points.
Figure 5.4 shows the attack. We need to show how B converts messages in both
phases. First, in the query phase it answers the identification requests from A us-
ing only the U-Prove oracle acting as tags. Second, B converts the impersonation
attack byA against the DSD scheme into an identification protocol for the U-Prove
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selective disclosure scheme. In the latter phase the U-Prove oracle acts as an (hon-
est) verifier. We assume that B has access to the public databases of (1) valid iden-
tifiers and (2) the pairs of attribute values and attribute points.
Initially, adversary B generates a random private key v and sets the public key V
to V = v
∑
Pi. Furthermore, for any entitled attributes i ∈ E adversary B generates
vi at random and sets Vi = viPi, and sends these Vi’s together with V to adversary
A. (For clarity, we set D = E . In both phases both systems, U-Prove as well as A,
have the same access to disclosed attributes.)
U-Prove system B A
P0, . . . , PL,D P0, . . . , PL,D
Initialisation
v ∈R Zp, V := v
∑L
i=0 P
∀i ∈ D : vi ∈R Zp, Vi := viPi
V,(Vi)i∈D
−−−−−−−−−−→
First phase: Query
Acting as a tag
Selected tag’s secret:
x0, . . . , xL
∀i /∈ D : αi ∈R Zp
A :=
∑
i/∈D αiPi
A
−−−−−−−−→ ∀i ∈ D : αi ∈R Zp, β ∈R Zp
A1 := A+
∑
i∈D αiPi
A2 := βV
∀i ∈ D : Bi := (αi + β)Vi
A1,A2,−−−−−−→
(Bi)i∈D
c
←−−−−−−− ←− Forward c—
c
←−−−−−−−
∀i /∈ D : ri := cxi + αi
I,(xi)i∈D ,
−−−−−−−−→
(ri)i/∈D
∀i /∈ D : r′i := ri + β
∀i ∈ D : r′i := cxi + αi + β
r′0,...,r
′
L−−−−−−−→
Second phase: Impersonation
Acting as a verifier
A
←−−−−−− A := A1 + v
−1A2
A1,A2,←−−−−−−
(Bi)i∈D
c
−−−−−−−→ —Forward c−→
c
−−−−−−−→
I := c−1(
∑L
i=0 riPi − A1 − v
−1A2)
r0,...,rL←−−−−−−−
If I valid:
∀i ∈ D : Ci := (cvi)
−1(riVi − Bi)
Accept
I,(xi)i∈D ,
←−−−−−−−−
(ri)i/∈D
Look up xi corresponding toCi
Figure 5.4: The security game in which Bmakes use of A to successfully attack the
U-Prove system. B does not have any insight or influence on the internal states and
operations of the U-Prove oracle as well as of adversary A; we denote this fact by
shading the corresponding columns. However, we describe the operations the U-
Prove oracle is supposed to do in the first phase. (For simplicity we assume E = D.)
During the first phase B answers interrogation queries for a tag as follows. First,
it queries the U-Prove oracle, who sends a commitment A. Adversary B generates
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αi ∈R Zp for all i ∈ D, β ∈R Zp, and sends toA the values
A1 = A+
∑
i∈D
αiPi
A2 = βV
Bi = (αi + β)Vi ∀i ∈ D.
Subsequently, B receives challenge c from A which it passes along to its U-Prove
oracle. In return it receives identifier I and ri for i /∈ D and xi for i ∈ D. B creates
and sends responses forA as follows:
r′i =
{
ri + β for i 6∈ D
cxi + αi + β (mod p) for i ∈ D.
Clearly, this construction is a perfect simulation of the designated verification pro-
tocol for A. This phase can be repeated multiple times (polynomial in the security
parameter k).
In the second phase adversary A can impersonate a tag with non-negligible
probability according to the assumption. The goal of adversary B is to transform
this communication such that it in turn impersonates a valid tag for the U-Prove
selective disclosure protocol. This means that B can create a proof of a valid iden-
tifier I in the U-Prove system.
First, A sends two commitments A1 and A2, which are converted by B into
A := A1 + v
−1A2
(
=
∑L
i=0(αi + β)Pi
)
before sending it to the original U-Prove
verifier. The verifier responds with a challenge c, which B relays unchanged to A.
Finally, A replies with the ri values. B computes identifier I and checks whether it
is valid. If I is not valid, it halts. Otherwise, for i /∈ D, B forwards these values to
the challenger. Note that they should equal ri = cxi + αi + β and are therefore ap-
propriate responses corresponding to commitmentA. For the disclosed attributes
(i ∈ D), B can calculate
Ci = (cvi)
−1(riVi −Bi)
Accessing the public database of attribute points and values, i.e. (Ci, xi),B can then
recover the attributes xi before forwarding them to the challenger according to the
U-Prove protocol (see Figure 5.1). This completes the proof.
5.4.4 Privacy
Theorem 5.9. Assuming the hardness of the DDH-problem, the designated verifier
selective disclosure (DSD) scheme is narrow-strong private.
Proof. We extend traces for the Randomized Schnorr protocol (the special case of
Figure 5.2 when L = 0) to full traces for the DSD protocol. We do this in such a
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way that the new responses are random if and only if the response of the original
instance was random. Therefore, any adversary against the DSD scheme can be
converted into a Randomized Schnorr adversary. Since the latter is secure under
the DDH-assumption [BCI08, Theorem 2], the result follows.
A transcript in our DSD protocol has the form:(
A1 =
L∑
i=0
αiPi, A2 = βV, (Bi)i∈D, c, (ri = cxi + αi + β)
L
i=0
)
.
Let us show that the adversary cannot tell apart properly constructed ri’s from ran-
domly chosen ones. Following the argument in Bringer et al. [BCI08], we can take
out the terms with the secret values of xi’s.
71 Consequently, the adversary has to
distinguish instances of the actual distribution
DLA =
{(
A1 =
L∑
i=0
αiPi, A2 = βV, (Bi)i∈D, (ri = αi + β)
)∣∣∣∣∣
αi, β ∈R Zp, 0 ≤ i ≤ L
}
from instances of the simulated distribution (with random responses ri’s)
DLS =
{(
A1 =
L∑
i=0
αiPi, A2 = βV, (Bi)i∈D, (ri)
)∣∣∣∣∣αi, β, ri ∈R Zp, 0 ≤ i ≤ L
}
.
Suppose we have an oracle for distinguishing these two distributions. We
will use this to decide between the corresponding instances for the Randomized
Schnorr scheme, which are in fact instances fromD0A orD
0
S . The main idea is that
we use a Randomized Schnorr instance (Â1 := α̂P̂ , Â2 := β̂V̂ , r̂) obtained as a
challenge,72 to construct a full instance for the adversary. Provided that this adver-
sary can distinguish the constructed transcript, we can also break the challenge.
The first attribute is reused from the original challenge, i.e. α0 := α̂, and all the
other, ‘dummy’ attributes are computed as αi := α̂ + γi where γi is random for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , L}. All further base points and the extensions of the commitment values
are generated similarly with ‘dummy’ values.
To set up the DSD system for the adversary, we generate the base pointsP0 := P̂
and Pi := piP̂ , with pi ∈R Zp random for all i ∈ {1, . . . , L}. Moreover, we construct
the designated public keys V and Vi’s:
73
V :=
(
1 +
L∑
i=1
pi
)
· V̂
(
= v̂ ·
(
P̂ +
L∑
i=1
Pi
)
= v̂ ·
L∑
i=0
Pi
)
.
71Since the adversary can receive all the secret values xi of the tags and she knows all the correspond-
ing challenges c, she can make this modification herself.
72We denote all the values in the challenge systemwith a hat (like x̂) no matter if it is secret or not.
73In the brackets we explain why we carry out the computations in the given way.
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We choose vi ∈R Zp and set Vi := viPi for all i ∈ D. Finally, we send the adversary
the points: (Pi)i=0,...,L, V , and (Vi)i∈D .
Next we constructA1 andA2 by extending Â1, Â2 from the challenge as follows:
A1 := Â1 +
L∑
i=1
(
piÂ1 + γiPi
) (
= α̂P̂ +
L∑
i=1
(α̂+ γi)Pi =
L∑
i=0
αiPi
)
;
A2 := Â2 +
L∑
i=1
piÂ2
(
= β̂ · v̂
L∑
i=0
Pi = β̂V
)
.
Then for all i ∈ D the valuesBi are constructed as
Bi := (r̂ + γi)Vi
(
= (α̂+ β̂ + γi)Vi = (αi + β̂)Vi
)
.
Lastly, we set r0 = r̂ and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , L}
ri = r̂ + γi
(
= α̂+ β̂ + γi = αi + β̂
)
.
We observe that the DSD adversary A can also compute Bi’s herself, which is not
surprising given the fact that she has the corruption power to know all secret xi’s
(and c).
If r̂ = α̂ + β̂ (and then in the DSD scheme for all indices ri = αi + β̂), we are in
the normal situation. However, if r̂ is random, then all the other response values are
random as well. This construction yields a valid input to our DSD adversary, and
can hence be used to break the privacy of the Randomized Schnorr scheme.
5.5 Discussion
There is an essential difference when working with a simple pair of private and
public keys, and with Attribute-Based Credentials. By definition a private key
should never be revealed, whereas attributes, carrying valuable information about
an entity, may sometimes be disclosed. The Randomized Schnorr scheme [BCI08]
employed the former model. We intended to generalise the scheme and apply a
similar technique to attributes. It is crucial to use a Pedersen commitment (see
Definition 3.7 on page 47) which has a randomly chosen secret value that should
never be revealed. This secret value (x0) ensures that the commitment is never fully
opened and thus, other entities cannot claim the same identifier. Technically, we
required that 0 /∈ D and 0 /∈ E .
The results of the work of Lee et al. [LBSV10] demonstrate that five point multi-
plications are feasible on a passive RFID tag. When a similar hardware architecture
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is applied for the DSD scheme, we foresee practical example applications with se-
lective disclosure. Tags can have for instance two attributes (and an additional pri-
vate scalar of course). If such a tag discloses 0, 1, or 2 attributes from the remaining
set, the number of required point multiplications is 4, 5, or 6, respectively.
Also, favourable remarks are valid for the memory requirements of a single tag.
Assuming L attributes, a tag has to store L+ 1 values where each is 160 bits long as
the group keys in the hierarchical proof protocols in Batina el at. [BSSV12]. Having,
for instance, four attributes to store, a tag requires 800 bits memory (assuming a
curve over a 160-bit field). This is completely acceptable even for passive tags as
attributes could be stored in the ROM memory the same way as the ECC parame-
ters. (Unlike registers, ROM is considered to be cheap.)
RFID chips in (biometric) passports are real-life examples of a similar logical
setup. Passport numbers, or identifiers, can be checked in an authentic database,
while attributes can be locally queried. Access to biometric data requires an ad-
ditional key74. The difference between the current practice and the technique de-
scribed in this chapter is mainly privacy and security related. Selective disclosure
of attributes and designated verifier proofs prevent illegitimate entities from re-
trieving personal information.
Another practical consideration is the governance of verifiers’ public keys. There
are two clear options in terms of public-key management when setting up a real-
world system. Both of themguarantee security in different ways for a prover’s iden-
tifier and disclosed attributes. First, an RFID tagmay store all the public keys corre-
sponding to the identifier (V ) and all public attribute keys (V1, . . . , VL). In this case
at each protocol execution the prover discloses all requested attributes using those
designated verifier keys. Second, a tag may use an instance-based designated ver-
ifier key. During interrogation a reader gives its public keys with a certificate along
with its proof request.75 A tag checks the certificate to disclose attributeswith using
only verified designated public keys.
We applied the idea of attribute-based authentication to the RFID technology.
As a result powerful and flexible use-cases can be developed. Considering the ex-
ample of hierarchical proofs [BSSV12], our solution could be deployedmeeting ex-
actly the same requirements as envisioned by the tree structure of the hierarchical
proofs. To obtain the same functionality, one could sort the attributes according
to their order of importance. More precisely, choose x1 to be less important i.e.
less privacy/security critical and therefore, the first secret verification key v1 can be
stored on a lot of readers, while v3, for example, only at a very limited set of veri-
fiers, etc. This infrastructure can easily be incorporated in the DSD scheme. In this
way, we achieve not just a more fine-grained access control for tags, but also more
fine-grained permissions for readers.
74The so-called Extended Access Control (EAC) includes this functionality.
75We assume here an underlying PKI for which the prover stores the root CA’s public key.
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Besides RFID applications, we foresee other possibilities. The idea of desig-
nated verifier can also be applied together with credential signatures76 integrated
in the U-Prove or Idemix technology. Issuing does not need to be changed, but
verification is improved. The basic idea is as follows. During interaction with the
verifier, the prover sends her credential signature, i.e. the issuer’s signature over
her identifier. An Idemix credential signature can be randomised every time, while
the ones in U-Prove should not be reused.77 As a result, a system can realise a
full-fledged ABC system without the need of an underlying secure channel. This
makes the designated verifier selective disclosure proof a powerful cryptographic
technique.
76This is proposed in one of our student papers [PAL13].
77To achievemulti-showunlinkability each credential can only beused once as explained onpage 58.
Chapter 6
An ABC Ecosystem
“[A]rchitecture is politics. The
structure of a network itself, more
than the regulations which govern
its use, significantly determines
what people can and cannot do.”
Mitch Kapor, 2006
We have made a long journey. After seeing the main problems with currentidentity management practice, we studied Attribute-Based Credentials and
their smart-card implementations. We also considered a more specific technical
problem about how an ABC card and a verifier can communicate securely.
In this chapter we propose an infrastructure based on our group’s smart-card
ABC implementation [VA13, Vul14] for tackling several of the problems in IDM.
The fundamental information unit about an individual is an attribute in an iden-
tity management system based on such an ABC card. This approach will have a
lot of benefits, including easier authentication and more transparency for users,
more reliable interaction between users and organisations, and more user-centric
and more privacy-friendly identity management, in general. We will discuss possi-
ble approaches to an ABC ecosystem, an independent infrastructure based on this
technology. This chapter describes an ABC ecosystem in which attribute-based
identity management is accomplished.
We intend to put Attribute-Based Credentials in practice because we believe
that this technology should be widely deployed. Its flexibility and privacy prop-
erties are exceptional and make it suitable for many applications. The examples
include a national identity system [BKPR14] that can provide a reliable source of
authentic information within and beyond government administration. By making
ABCs practical, we are able to build a user-centric and privacy-friendly identity-
management system realising the objectives described in e.g. [CSFH+05, BSCGS07]
within the European legal framework, see the EUDirectives 95/46/EC (DataProtec-
tion, [Eur95]), 2002/58/EC (Privacy and Electronic Communications) and the pro-
posal of the General Data Protection Regulation (cf. page 19). Since themapping of
personal data to separate attributes is easy to comprehend, it is also easy to argue
about attribute-based, privacy-friendly access to services. Our hope, supported by
some positive experience, is that people are increasingly willing to accept that it is
sufficient to authenticate based on those, possibly non-identifying attributes. In
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sum, although ABCs are devised primarily for privacy-friendly authorisation, we
intend to show that with an ABC card an identity ecosystem can be built that re-
alises muchmore.
Our goal in the chapter is to summarise our vision about the possible usage
scenarios and an infrastructure based on ABC cards.
6.1 Introduction
Authorisation requires authentication: Before letting someone do or use some-
thing, it must be clear that this someone is actually allowed to do so. Traditionally,
authentication is understood as a proof of identity, for instance, bymeans of a pass-
word or an identity document. But precisely identifying people, using uniquely
identifying numbers and names – such as a social security number (SSN), credit
card or bank account number – is often an overkill. Inmany situations it suffices to
know some attributes (properties) of a person in order to authorise a transaction.
If a hairdresser offers a cheap haircut to students, it is not necessary, or even de-
sirable, that the hairdresser learns, and potentially stores, a (uniquely identifying)
student number as part of the proof of “studentship”. Similarly, buying alcoholic
drink only requires a proof that the buyer is above a certain age limit (16, 18 or
21). Attribute-based authentication aims to provide amechanism for exactly doing
this: Allowing transactions on the basis of those attributes which are required for
the transaction. The main advantages are:
• It is privacy friendly: in the sense that it is based on the idea of data minimi-
sation and that it provides unlinkability among user transactions;
• It offers protection against identity fraud: if one’s identity is not involved in a
transaction, it cannot be stolen;
• It provides a new, more flexible approach in identity management and au-
thentication: in particular, an approach that is based on attributes instead of
whole identities with unique identifiers.
Attribute-based authentication is not new. Attribute certificates [FH02] were
defined in the X.509 stack over a decade ago. They enable authentication that does
not require identification; e.g. role-based access, proof of membership or more
generally attribute-based access control [WWJ04, YT05, VFK+14]. However, they
are (1) linkable (each transaction is linked to the same public key) and (2) trans-
ferable (delegateable). Attributes in the context of Attribute-Based Credentials and
in this chapter are different; they provide security, unlinkability and untransfer-
ability, simultaneously. Cryptographic techniques that enable secure and privacy-
friendly attribute-based authentication have also been around for more than a
decade, see [Bra00, Ver01, CL01, ?]. But what is new is that the state-of-the-art
smart cards are powerful enough to perform the required (non-trivial) cryptographic
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operations in an adequately efficient manner. Hence only nowwe see efforts to ac-
tually deploy attributes in practice. This chapter is based on the experiences in
one such deployment in the course of the IRMA project78 in The Netherlands. It
relies on the Idemix technology [?, CVH02, IBM12] and uses personal smart cards
as carriers of credentials and attributes. Getting privacy-friendly attribute technol-
ogy up and running brings us into largely unexplored territory that poses a multi-
tude of technical, organisational and research challenges. As itsmain contribution,
the current chapter explores these matters. It concentrates on the issues that arise
regarding the organisation of multiple attributes and of the dependencies among
them, and on the decisions that need to bemade tomake these cryptographic tech-
niques and their implementation practical while preserving their advanced prop-
erties. We refer the reader to Chapter 3 for the underlying cryptography and the
main results of the applied smart-card implementations.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two other pilot projects – one
in Sweden, the other one in Greece – in the context of Attribute-Based Creden-
tials. Both of them are carried out by the EU-sponsored ABC4Trust [CKL+11]. The
Swedish pilot [BGOZ12] gives anonymous access for elementary school pupils to
online resources (e.g. chat rooms), while the Greek pilot [ALP+12] enables univer-
sity students to evaluate lectures anonymously. In both cases eligibility and privacy
are of primary importance. Although our pilot uses the same underlying technol-
ogy, the objective of our research is more general as we investigate a broad variety
of attributes and applications. The kind of challenges investigated in this chapter
do not appear in these ABC4Trust pilots since each focusses on a single context.
In Chapter 2 identity was defined as the set of all characteristics that have been
attributed to this entity within a scope. So, from the scope’s perspective the entity is
seen as all his or her characteristics. From the entity’s point of view, however, each
of these collections is a partial identity [BMH05, PH10]; this is best depicted by
the FIDIS project – see Figure 6.1. Although authorisation often requires an iden-
tified partial identity,79 it would be sufficient to extract directly those attributes
that are relevant from a partial identity in a specific authorisation decision. This
would make the process more efficient with the participation of potentially fewer
parties (no IdP online), andmost importantly, it would often lead to amore privacy-
friendly transaction because the required attributes can truly be the minimal data
78I Reveal My Attributes (IRMA); see https://www.irmacard.org. This abbreviation and its full form
were coined by Bart Jacobs and Pim Vullers, respectively, during a brainstorming session about the
pilot project at the lunch table in the courtyard of our university’s Huygens building. In May 2012, the
project name was approved by our group’s secretary Irma Haerkens who has the same first name – not
coincidentally.
79In most cases in practice, a typical authorisation process scheme looks like (cf. network-based
IDM in Figure 2.1): (U) Claim an identifier −→ (U) Prove that this identifier belongs to you −→ (IdP)
Look up the partial identity corresponding to this identifier −→ (IdP) Select relevant attributes from
this partial identity −→ (IdP/SP) Make an authorisation decision based on these attributes (possibly
with additional data).
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Figure 6.1: An individual’s identity is made up of attributes which form several par-
tial identities in different contexts. (Source: FIDIS [Bac05, Figure 7])
set required for the access decision. So, instead of all attributes from a partial iden-
tity, only a minimum subset is used.
We can imagine that with a personal ABC card, people manage dozens of at-
tributes that are relevant for authorisation purposes in all kinds of contexts. Given
that there aremany dependencies betweenall these attributes, the question of how
to organise them in a logical, coherent and intuitive manner is non-trivial and of-
ten not free from politics (e.g. potentially enforced Facebook’s real-name policy;
see Section 6.4.1). In this chapter wemake the various issues explicit that we came
across in the context of the IRMA project and explain the choices we have made.
This is certainly relevant beyond this particular project as well as this thesis.
As we mentioned our discussion addresses smart cards as ABC carrier devices
for two reasons. Firstly, current smart cards are able to perform all cryptographic
operations required for achieving the favourable properties of ABCs. Secondly, in-
dividuals have a familiar and intimate relation with their smart cards. They recog-
nise them (particular cards are easily distinguishable based on their outward ap-
pearances), know the technology (bank cards, public transport cards, etc.) and can
trust them more than other devices (such as their mobile phones susceptible to
malware).
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The chapter proceeds with a collection of possible Attribute-Based Credentials
and related use cases, thenwegive apossible descriptionof attribute-based identity
management (ABIdM) in Section 6.3. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 study the new notions of
credential design and a schememanager in the context of ABIdM. Section 6.6 briefly
discusses revocation and the use of a personal mobile phone to communicate with
an ABCcard. Finally, we consider other attribute-based technologies in Section 6.7.
6.2 Motivation: Use Cases
To motivate attribute-based identity management, we describe some envisioned
credentials and use cases. Informally, we assume that issuing and showing proto-
cols work as they are described in Chapter 3 and that an Attribute-BasedCredential
can hold at most four attributes. As the current discussion considers attributes of
a wide variety, we let attributes be non-identifying as well as identifying. While
ABCs were originally devised for anonymous applications, we are convinced that
they provide many more usage and application opportunities with (partly) iden-
tifying attributes.80 These use cases serve as motivation for credential design (see
Section 6.4) principles and more general concepts relating to an ABC ecosystem.
Figure 3.1 gave an abstract viewof an Attribute-BasedCredential. In this section
we discuss example credentials with a main focus on the attributes within creden-
tials. Wedescribe possible issuers at each credential. The template of the simplified
abstract view in this chapter looks like this:
credential name
attribute 1
attribute 2
attribute 3
attribute 4
Attributes can be of different types: boolean (‘yes’ or ‘no’), an option from a list
(e.g. ‘gender’) or a string (e.g. ‘full name’). Mostly attribute types are clear from
the description and the context.
Agebounds The attribute that ismost needed in practice is probably theminimal-
age attribute, like “over 18”. It is useful for many online and offline transactions,
such as buying (violent) games, alcoholic drinks, cigarettes, (certain) movies or
books and online gambling. Analogously, one may form maximal-age attributes,
like “under 15”. They may be used to regulate access to certain chat rooms which
are set up exclusively for minors.
80In this thesis the degree of anonymity is out of scope, e.g. k-anonymity [Swe02,MKGV07], although
we recognise that it is an essential consideration in the context of attributes and privacy.
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Within the Idemix context there are “interval proofs” which make it possible
to derive these minimal- and maximal-age attributes from the date of birth. Such
proofs are computationally rather expensive and are (currently) not included in
this project because they cannot be implementedon a smart card.81 Instead,minimal-
age andmaximal-age credentials are foreseen that contain themost often used age
limits (of boolean type). These credentials look as follows:
minimal junior
≥ 12
≥ 16
≥ 18
≥ 21
minimal senior
≥ 60
≥ 65
≥ 70
≥ 75
maximal junior
< 12
< 16
< 18
< 21
Themost authoritative issuers for such credentials are local or national authorities,
using, for instance, their citizen registration database.
Citizen Identity A citizen’s identity may be organised in three coherent creden-
tials:
name
full name
birth name
family name
first name
identity
social security nr.
date of birth
place of birth
gender
address
country
city
street + number
postal code
As before, governmental authorities are themost authoritative source to issue such
credentials. Recall that each of these attributes can be used separately in authenti-
cation. But also combinations of these (and other) attributes are possible.
Loyalty Cards and Pseudonyms Shops, airlines and other commercial organisa-
tions like to build a steady relationship with their customers using loyalty cards. A
possible and popular means is to give them selected benefits when they have ac-
cumulated enough loyalty points. Applying such cards, these companies can keep
track of who purchases what, and this allows them to build up detailed profiles of
their customers. In practice, each chain of shops issues its own (physical or virtual)
loyalty card. This is no longer needed with an open ABC card, since each organisa-
tion can add its own loyalty credential to it which can work independently.
81After this chapter was written new implementation results showed that with certain cryptographic
modifications and some efficiency loss, equality and interval proofs are becoming feasible on current
smart cards. [dlPHV14]
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shop X loyalty
customer number
customer status
. . .
. . .
The customer number in the credential acts as a key for a database entry in
the back office that contains the actual purchase history of the customer (card
holder).82 On the basis of this history, a customer may reach a certain status, like
bronze/silver/gold. In each shopping situation the customer may be offered the
option (i) to buy anonymously, using only the status attribute to get certain ben-
efits, or (ii) to buy non-anonymously using also the customer number. Only in the
latter case, the purchase is added to the personal history (in the back office) and
contributes to the status build-up. The remaining two attributes, written as ‘. . . ’,
are left open and can be used for other CustomerRelationshipManagement (CRM)
purposes. They can also be left empty (blank).
A card holder may use his card with this credential offline, in a “brick and mor-
tar” shop. But it can also be used online, to purchase something, or to access an
overview of the card holder’s purchase history and, possibly, to update the status
attributes. For these purposes, the loyalty number attribute is sufficient as authen-
tication.83 Of course the name and the gender are appealing to have for communi-
cation purposes, but they are not necessary to be stored in this credential or in the
CRM system. Moreover, the customer may choose not to use his real or authentic
data. An address credential may be required in case of delivery. It can be verified in
each transaction, and need not be stored centrally.
Such customer numbers in credentials may thus be used as pseudonyms, one
for each commercial relationship (with shops X , Y , Z, etc.). There is a potential
privacy risk when many commercial organisations decide to cooperate and use
one number for all of them. In this way they can profile customers across different
organisations, a bit like it is done now using third-party cookies or device finger-
printing [MM12]. Such broad commercial use of a single pseudonym, possibly at a
national level, may be forbidden by the scheme manager (see Section 6.5) and/or
by the relevant data protection authority.
Medical information In a medical context one can envisage attributes for pa-
tients and for medical staff. Patients can carry for instance credentials with at-
tributes containing essential personal medical information in a micro-dossier, see
the first two credentials below. (Lists, like (encoded) allergies and chronic diseases,
are assumed to be disclosed as a whole.) Medical staff can use credentials that de-
82A similar approach for a privacy-friendly loyalty system was recently proposed in [MDPDD14].
83Technically, a secure channel is establishedbetween the card and the verifier inwhich the card also
provides an anonymous validity proof as described in Chapter 4.
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scribe their medical role and access rights to patient files, as suggested in the third
one:
medical basics
blood type
allergies
chronic diseases
. . .
medicines
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
medical staff
position
registration nr.
. . .
. . .
The first two credentials may be issued by health authorities (hospitals, or even
general practitioners). They are useful in medical emergency situations, like after
an accident. The last credential falls under the responsibility of health employee
registration authorities. The ‘position’ attribute typically determines access right
to medical records, such as: doctors may both read and write, but nurses may
only read. For accountability, the registration number should be used in each such
transaction in order to monitor who accesses which file.
As we see, further personal details, such as name or date of birth, are not in-
cluded in these credentials. The citizen identity credentials already describe those
issued by the governmental administration. Those attributes may also be revealed
in a medical context. Attribute duplication is not necessary and not even desired.
We elaborate on this issue later; see Section 6.4.
Access control and role/attribute-based access control Within an organisation
X or an educational institution, a credential can be designed for specific access
rights, roles, positions, etc., as suggested in:
X access
parking
main entrance
vault
intranet
X staff
position
employee nr.
. . .
. . .
student
university/college
field of study
student nr.
enrollment year
Issuing a mobile phone number credential So far we have concentrated mostly
on the attributes in credentials and how they are verified. We now consider the
issuing of a credential. Suppose one wishes to obtain a credential containing ones
mobile phone number. The obvious issuer is the mobile network operator (MNO).
The issuing procedure might work as follows:
1. The user goes to the website of the MNO, using TLS (i.e. https), and proves
her name and date of birth using her ABC card.
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2. The MNO looks up in its database if there is a contract with this name and
date of birth84; if not, it aborts; otherwise, it sends a one-time code over SMS
to the (mobile) phone number associated with this contract.
3. Upon receiving this one-time code, the user feeds it back into the website
(within the same https session).
4. The MNO now issues the credential containing her phone number, possibly
together with some other attributes, to the user’s card.
What is interesting about this protocol is that it involves authentication that uses
both existing credentials and an out-of-band channel. The use of existing creden-
tials leads to dependencies among credentials, as described in Section 6.4.1.
Login Currently, users have to remember several online usernames and corre-
sponding passwords at various websites. An alternative way is to have the web-
site issue a credential when the user registers; such a credential would contain the
‘username’ attribute. The login procedure is simply showing the username from the
card – the password is not required anymore.
Festival ticket We conclude this list of use cases with a non-standard application
of attributes, in order to suggest the great variety and breadth of possible usage sce-
narios. If individuals wish to get a ticket online for a pop concert or other festival,
they currently need to fill out long forms requiring personal information. Themain
purpose – apart from allegedly profiling – seems to be to prevent copying or trans-
fer of tickets and to limit the number of tickets one individual purchases. Physical
(paper) tickets are traditionally anonymous. One may also provide such a ticket in
electronic form, after payment, as a credential for the festival at hand, containing
for instance the following attributes:
festival ticket
festival name
date
ticket number
. . .
where . . . may describe any additional information, such as pre-paid consump-
tions. The issuing of such a digital ticket may be preceded with some verification
of attributes on the same card. For instance, it is required to check that the card
84In many countries, before obtaining a mobile phone subscription, a contractual commitment is
requiredwhich includes the verification of an identity document and the storage of some personal data;
this is assumed here.
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holder is ‘over 18’ to receive a voucher for alcoholic drinks. Upon entering the fes-
tival terrain, the presence of a valid ticket on a card can be checked (and consump-
tion vouchers can be handed over). The next day the ticket/credential is unusable,
and can be removed from the card (by the card holder).
6.3 Attribute-Based Identity Management
Identitymanagementwas defined inDefinition 2.2 as “the processes and all under-
lying technologies for the creation, management, and usage of digital identities”. A
user-centric identity management system “needs to support user control and con-
sider user-centric architectural and usability aspects” [BSCGS07]. More generally,
user-centricity refers to the quality of a system that it is “structured so as to allow
users to conceptualise, enumerate and control their relationships with other par-
ties, including the flow of information” [CPR09].
Our goal in this section is to embed the ABC technology and its smart-card im-
plementation into a user-centric identity management framework, which results
in what we call attribute-based identity management (ABIdM). To this end we dis-
cuss the underlying technologies and processes. Our narrative here is organised
from the bottom up, that is, from the ABC card through the participants and the
assumptions about the technology to the processes in the identity ecosystem. The
section concludes with some practical considerations that we encountered during
the IRMA project.
6.3.1 Participants and Assumptions
In an ABC ecosystem we distinguish at least four types of operational participants:
the user, the card provider, the issuer and the verifier. Each user (an individual)
has a personal ABC card that carries credentials with attributes related to the user.
Such a card is provided by the card provider to a user after a card provisioning pro-
cess. The card is then bound to the user (card holder) physically as well as digitally.
An issuer issues certain attributes to the user’s card in the form of a credential af-
ter verifying those attributes with respect to the user. A verifier , protecting some
resource (e.g. , application, service), checks attributes from the credentials on the
user’s card and decides upon user access based on the attribute values. Later we
mention further possible participants, such as a scheme manager and a certificate
authority (Section 6.5) or a revocation authority (Section 6.6.1).
All underlying cryptographic techniques are assumed to be secure with regard
to the system’s security parameter. In particular, ABCs have to provide all security
and privacy properties described in Section 3.3 on page 52. All ABCs on a user’s
card are bound to the card by a secret key, no credential can thus be transferred
to another user (provided that the card itself with its Personal Identification Num-
ber (PIN) is not transferred). This secret key is generated on the card, embedded
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as an attribute in each credential and is never revealed. A card is assumed to be
tamper-resistant so that it protects all secret values (keys, PINs) and attributes. It
has to be able to perform all required computational tasks. It is thus assumed to
generate all random values unpredictably, carry out cryptographic computations
correctly. The card implementation is presumed to execute also conventional cryp-
tographic operations for the whole protocol run. For instance, signature verifica-
tion is required for checking the public-key certificate of a terminal (of an issuer
or a verifier), and encryption is necessary for communicating with the terminal
through a secure channel. The entire software implementation is supposed to be
side-channel resistant to prevent information leakage about any secret values.
The communication between a card and a terminal of an issuer or a verifier is
assumed to be protectedby a secure channel definedand realised inChapter 4.85 In
offline use cases this secure channel provides anonymity leaving no linkable traces
of a card. However, in online use cases it is assumed that the underlying trans-
portation of messages is anonymous, such as a mix network or Tor86 in particu-
lar. Otherwise, the Internet connection of the user’s card-reading device (e.g. PC or
mobile phone) makes the communication traceable. To prevent rogue issuers and
verifiers, conventional public-key certificates are applied. We discussed that an
Attribute-Based Credential is a special signature on the attributes; the issuer’s cor-
responding public key has to be certified. In this way a verifier can ensure during a
verification protocol instance that an ABC’s signature originates from an authentic
issuer (certificates are assumed to be publicly available). Verifiers also have to have
certificates for the cards to be able to justify authorisation requests. Finally, cards
are assumed to provide random identifiers (specified in ISO14443-3 [ISO11]) every
timewhen they communicate with verifiers; otherwise, card transactions would be
linkable, based on this underlying number.
6.3.2 Processes
Now we turn to the operational processes in an ABC ecosystem from the user’s
point of view. The processes below show apossible realisation of an identity system
based on ABC cards. Several concepts will be discussed in more detail later.
• Card provisioning phase
– Card registration. This is a user-initiated, offline or online process in
which a user intends to receive a new card. This step includes the reg-
istration of fundamental personal data; in particular, an official (self-
asserted) photo, an identifier in the card provider’s system (such as a
random value, a pair of a name and a date of birth or a social security
number) and an address (physical or electronic).
85Alternatively, the systemcanbe set up in away that ABCproofs also support designated verification
(see Chapter 5).
86https://www.torproject.org [last accessed: October 26, 2014].
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– Card personalisation. The smart card is prepared for the user. This step
includes printing on the surface of the card and installing the required
software components on its chip. The user receives a notification to her
provided address that includes a temporary operational PIN.
– ID Proof. The card provider authenticates future card holder. This is a
physical process in which the prospective card holder has to be person-
ally present at the organisation and to prove her identity using her photo
and prescribed identity documents (e.g. , passport or driving licence) be-
longing to her.
– Vouching for identity. The first (root) credential is issued to the card. In
this process the user also has to enter the operational PIN received to
her address. With this credential the user can prove her identity later
(see details below and in Section 6.4).
– Card hand-over. If the entire procedure above succeeds, the card carries
all necessary personal information (photo, root credentials, etc.). The
card is bound to its holder both physically (photo) and digitally (PIN),
and so it can be handed over to the holder.
• Verification (i.e. authorisation)
– Access request. The user initiates communication with a verifier by re-
questing access to some resource. The verifier informs the user which
attributes need to be checked. The user gives her consent by presenting
her card to the system. Technically, the verifier’s certificate proves that
the verifier legitimately requests these attributes. The card can verify the
certificate and – if it is valid and the user has given her consent – reveal
the requested attributes.
– Proof of card possession. The user authenticates to the card87 to guaran-
tee that she is the legitimate card holder. In offline scenarios the photo
may be sufficient, in online scenarios the PIN is required.
– Disclosure of attributes. The card and the verifier perform an interactive
ABC selective disclosure proof. As a result, the verifier receives authentic
attributes about the user.
– Access decision and access. The verifier makes a decision based on the
received attributes and grants or denies access to the resource.
• Credential issuance
– Credential request. The user requests a new credential onto her ABC
card.
87The card is trusted by the user and all other parties, so this authentication guarantees privacy for
the user while provides assurance for issuers and verifiers. Colloquially, we can say that the IdP (issuer)
delegates its job to the card; cf. footnote 79.
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– Proof of card possession. See within the verification procedure above.
– Authorisation. The issuer verifies eligibility of the card holder for the
new credential by possibly using attributes from the card. (See a further
discussion about credential types based on authorisation on page 120.)
– Issuance. After authorisation, the issuer collects the necessary attributes
and issues a new credential to the user’s card according to the ABC pro-
tocol.
Clearly, the processes support a user-centric design for identitymanagement by
“giving the user full control of transactions involving her identity data” [BSCGS07].
Card provisioning is initiated by individuals. Therefore, users themselves decide to
participate in an ecosystem. Issuing procedures are initiated also by users when-
ever they need new or updated credentials. Finally, verification is initiated and
consented by the user.
6.3.3 Card and its owner – practical considerations
Since ABC cards provide a high degree of privacy and they work dynamically, sev-
eral new practical decisions have to be made when putting forth general recom-
mendations about an ABC ecosystem. In this section we explore three aspects of
the relation between the card and its holder: PINs, the outside of a card and the
card management software interface.
Only the card holder should be able to use her ABC card. In general, a PIN can
restrict access to a card by ensuring:
• confidentiality: to prevent unauthorised reading of private data, for instance,
after a card loss;
• user consent : to make sure that a card is only used when the card holder
agrees;
• authentication: the card is only usable by the card owner; in particular, some-
one else who obtains/finds a card cannot use it.
In general, the addition of new credentials to a card should be protected by a PIN
to guarantee consent and authentication. But when should revealing of attributes
be protected by a PIN? Although the “over 18” attribute seems fairly innocuous,
it should not be possible that a minor temporarily borrows an adult’s card to ob-
tain “over 18” items online. Hence, the age credential should be PIN-protected.
Attributes that give access to a parking or open an entrance may typically be not
PIN-protected, except for high-security facilities.
If some attributes or credentials require PIN-protection and others do not, the
question arises: Who decides about this? One option is to leave the decision to set
PIN-protection to the verifier’s card-reader terminal or the user. Another one, is to
follow some general policy, which seems to be more practical in terms of privacy,
118 6. An ABC Ecosystem
Figure 6.2: An example ABC card (within the IRMA project) showing minimal per-
sonal information.
security and usability. This policy should be set in general terms by the scheme
manager (see Section 6.5), and elaborated in detail with each credential issuer. For
instance, such a policy can be that ‘the use of a PIN is mandatory online and it is
described in the verifier’s certificate offline’.
An ABC card is primarily used as an enabler for privacy-friendly authorisation
online as well as offline. In online usage the outside of a card is irrelevant for the
issuer or the verifier. The only practical requirement is that the card owner should
recognise his own card (to prevent confusion). In offline scenarios, however, the
(human) verifier should be able to check that the person presenting a card is the
card holder. This is done using the holder’s photo on the front of the card. Besides
this picture, the verification of certain attributesmay be strengthened by requiring
the PIN to further improve security.
On the back of a card there is (general) information about how lost cards can
be returned. Additionally, there is a card-specific number. It can be used to search
for the card during card hand-over and to look up the owner of a lost-and-returned
card. The card number is a dangerous addition that could make it possible to trace
cards. Therefore, the card number is used only externally, and not internally, in the
chip. Figure 6.2 shows an example for such an ABC card.
Unlike smart cards used nowadays, the digital content of an ABC card can be
dynamic. Today I may only have an identity credential, but after issuing new cre-
dentials tomorrow, I can have several credentials and dozens of attributes on my
card. Since smart cards do not have a user interface, it is desirable to provide func-
tionality for users to see and manage their cards’ content. This is the goal of the
card management application which can be run on a PC, on a mobile phone or
on another device that has a (contact or contactless) card reader. This novel appli-
cation enables the user to administer her card privately. The application should
run on a trusted device (trusted to display information honestly and not to re-
veal/forward personal data to any third party) and be protected with a separate
(potentially longer administration) PIN.
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Figure 6.3: An example interface for the card management application in the IRMA
project. It shows the last few activities carried out by the card.
• Credential administration. A user can maintain all credentials on her card:
overviewof existing credentials, initiate credential update, delete expired cre-
dentials.
• Logs. A user can look at the last few events on her card and check that the card
was not abused. Such recorded events are the issuance of a credential and
each verification instance (with the identity of the verifier and the revealed
attributes); see Figure 6.3.
• Modifying PINs. The user can change both (operational and administration)
PINs. As the first use of the card management application, the holder should
change her system-generated PINs right after card provisioning.
6.4 Credential Design
An ABC card may contain over a dozen credentials, each with multiple attributes.
In a particular selective disclosure proof, any subset of attributes in a single cre-
dential may be revealed, without revealing the remaining attributes.
Within the context of the IRMA project at most four attributes are grouped to-
gether in a credential. The number four is chosen pragmatically, mainly for imple-
mentation reasons, but other reasons turn out to confirm this choice. On the one
hand, having many attributes in one credential means that if only one attribute is
revealed, all the others remain hidden. Hidingmore attributes requires more time,
and thus reduces the performance (see Section 3.4, page 59). On the other hand,
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the number four seems to be reasonable to form a coherent set of attributes, issued
jointly by a single authority.
All credentials are required to contain two fundamental attributes. First, each
user has amaster secret key, stored in the smart card’s secure storage, which is also
incorporated – technically, like an attribute – in all credentials. Second, an expiry
date has to be determined at issuance, and it is included as an attribute applying
to the whole credential. When the credential is verified, the expiry date can be
revealed to confirm validity.88
In the credential examples on page 111 we have seen that a card holder’s name
occurs in the Name credential (obviously!), but not in a medical staff or employee
credential. This may look strange at first. In principle, there could be multiple
name attributes, issued by different parties (like local authorities and Facebook).
Similarly, multiple accounts at different banks or different phone numbers can be
issued in separate credentials. It is the role of the schememanager to decide which
organisations are authoritative about a type of credential. Verifiers can then de-
cide which issuer they wish to trust for having attested to certain attributes. How-
ever, we propose as few attributes to be issued by multiple issuers as possible for
simplicity and efficiency. Private data should be kept accurate and up-to-date ac-
cording to the data quality principle [OEC80]. First, the quality is guaranteed most
likely by the most authoritative entity. Second, it is not straightforward to keep the
same piece of data up-to-date at different locations. In fact, so far we are excluding
any duplication of attributes (same content, different issuers). Although theoreti-
cally feasible, we think such attribute duplication makes credential administration
much more confusing for card owners (and possibly for verifiers too). This means
that for each possible attribute there must be a single most authoritative issuer.
Again, it is the role of the scheme manager to decide who is authoritative about
which set of attributes.
6.4.1 An Example Credential Dependency Graph
Aswe saw in Figure 3.1, credentials are containers of attributes signed by an author-
itative issuer. An issuing procedure requires some form of authentication to prove
that a specific card is entitled to hold a credential. This authentication can include
the verification of already existing credentials on the card. On the one hand, a so-
called root credential does not require the verification of other credentials from
the ABC card before it is issued. This process can be performed during card provi-
sioning or it can be initiated later by the user. In particular, root credentials are re-
quired when a user establishes a new identity, i.e. in a new context. Often this pro-
cess requires an out-of-band authentication (e.g. a citizen root credential requires a
physical verification of the user), while in other cases the process does not require
authentication (e.g. an online commercial service may not require verification in
order to issue a pseudonymous loyalty number). A dependent credential, on the
88For privacy reasons, the expiry date should be a coarse date, such as the last day of a month.
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Figure 6.4: An example for credential dependencies on an ABC card.
other hand, is issued only after verifying at least one other existing credential on the
ABC card. First a set of attributes (or possibly, the presence of a credential by using
an empty proof) on the card is verified, and then the new, dependent credential is
issued on the same card. (We note that the two protocols have to be performed in
the same session, i.e. in the same secure channel.) For instance, the issuing pro-
cedure of a ‘mobile phone number’ credential (described on page 112) results in
a typical dependent credential because the user’s ‘name’ and ‘date of birth’ are
verified from other credentials residing already on the card.
All credentials on a card can be depicted using these dependencies. Figure 6.4
shows an example for a simple dependency graph. In this example, there are two
root credentials. An ‘academia’ credential represents the card holder’s identity in
the national education system. A ‘student’ credential, for instance, relies only on
the ‘academia’ root. After a student proves that he or she has such a root credential
with the appropriate attributes of ‘institution’ and a unique ‘academia ID’, the
organisation can look up all relevant personal data in its database and issue the
‘student’ credential. Note that this issuing procedure requires identification since
a ‘student’ credential is bound to a specific person. Such a credential contains sim-
ilar personal information as a traditional student card.
A ‘citizen’ root credential can be issued after a personal, face-to-face identifica-
tion accompanied by a physical identity document authentication. This credential,
similarly to the ‘academia’ root, contains an identifier in the given identity con-
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text; this may or may not be identical to the social security number [OHF07]. This
root credential, issued by and often used within the government administration,
can also be utilised in a broader context. For instance, a ‘citizen identifier’ can be
used to retrieve attributes for an identity credential at the municipality, like those
of an identity card. A trusted service (such as the municipality itself or another
provider) can issue a ‘minimal junior’ credential after verifying the ‘date of birth
(DOB)’ attribute from the ‘identity’ credential. Strictly speaking, this procedure is
non-identifying if we stick to the data minimisation principle. In the example on
page 113, a ‘festival ticket’ is issued as a dependent credential relying on one or two
credentials. A possible restriction is that such tickets can only be sold to customers
‘over 12’, but in case a voucher for alcoholic consumption is also included, the
ticket issuer must check the ‘over 18’ attribute from the ‘minimal junior’ creden-
tial. Optionally, if the customer can prove that he is a bachelor or master student
(using the ‘level’ attribute from his ‘student’ credential), he can also get some dis-
count. Note that all verification (authentication and authorisation) and ticket issu-
ing can be carried out anonymously with the card’s participation.
We discussed the possibility of logging in with a credential, previously issued
by the website. In what follows, we take Facebook as an example in considerations
that apply to many other similar organisations.
Facebook – root credential or not? If a user signs up for Facebook, she chooses
the name that she likes (within certain technical/decency limits). Facebook has a
Real Name Policy89, but this policy is not enforced by some technical mechanism.
Many people like to use a pseudonym on Facebook and currently this is possible.
Now suppose Facebook wishes to join the project at hand and would use ABC
cards for authentication. The credential only needs to contain Facebook’s user ID.
An interesting question is: Should this be a root credential or not? This technical
question has wide societal relevance.
1. Peoplewho do not wish to use their real name onFacebook expect Facebook’s
credential to be root, not depending on any other ones.
2. Facebook, on the other hand, probably does not want to have a root creden-
tial: It would like to first verify the (real) name on the ABC card (and probably
more attributes), before issuing its own credential. In this way Facebook can
enforce its Real Name Policy.
89http://www.facebook.com/help/292517374180078: “We require everyone to provide their real
names [...] The name you use should be your real name as it would be listed on your credit card, student
ID, etc.” [last accessed: May 5, 2014]. Later Facebook has changed its policy as follows: “We require
people to provide the name they use in real life [...] The name you use should be your authentic iden-
tity; as your friends call you in real life and as our acceptable identification formswould show”, referring
to the options to “confirm your identity”; see https://www.facebook.com/help/159096464162185 [last
accessed: November 7, 2014]
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3. Currently, it is possible to register with another person’s name. Thus, to pre-
vent this type of identity theft, individuals may also be interested to enforce
the Real Name Policy.
6.4.2 Credential Design Principles
To summarise, we formulate five credential design principles that are meant as a
set of non-mandatory guidelines to help a scheme manager (see the next section)
or a community (see Section 6.5.4) to efficiently apply ABC cards.
1. Attributes in a credential form a coherent set.
2. All attributes in a credential fall under the responsibility of a single most au-
thoritative issuer.
3. Attribute duplication (same content, multiple issuers) is avoided.
4. Verifiers can read only a limited, predefined, proportionate (in terms of the
given context) set of attributes.
5. For efficiency reasons, credential design requiresminimising the average num-
ber of credentials in verification processes.
6.5 SchemeManager as the Defining Party
In order for an ecosystem to operate appropriately, a so-called scheme manager
takes care of governance. This involves regulations in a contractual and a techni-
cal manner. The scheme manager determines possibilities and operations in an
ecosystem although it does not take part in any of the operational steps. This sec-
tion provides an overview of the main functions of this governing entity, discusses
its power and proposes two different approaches to ecosystems in relation to the
schememanager.
6.5.1 Tasks
A scheme manager has a pivotal role in the operation and the possible success of
an ecosystem. The following list collects the main tasks of a schememanager:
• Initiation and implementation phase:
– To define the main goal(s) of the ecosystem. (For instance, it serves as a
national eID system or a loyalty card system.)
– To decide about the technology (credential carrier device (e.g. the type of
smart cards), ABC technology, cryptographic primitives (hash, signature,
encryption mechanisms), etc.
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– To determine the main types of use cases and to lay down main regula-
tory and organisational principles, for instance by publishing an ‘ecosys-
tem charter’.
• Maintenance phase:
– To design the card provisioning process and select a card provider.
– To design (or to accept the design of) new credentials, issuing processes
(e.g. , credential dependencies, identity proofing, etc.) and match them
to potential use cases.
– To certify issuers, which includes permission provisioning for the issuer
which credentials it is entitled to issue to cards.
– To certify verifiers (service providers), which includes permission pro-
visioning for the verifier which attributes it is entitled to request from
cards.
An informal description of certification processes (realising the last three steps
above) can look as follows:
• Issuer certificate.
– The issuer sends a request to the scheme manager for a credential de-
sign (see Section 6.4) describing the attributes that the credential would
contain, the reason why this particular issuer is the most authoritative
with regards to these attributes, the verification procedure that would
take place before issuance and arguments why the credential design is
in line with the general principles of the ABC ecosystem.
– The schememanager evaluates the request.
– If the request is approved, the issuer generates a fresh key90 for creden-
tial signatures that the scheme manager (or a delegated CA) certifies to-
gether with a description of the credential design.
• Verifier certificate.
– The verifier requests attribute access rights from the scheme manager
in relation to the authorisation type to a certain use case (e.g. to allow
a user to watch movies online if she is over one of the age limits [12,
16, 18] and she is a member of the service provider’s movie club). The
request should include particular attributes within credentials that the
verifier needs for this authorisation type and the verifier’s public key that
he would use in this application.
90Alternatively, the issuer re-uses an existing key which becomes certified also for this new creden-
tial.
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– The scheme manager evaluates the request whether it is in line with the
ecosystem charter and it is well-supported (e.g. proportionate) in the
context of this application.
– Upon approval, the scheme manager (or a delegated CA) issues a new
certificate containing the verifier’s public key, the identifier of the veri-
fier, a name of the application and the access right (or Att_Acc) that de-
scribes what attributes the verifier is allowed to request from ABC cards.
6.5.2 Power
It is obvious that a scheme manager has substantial power in an ecosystem. There
may often be conflicting interests between verifiers and users. Verifiers want to
know as much as possible about users, while users want to release as little infor-
mation as possible to get access to the verifiers’ services. Even though the scheme
manager does not participate in transactions, it decides by setting the rules.
User control is essential in a user-centric system, and so it is in an ABC ecosys-
tem. Thus users can initiate issuing and verification procedures, check what cre-
dentials and attributes verifiers request. Moreover, ABC cards support users by
checking the validity of issuers’ and verifiers’ certificates to ensure that they do not
abuse their power. Nevertheless, users act according to provided possibilities and
thus rely heavily on the scheme manager who can decide to limit or overuse at-
tributes on a system level. Users will most often choose to initiate processes when
they need to access a particular resource without a thorough check of the veri-
fier. Also, users tend not to be attentive in giving permissions to verifiers, such
as authorities and commercial organisations, when they request personal infor-
mation [AABL13]. Moreover, it is often the case that users do not have a choice in
picking a particular verifier or restricting their power. Therefore, a scheme man-
ager’s role is paramount in deciding about issuers and verifiers, and their rights.
A more elaborate discussion about the socio-technical and legal evaluation of an
ABC ecosystem is out of scope in this discussion; see our work for further de-
tails [KKAH14].
6.5.3 Principles
This section collects principles that limit the power of a scheme manager by mak-
ing its working as transparent as possible. We focus on independency, distribution
of power and openness.
We firmly believe that the schememanager should be set up and run as an inde-
pendent, non-profit and potentially distributed organisation. Since the whole pro-
cess in relation to attributes and credentials takes place using open standards (and
to a large extent even via open-source software), every organisation or individual
can use the same card for their own purpose. Therefore, there will be many par-
ticipants interested in issuing and using their own credentials if they can be based
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on other (reliable) attributes (cf. page 122): probably Facebook, Google, Microsoft
(Skype) and possibly also bookshops or supermarket chains. The schememanager
has the technical means (by issuing certificates to issuers and verifiers) to control
these processes. Should the scheme manager allow this, and on which grounds?
These decisions are political in nature, and they involve the identity fabric of our
society and also considerable commercial interest.
To be effective and transparent, an ecosystem has to be open about its oper-
ation. We recommend for a scheme manager to publish an ‘ecosystem charter’
when establishing the ecosystem to set up the basic rules. This document should
describe the main objectives of the ecosystem and its principles about selecting
members (issuers, verifiers) and defining their capabilities. It should act similarly
to a constitution, functioning as the fundament of the laws in a nation state. Such
a charter makes it easy to evaluate for issuers and verifiers whether to join. Infor-
mation about the operation, such as the identity of issuers and verifiers and their
permissions in terms of credentials and attributes, should also be public. In this
way users or user groups can assess this information and take actions should they
disagreed.
We put forth the general principles for an ABC ecosystem and all procedures
within it that ensure transparency for the system:
1. The scheme manager is an independent, nonprofit and possibly distributed
‘multi-stakeholder’.
2. The design of the whole system and the ecosystem charter are public. Open
standards and open-source codes are freely available.
3. The system’s security relies solely on the underlying technology and the secret
values (private keys and individual attributes).
4. Public-key certificates of issuers and verifiers are publicly accessible for veri-
fication.
5. The design of each credential is public (in particular, attribute names in a
credential, the issuer’s identity and the duration of validity).
6. The issuing procedure in relation to each credential is public (i.e. how the
authorisation is done before credential issuance); thus, implicitly, credential
dependencies are public.
The principles can be classified as the openness of metadata about the ecosystem
(1.–3.), the participants (4.) and the credentials (5.–6.).
6.5.4 An Alternative Ecosystem
It is hard to predict the future of attribute-based credentials. We collected possible
use cases, proposed an independent scheme manager and laid down principles.
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We tried to keep in mind convenience and intuitiveness to stimulate business and
governmental interest, while preserving the beneficial security and privacy features
of the ABC technology.
We foresee two approaches for the uptake of this technology. This chapter de-
scribed a top-down approach. Examples for such an ecosystem include a govern-
mental identity system, a public transport card, a health insurance card or a uni-
fied commercial loyalty system. In this approach the parties first set up a scheme
manager which in turn launches the ecosystem. In a bottom-up approach, on the
other hand, different organisations can decide to issue ABC cards that conform to
a certain industry standard. It allows arbitrary issuers and service providers to use
the platform. The public keys used in such a setup can be arranged in a PKI, or
even in a web of trust, and so all participants can verify certificates. In essence
in such a setup, a unique scheme manager is not present, rather small groups of
stakeholdersmay decide to create schememanagers of their own and use the open
platform to create more closed ABC subsystems (cf. Kapor’s quote; page 105). Mul-
tiple ABC ecosystems then may coexist on a single card. With its open standards
and alternative technical solutions, the World Wide Web is perhaps the most im-
portant example of a technology that has become widespread with a bottom-up
approach.
6.6 Functional Extensions
When an identity system is deployed, revocation and usability are of great impor-
tance. Revocation is crucial to build an identity infrastructure in which lost and
stolen cards should become unusable. And users should conveniently make use of
their ABC cards independently of their location. Without solving these problems,
the deployment of such an ecosystemwould not be possible or soon fail to become
widely used. We briefly discuss these two functions.
6.6.1 Revocation
Revocation of pubic-key certificates is usually done by black- or whitelists which
collect the identifiers of all revoked or non-revoked certificates, respectively. How-
ever, revocation in the context of Attribute-BasedCredentials (and often in privacy-
preserving applications in general [LEHS12]) is challenging because there are no
identifiers, and in fact, user transactions are unlinkable; see e.g. [CL01, CL02, BKMN10,
LKDDN11, HM13]. Moreover, in relation to ABC cards, where all the cryptographic
computation on the client’s side is carried out by a resource-limited smart card,
the challenge is even harder. Not only is it required to find the trade-off between
anonymity and revocation, but also the client side of the solution has to be efficient
enough to run on an ABC card.
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In this direction we have done research.91 Our proposal sets up an ABC ecosys-
tem model where the following assumption holds: The frequency of interactions
between users and particular verifiers can be estimated and given a lower bound.
For instance, users may want to authorise transactions at the national tax office on
a monthly basis, but do online shopping at web stores every day. To capture this
notion, we introduce verifier-specific epochs.
Confirmation of card’s validity (i.e. the card was not revoked) becomes a part of
the verification protocol. A one-way function92 is specified for the system and each
card stores a secret revocation value. The revocation authority keeps a blacklist,
that is, a list of the revoked revocation values. For each verifier the revocation au-
thority selects a random generator and creates an epoch-specific list of numbers.
Each number is a masked revocation value, computed by the one-way function
with the generator and a revocation value as input. The ABC verification process
gets slightly extended to enable revocation. When a card is used for authorisa-
tion, the verifier’s terminal sends not only the above-mentionedcertificatewith the
Att_Acc, but also another certificate signed by the revocation authority. Besides
other technical components, it contains the generator of the current epoch and
the validity period of the generator. The card then provides the effective attribute
proofs extended with a value computed by the one-way function with the given
generator and the secret revocation value as input. The card also proves, without
revealing any secret, that all the computation was performed honestly. The card,
not having an internal clock, keeps a time estimate based on the given validity pe-
riods of verified certificates. Having received the masked value and the proof from
the card, the verifier can look up this value in its epoch-specific list and decide
whether the card has been revoked or not.
Thismethodprovides security for the verifier andprivacy for the user. If a card is
revoked (i.e. it is on the blacklist of the revocation authority), it cannot avoid being
noticed and possibly withdrawn. But a card that is not revoked remains unlinkable
as long as it does not revisit the same verifier within the same epoch.
6.6.2 AMobile Phone as a Personal Card Reader
A smart card is often used with public card readers, such as a cash machine (ATM),
a point-of-sale (POS) terminal or an access point. This is also the case with an
ABC card. However, there are applications in which the user needs a personal card
reader. For instance, if she wants to use her card from home or wishes to manage
the card’s content. A card reader that is attached to a PC is an obvious choice, but
it is not always available, secure or convenient. Therefore, we propose the use of a
personal mobile phone that can act as a card reader communicating with an ABC
91Joint work with Jaap-Henk Hoepman, Wouter Lueks and Pim Vullers.
92A suitable one-way function can be the modular exponentiation in a DL group with a fixed gener-
ator; see Section 3.2.1.
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card through their contactless interfaces93. Since a mobile phone can access the
(remote) terminal of the verifier or issuer through the Internet, it can assist remote
ABC authorisation processes; see our papers [ABV12, AE13].
The same technology can also helpwith the cardmanagement; see Section 6.3.3.
By means of a mobile application, a user can review the content of the card and
manage all personal data on it; see an example in Figure 6.3 that shows a tablet
screenshot of an Android implementation. Of course, this software has to be pro-
tected by the user’s administration PIN to prevent illegitimate reading and modifi-
cation of the card.
By applying a personal mobile phone, users can access all identity services re-
lated to their ABC cards. They can authenticate to service providers to access ser-
vices and they can manage their identity attributes. In this way they become ‘loca-
tion independent’ as the 8th law of identity requires, see Section 2.5.1. First, mobile
internet access is already virtually ubiquitous and therefore users can access all on-
line services where they can use their ABC cards. They can also authenticate using
their phone and the personal ABC card while working on another computer, such
as a public PC in an internet café. Second, the cardmanagement interface provides
identitymanagement functions offline, including deleting obsolete credentials and
viewing all attributes on the card. So, users become independent of any external
identity services.
6.7 Other Attribute-Based Technologies
There is abundant work on identity management, privacy-enhancing technologies
and attribute-based credentials. In Chapter 2 we discussed the main problems in
open identity management. In this subsection we focus on attribute-based autho-
risation techniques, that is, other works in relation to attribute-based credentials
and attribute-based access control. We also discuss briefly the relations between
these other technologies and our work.
Attributes first appear as a central logical building block in the Attribute-Based
Credential technology [Bra00, ?]. Probably this also affected the then active role-
based access control paradigm [SCFY96] that could not satisfy the dynamic and
complex access control requirements on the Internet (e.g.web services). Attributes
as a generalisation of roles (or groups) have been proposed by [WWJ04, YT05].
93A detailed description of the technology and the protocols are out of scope here; see details in
[ABV12, AE13]. We remark that NFC-enabledmobile phones can communicate with the contactless in-
terface of the ABC card. The requirement that users have personal NFC-enabledphones is realistic since
these devices are already prevalent and becoming increasingly popular; see e.g. http://www.nfcworld.
com/2014/02/12/327790/two-three-phones-come-nfc-2018/ [last accessed: October 26, 2014].
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6.7.1 Attribute-Based Credentials
Since anonymous and attribute-based credentials [Bra00, CL01, ?, CL04] were de-
vised, much work has been done on possible extensions [CL02, LKDDN11, ABL12,
HM13], implementations [SGPV09, BCGS09, TJ09, MV11, VA13], improvements in
functionalities [CL02, CG08, CCGS10, ABL12, PAL13, AH13], applications [VLV+08,
ABV12, BGOZ12, ALP+12] and possible ABC infrastructures [CVH02, CSFH+05,
Bra10, Paq10, Cor11, IBM12, CKL+11, CDL+13, AJ13]. Academic research con-
siders Attribute-Based Credentials one of the most applicable privacy-enhancing
technologies and thus invests a lot of efforts to further improve and implement
them as well as design new applications and infrastructures based on them. How-
ever, in spite of Microsoft’s U-Prove94 and IBM’s Idemix95 open approach, ABCs
are not yet employed in practice. A recent project, the ABC4Trust [CKL+11] aims
to bridge the gap between the ready-made advanced technology and the lack of
interest, by building a common, technology-agnostic framework (i.e. swappable
U-Prove or Idemix cryptographic components) and demonstrating its usability
by pilot projects. In ABC4Trust’s view ABCs “will ultimately replace traditional
PKI” [SS13], that is, entities will be able to verify universally each other in accor-
dance with the data minimisation principle. Another approach to deploy ABCs
can be found within the FutureID project (see Section 6.7.3) that attempts to host
several identity technologies within one infrastructure. An ongoing joint effort be-
tween the FutureID and the IRMA96 projects is to incorporate also our approach in
this framework.
To embed ABCs in a wider context, credential-based access control [CMN+10]
is proposed. It is a general notion that includes role-based and attribute-based
access control as well as access control based on complex proofs using attribute-
based credentials. Camenisch et al. [CMN+10] propose a language, CARL, for de-
scribing requirements that verifiers can present and users have to satisfy with their
certificates or credentials. The language is agnostic about the underlying identity
management technology. The requirements can be satisfied with various tech-
nologies (such as, X.509, SAML, ABCs), and the transaction may or may not in-
clude an online identity provider. The abstract language CARL has been developed
within the European PrimeLife project, and later it has also been implemented in
the XACML access control language [OAS05] (using XML) within the ABC4Trust
project [CDL+13].
CARL is a possible choice for defining rules on the verifier’s side in an ABC
ecosystem. However, we propose first a more straightforward approach when At-
tribute-Based Credentials are introduced for a wide audience. This would help
business and governmental parties to develop simple use cases, and help users to
understand the benefits of using an ABC card in terms of simplicity, diverse ap-
94http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/u-prove/
95http://idemix.wordpress.com
96On IRMA’s behalf by Antonio de la Piedra and Jaap-Henk Hoepman
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plicability and, most importantly, privacy. Therefore, we propose to apply only a
subset of CARL without an XACML/XML implementation that is easy to interpret
also for smart cards. A potential approach is that the requirements for selective dis-
closure proofs are expressed as references to the types of credentials and attributes
that can be unique within an ecosystem.
6.7.2 Attribute-Based Access Control
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [WWJ04, YT05, VFK+14] defines a new and
flexible way to define and enforce access policies based on attributes. Attributes
are similarly defined as in this thesis but embrace a much bigger set. They can be-
long not only to a human being but also to a non-person entity. Furthermore, not
only the client side but also the resource and even the environment (context) have
attributes. ThemainmotivationbehindABAC is to simplify access control in an en-
terprise context that is first based on identities (like inmandatory and discretionary
access control). Later role-based access control [SCFY96] enabled the definition of
access policies independently of particular identities. So, first access control ab-
stracts away from identities to roles (groups), and later from roles to attributes.
Attributes generalise roles since attributes can describe roles but also many more
characteristics.
Claims-based identity management [BBB+11] is a successor of previous works
of Microsoft and Kim Cameron [Cam05, CJ07, BSB07]. It aims at developing effi-
cient enterprise IDM with flexible policy evaluation and federated identity man-
agement services (such as, single sign-on). Claims-based identity management is
closely related to ABAC, but the claims-based approach focusses much more on
identity (not only authorisation) and especially on federations of multiple realms.
As privacy is not a main concern, claims-based IDM does not satisfy the privacy
requirements that attribute-based identity management does. In particular, the
requirement of an offline IdP is violated as some attribute service (such as an Ac-
tive Directory service) is involved in each verification process. Moreover, this com-
ponent can also link these activities of the user, breaking the unlinkability require-
ments, because an identifying authentication is required in the same session. ABIdM
can be described as a special case of claims-based identity management in which
strict privacy restrictions apply.
6.7.3 Related European Projects
Besides ABC4Trust [CKL+11], there are important European projects that we dis-
cuss in relation to attribute-based identity management.
The new German eID (neuer Personalausweis), introduced in 2010, is a nation-
wide electronic identity system inwhich each citizenhas an identity card [PWVT12].
Several countries have introduced electronic identity cards, but the German eID is
the most advanced working identity card technology in terms of privacy. A card’s
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chip provides three functions: offline identification (ePass), authentication (eID)
and electronic signature (eSign). The eID function aims at secure and privacy-
friendly authentication online, which is relevant in the context of this thesis. Al-
though the underlying technology is different, there are similarities with an ABC
card. First of all, a card can be used for online authentication in a user-centric
way.97 All personal data is stored on the card and can be shown without having an
identity provider online. Second, the card verifies the validity of the verifier using
its certificate. Also, an end-to-end secure channel established between the ser-
vice provider’s server and the card’s chip and all subsequent communication flows
through it. Finally, the verifier’s certificate describes for the card what this service
provider is eligible to request and after the user’s consent (including a 6-digit PIN
to be entered by the user) the card sends the required information.
There are also important differences that we briefly discuss. In the German
model, chip authentication is not only used for setting up a secure channel, but also
to establish trust that all data released by such a card inherently originates from the
government administration. In terms of ABCs this means that the only attribute is-
suer is the government. Thismakes applicationsmuch less dynamic, because other
issuers cannot participate, unlike in an ABC ecosystem. Another consequence of
this technical approach is that attributes in the German model are sent unsigned,
and thus the security relies heavily on the smart card. Second, a German eID card
is enforced to create a (scope-specific) pseudonym for each transaction. This is not
the case in an ABC ecosystem where authentication does not necessarily include a
pseudonym, it is just an option (cf. Idemix’ pseudonyms [IBM12]). Third, there is
no card management application that would enable a citizen to manage his per-
sonal information stored on his card. The main reason for this is that certificate
verification is enforced on the card before every information release instance and
only service providers, not clients, can get such certificates. [PWVT12] Finally, revo-
cation in theGermanmodel is based onanumber distributed to a batchof cards for
privacy reasons; see more detail in Section 4.6.2 on page 84. This excludes the pos-
sibility to identify specific cards. If a card has to be revoked, this number is placed
on a revocation list, and the whole batch needs to be withdrawn. Clearly, this is not
practical. Revocation techniques described in [LKDDN11] and the new approach
described in Section 6.6.1 show that any card can be revoked in a privacy-friendly
way in an ABC ecosystem.
FIDIS (Future of Identity in the Information Society)98, having run from 2004
to 2009, was a network of excellence project entailing a lot of interdisciplinary re-
search effort in relation to identity. The result of the project is over 120 deliverables
that include surveys of current technologies, collections of best practices, propos-
als to research andmanagement approaches, notes onworkshops organised by the
97Applications where citizens can use their eID card for authentication purposes are available here:
http://www.personalausweisportal.de/EN/Citizens/Applications/applications_node.html [last
accessed: October 26, 2014]. Apparently, most of these services are identifying.
98http://www.fidis.net, [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
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project, proposals for new techniques, collections of use cases, studies on current
practices and policies. Since it covers so many aspects of identity, technology and
privacy, FIDIS is relevant in relation to an ABC ecosystem. However, FIDIS does
not aim to provide a concrete technology that would provide privacy-friendly au-
thentication comparable to an ABC card or an ABC ecosystem. It does reflect the
state of identitymanagement and related research. ABIdM is strongly related to the
following FIDIS topics: Privacy and the legal-social content of identity; HighTech
ID; Mobility and Identity. What FIDIS recommends for follow-up work is to design
and implement a reference architecture and to apply it in important contexts, such
as eGovernment, eHealth andmobility [RR09]. Our proposal for an ABC ecosystem
is a big step in this direction although it is not concerned about interoperability,
federations and complex policies. However, for a well-definedapplication environ-
ment – even if it is so broad as a national government administration – users can
manage their identity attributes in a “privacy-aware” manner. The clear notions in
ABIdM and its transparency principles (credential design, scheme manager) help
identity and service providers as well as users accept this new technology and let
this PET get deployed – much in the spirit of FIDIS’ results.
STORK (Secure idenTity acrOss boRders linKed)99 is a technical project that
aims to provide a cross-border, interoperable identity service in which citizens can
use services using their national electronic identity all over Europe. Potentially,
STORK would have a direct relation with our project if a European member state
chose to deploy an ABC ecosystem as its national electronic identity. In this case
further efforts have to be made towards interoperability with the STORK frame-
work. This includes technical and possibly legal work as well as analysis and risk as-
sessment considering all the relevant issuing processes that in the national ecosys-
tem take place. Conceivably, the interconnection can happen through the Fu-
tureID project (see below).
Furthermore, STORK defined four Quality Authentication Assurance (QAA) lev-
els for identification and authentication systems. A thorough analysis is important
to carry out in practice with respect to a particular ABC ecosystem. Nevertheless,
in principle, authentication in an ABC ecosystem can achieve the highest QAA level
(i.e. Level 4). This is because of the card and identity provision processes, the pro-
tection of authentication against themost important attacks (guessing, eavesdrop-
ping, hijacking, replay and man-in-the-middle) and the robustness and security of
ABC card authentication.
The FutureID100 project, running from November, 2012 to October, 2015, is a
technical project that aims to build an infrastructure that enables authentication
throughout Europe independently of the local identitymanagement systems. Thus,
it has an umbrella role overmost of the eID systems, including STORK. For all three
types of participants, i.e. IdPs, SP and users, FutureIDmakes it easy to connect with
each other. More specifically, identity providers can connect through an interface
99https://www.eid-stork.eu and https://www.eid-stork2.eu [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
100http://www.futureid.eu [last accessed: October 26, 2014]
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by any standard federation technologies and service providers do not even need
to change their current configuration. FutureID intends to incorporate clients of
legacy as well as cutting-edge technologies, including Attribute-Based Credentials.
In fact, FutureID and the IRMA project are currently cooperating to create an in-
terface that enables ABC cards to communicate with the FutureID platform. As a
result, an ABC ecosystem will have an interface and credentials can be issued and
verified using the cards.
6.8 Discussion
In this chapter we described attribute-based identity management and realised it
by using an ABC card, i.e. a full-fledged smart-card implementation of the client
side of Attribute-Based Credentials. In this setup users and service providers be-
come independent of actively participating identity providers and any additional
user devices.
An ABC ecosystem is a new type of federated system, in which all participants
rely on the regulating power of the schememanager. Each user has an ABC card on
which she can collect Attribute-Based Credentials from several identity providers
(issuers), and she canproportionately showattributes from them to service providers
(verifiers) in various contexts. A scheme manager determines the set of attributes
to be revealed specified for each type of resource access. Cards are willing to per-
form ABC protocols only with legitimate terminals, which is enforced by verifier
certificates.
An ABC ecosystem makes it easy for users to understand what personal infor-
mation they disclose about themselves in a particular situation. But there is amore
immediate benefit of our approach (a card implementation, simple attributes, pre-
defined authorisation, etc.). As a research project investigating this technology,
IRMA showed that it also simplifies comprehension of ABCs for decision-makers
in the identity realm. They understand that with the current and upcoming Euro-
pean regulation, ABCs provide a clear way for electronic authentication to comply
with the legal framework in terms of processing personal data.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
“But it was all right, everything was
all right, the struggle was finished.
He had won the victory over
himself.”
George Orwell, 1984
This thesis indicates a new and practical approach to the use of attribute-basedcredentials. It develops the concept of attribute-based identity management
(ABIdM) – having its root in security and privacy requirements as well as in an effi-
cient smart-card implementation of ABCs. Authentic attributes, originating from a
trusted party about a data subject, enable relying parties to make access decisions
to their resources.
In this work we propose to modify the role of identity providers without the
need to change the way how identity information is stored at IdPs: They are not
involved directly in the authorisation processes. And still, the attributes that users
submit to relying parties are up-to-date and authentically related to the users. The
identitymanagement, called attribute-based identitymanagement, based on these
processes, results in
• reliable data for the service providers (verified, up-to-date and signed data by
the identity provider);
• less burden on the identity providers (no required presence at each authenti-
cation process); and
• more privacy for the user (no traceability and no dependence on third par-
ties).
Additionally, a user can view all her identity information. The user can easily check
attributes and credentials, stored on her personal ABC card, independently of any
third parties. Concretely, a card management application is proposed for this pur-
pose.
An ABC ecosystem can provide real privacy to users in various contexts. First
of all, it makes it impossible for IdPs and RPs to link a user’s activities when she
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needs only non-identifying attributes for accessing services. By this, users can re-
main anonymous when identification is not required in a scenario. Second, it also
prevents IdPs to sign in on behalf of the user unlike in traditional identity manage-
ment systems. By this, users can remain in control with regard to their personal
data.
Some further technical problems are yet to be solved with regard to the deploy-
ment of attribute-based identitymanagement, it can certainly be solved in the near
future. First, the security level of the described smart-card implementation is about
80 bits (corresponding to a 1024-bit RSA key). However, this is not considered to be
secure enough currently, so it would be desirable to increase it. A later generation
of MULTOS cards, having bigger RAM, will probably be able to support a modified
implementation of a higher security level. And second, revocation is still hard in
the context of attribute-based credentials. Privacy, efficiency and security are hard
to align, especially on a restricted infrastructure (e.g. no internet connection) and
limited client’s devices (slow, little computational capabilities, small memory, etc.).
The revocation technique, described in Section 6.6.1, is a promising way to solve
this problem.
In spite of the above-mentioned technical challenges, ABIdM is becoming prac-
tical for various applications by the use of secure personal devices, such as smart
cards. In principle, high levels of security can be achieved coupled with such pri-
vacy guarantees that no other authentication technology can achieve. Therefore, it
would be desirable to put this technology in practice. We recognise that this pro-
cess comprises several important steps: changing business models; raising aware-
ness; creating standards and best practices; and carrying out projects that bring
academic studies closer to real-life applications.
To conclude, in Section 7.1 we collect possible research directions and in Sec-
tion 7.2 we discuss problems that ABIdM solves with respect to the recommenda-
tions put forward in Chapter 2.
7.1 Future Research
For further research in the context of digital identity we collectedmany open issues
in the recommendation paragraphs in Chapter 2 and in Section 2.6. Belowwe offer
additional open questions.
Resources, as we discussed them in Section 2.2.2, can be classified by rivalry
and durability. Further study would be required with regards to ABC cards being
used for accessing different kinds of resources.
As we discussed in Chapter 2, we distinguish federated identity management
from non-federated IDM based on the fact whether identities are shared across
multiple domains or not. Federated IDM typically involves multiple identity
providers and a Directory Service, which acts as a hub among them. In the web
of social networks the setup becomesmore complex; while traditionally a user has
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a primary IdP, this is not the case anymore. RPs offer users the possibility to se-
lect from several social networks an IdP to access the RP’s service. Users have often
more than one choice which of their identities (e.g. , Google’s, Facebook’s) to use
because they have multiple accounts. In the near future this choice may become
harder as customers will have an increasing number of identities, via multiple de-
vices, and they access more and more services. Further research is required to dis-
cover what security, privacy and usability consequences this new challenge means
for people, what the most optimal choice is and how they can find that particular
one in a usable way.
Location independence is a new and essential requirement proposed in Chap-
ter 2. Users should be able to maintain and use their identities independently of
the platform they are operating with. Currently, social identity providers (such as,
Google, Apple or Facebook) give the possibility for a user to act relying only on
some Internet access and a personal account. Note however that this service satis-
fies only half of the location independence requirement as it violates users’ privacy:
the identity provider can trace the user and all her activities. ABIdM provides ap-
propriate procedures that allow the users tomanage their identities independently
of a central IdP and they to authenticate at RPs without involving IdPs in the ac-
tual communication. Mainly non-technical research and innovation are required
to bridge the gap between this technology and practical deployment in the social
context. Finding viable solutions probably requires to re-design business models,
to introduce new policies and to raise awareness amongst users and business own-
ers about potential benefits of ABIdM.
Further research is required to analyse to what extent can a designated verifier
proof be a substitute for a secure channel. This research includes the analysis of
many aspects. (1) Efficiency: Establishing a secure channel may involve the use of
public-key cryptography, but confidentiality and authenticity of messages rely on
efficient symmetric-key primitives. Designated verifier proofs, however, extended
zero-knowledgeproofs that perform purely especially on resource-constrained de-
vices. (2) Security model: Since the two techniques are very different in nature, it is
required to take particular attention when comparing their security. (3) Function-
ality: A secure channel provides flexibility with regard to messages that it conveys,
while designated verifier proofs are muchmore rigid in structure.
A possible research project can define the achievable QAA levels (see page 133)
using ABC cards. This certainly depends not only the cryptographic and imple-
mentation parameters, but also organisational, infrastructural and contextual de-
cisions within an ABC ecosystem.
7.2 Discussion
Finally, we discuss the main benefits of an ABC ecosystem that ameliorate the cur-
rent identity crisis. An ABC ecosystem (Chapter 6) is an (attribute-based) identity
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management system, and as such, we can discuss whether it implements recom-
mendations we put forward in Chapter 2.
• Dynamic identity. An ABC card provides the possibility for users to collect
their attributes from several issuers. Credentials and sets of credentials can
be considered as partial identities of the user that can be issued and shown
under the user’s control. In diverse contexts users can show different yet
authentic attributes about themselves to verifiers. Nevertheless, because of
technical limitations on the speed of issuance and verification, an ABC card
is not yet suitable for applications in which very short-lived identities and to-
kens are required, such as public digital transport tickets, electronic wallet
functions, etc.
• Phishing attacks. There are two important technical measures in an ABC
ecosystem that prevent phishing attacks. First, there is no digitally con-
veyed secret, like a password, that can be stolen. A user (or her card) sends
only zero-knowledge proofs as authentication of attributes, which cannot be
reused by an adversary. Second, IdPs and RPs have to authenticate to the card
before they can communicate with it. Thus, mutual authentication is man-
dated. The technique does not require additional user interaction.
• User privacy. ABIdM inherits all privacy properties defined at ABCs; see Sec-
tion 3.3 onpage 52. Therefore, users need to reveal only theminimumamount
of personal information for a given service and this happens without inter-
acting with IdPs (credential issuers). Moreover, although users have to rely
on the scheme manager that authentication instances happen in the most
privacy-friendlyway, they can still practice control by reviewing the requested
attributes and giving their consent before actual data disclosure.
• Location Independence. Having an ABC card, users can make use of all fea-
tures that the ABC ecosystem provides, and they can interact with identity
and service providerswithout having to rely on their location or devices. Thus,
the system satisfies the 8th Law of Identity, about Location Independence
(see page 34).
• Determine minimal role automatically. In an ABC ecosystem the scheme
manager is responsible to decide about the minimal amount of revealed at-
tributes that users need for accessing a given resource. Relying on these de-
cisions, this requirement is satisfied from the user’s point of view when the
actual authentication occurs.
• Federation and user control. An ABC ecosystem can be considered as a spe-
cial type of user-centric federation, in which several issuers provide attributes
that can be used for authorisation purposes in multiple organisational do-
mains (at verifiers). However, SSO is not provided since sessions are intrinsi-
cally unrelated.
7.2. Discussion 139
Security and privacy are historically trade-offs in the digital world. The more it
is known what users are doing, the more secure the system is often considered to
be – and in turn, the less privacy the users have. But this compromise is not a fun-
damental law that systems are bound to comply with. Rather it is a technical legacy
that we are conditioned to live with. PETs are demonstrating that security and
privacy can exist simultaneously, and in fact, they can even reinforce each other.
ABCs, their smart-card implementation and an ABC ecosystem, for instance, de-
crease the necessity of storing a lot of personal data at various parties, and by this,
it increases the security of the overall system. Additionally, it gives users control
over the disclosure of their personal information and ultimately, it enhances trust
in the technology and achieves a higher level of acceptance.
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